The history and nature of international relations

THE HISTORY AND NATURE

of
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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THE HISTORY AND NATURE

of
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by

Edmund A* \Calsh, S.J., Ph.D.,

Regent, School of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University

Contributors

Stephen P. Duggan
Michael I. Rostovtseff
Carlton J. H. Hayes
James Brown Scott
James Lawrence Laughlin

John Bassett Moore
Esteban Gil Borges
Leo S. Rowe
Paul S. Reinsch
Edwin M. Borchard

97.3-

fork
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1922

All rights reserved

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COPYRIGHT, 1922,
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Set up and printed. Published January, 1922.

FERRIS PRINTING COMPANY
NEW YORK

To

Constantine E. McGuire, Ph.D.

With respect and appreciation

PREFACE

In order to afford the students of the School of Foreign
Service of Georgetown University an opportunity to
supplement and illustrate their classroom work by a rapid
survey of the principal phases in the history of relations
between sovereign states from the earliest antiquity down
to our own times, the authorities of the School have un-
dertaken to invite, each year, a number o>f distinguished
scholars, each a master in his respective field, to deliver
a special course of lectures on international relations.
The first fifteen of these lectures articulated into an
organic whole and entitled "The History and Nature of
International Relations," were delivered in the Auditori-
um of the National Museum, Washington, D. C, and
were open to the general public. The presence, in grati-
fying numbers, of the general public on alternate Friday
evenings during the winter and spring of 19201921
furnished abundant proof of the growing interest now
being manifested by thoughtful Americans as well in
theories of Political Science as in the actual conduct of
our foreign relations.

The present volume reproduces such of the lectures
as have been judged likely to prove of permanent value
both for students of the School of Foreign Service and
for general readers seeking authoritative guidance
through the tangled maze of world politics.

Whether or not it is because the centre of political
gravity in international affairs is to be found near, if not
conterminous with the centre of financial gravity, it is
beyond dispute that the Capital of the United States, at
the present time, has become the focal point of interest
for the civilized world. It was, therefore, never more
imperative than at the present juncture to foster scientific
study of the principles and practice of international re-

PREFACE

lations and even of such preambles of the science of
government as a right understanding of the origin of civil
society and its first postulate, authority, since foreign
policies will naturally be largely influenced by the phi-
losophy underlying the decisions of those who direct the
destinies of states.

The gunfire of an irresponsible fanatic at Sarajevo,
seven years ago, unloosened elemental forces that not
only swept crowns and thrones into the discard but tore
the veil of respectability from a certain type of imported
philosophy extremely popular in American universities,
during the last two generations, but not professed so con-
fidently since August, 1914. The "scrap-of-paper" so-
lution of embarrassing difficulties arising out of inter-
national obligations is a logical through brutally ex-
pressed corollary of the metaphysics that would substitute
expediency and the pragmatic sanction for the ethical
basis of jurisprudence.

It is hoped that the present volume will clear a satis-
factory approach to the detailed studies of the various
aspects of international relations which this series will
present from time to time.

In conclusion, the Editor begs to express to the Regents
of the Smithsonian Institution the thanks of the author-
ities of the School of Foreign Service for the use of the
Auditorium of the National Museum; acknowledgment
of great indebtedness is likewise made to Dr. Constantine
E. McGuire of the Inter-American High Commission for
his untiring labors in arranging the details of the course,
—to Dr. J. Franklin Jameson, Department of Historical
Research of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, for
his gracious words of introduction on the occasion of the
first lecture, and to Mr. Thomas H. Healy, Secretary of
the School of Foreign Service, into whose capable hands
was entrusted the important but thankless task of cor-
recting the proofs of this publication.
August 8, 1921.

EDMUND A. WALSH

CONTENTS

THE FUNDAMENTALS
IN A SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Stephen P. Duggan, Ph.D.

The College of the City of New York

Director of the Institute of International Relations

1. Nature of Diplomacy 1

2. History of Diplomacy 4

3. The Agents of Diplomacy 9

4. Legislative Intervention in the Conduct of Inter-

national Relations 13

5. Methods of Diplomacy 21

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE
ANCIENT WORLD

by

Professor Michael I. Rostovtseff, Ph.D., D.Litt. (Oxon), of
the University of Wisconsin, formerly of the University of
Petrograd ; Member of the Russan Academy of Sciences and
Corresponding Member of the British Academy.

1. Source Material and Method of Approach 31

2. Ancient and Modern View of War 35

3. Means of Preserving Peace in Antiquity. The

Balance of Power 37

4. Ancient Treaties 40

5. Religion as an Influence in International Relations 45

6. Peace by Arbitration in the Ancient World 49

7. Diplomatic Agents in Antiquity 51

8. Conflict between Right and Force 55

9. Period of Constant Flux 57

10. The Roman Theory of International Relations 61

CONTENTS

MEDIEVAL DIPLOMACY

by

Professo Carlton J. H. Hayes, Ph.D.
of Columbia University

1. The Medieval Heritage 69

2. Medieval Churchmen and International Law. ..... .74

3. The Truce of God, Chivalry, Papal Ambassadors. . . 77

4. The Catholic Ideal of Universal Peace 81

5. Evolution of Professional Diplomacy 85

DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMACY
IN MODERN TIMES

by

Hon. James Brown Scott, A.M., .U.D., LL.D.

Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

1. Popular Concept of Diplomats and Diplomacy 93

2. True Functions of Diplomats and Diplomacy 95

3. The Modern State System and the Law of States. . 96

4. The Balance of Power, Its Nature and Application 99

5. The Balance of Power in Modern Times, The Holy

Alliance 107

6. The Content of Modern Diplomacy 110

7. Arbitration, Definition and Historical Application. . 112

8. International Conferences — The Ideal of Simon

Bolivar 116

9. The Hague Conferences 120

10. The United States as an Exemplification of Inter-
national Organization 124

CONTENTS

ECONOMIC FACTORS
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Professor James Laurenc Laughlin, Ph.D. (Harvard), Ph D.
(honoris causa, Geissen), formerly of the University of
Chicago; Director of the Journal of Political Economy.

1. Economics and Politics 133

2. Movements of Population 135

3. Foreign Trade and Shipping 138

4. Economic Postulates of Foreign Trade 141

5. Foreign Exchange 145

6. Financial and Industrial Obstacles to International

Peace.. 148

SPECIFIC AGENCIES FOR THE

PROPER CONDUCT
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Hon. John Bassett Moore, LL.D., Professor at Columbia
University; formerly Counsellor of the Department of
State; Member of the Permanent Court of The Hague;
Vice-President of the Inter- American High Commission;
Member of the International Commission of Jurists; Presi-
dent of the Pan-American Society of the United States.

1. Amicable Methods — Negotiations — Good Offices —

Mediation — Arbitration 157

2. Non-Amicable Methods. Non-Forcible, Rupture of

Diplomatic Relations. Forcible, Reprisals — Pa-
cific Blockade, War — Limited War — General
War.. 167

CONTENTS

THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW

by

The Honorable Esteban Gil Borges, LL.D. (Georgetown)
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Venezuela

1. The Evolution of International Private Law. . ,185

LATIN AMERICA AS A
FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Hon. Leo S. Rowe, Ph.D.,LL.D., Director General of the Pan-
American Union; President . f the American Academy of
Political and Social Sciences.

1. The Philosophy of American History 203

2. Latin American Ideals — Bolivar 205

3. Sources of Po ten tiaMnfluence for American States . 208

4. Pan-American Co-operation 210

5. The Role of the Americas . . .212

THE FAR EAST AS A
FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

by

Hon. Paul S. Reinsch, Ph.D., LL.D., former Minister of the
United States to China

1. China before contact with Western civilization. . . . 219

2. Present-day China 220

3. Relations between China and Japan during and after

the World War 223

4. China, Japan and Siberia 225

CONTENTS

THE UNITED STATES AS A FACTOR IN TIIK
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Professor Edwin M. Borchard, LL.B., Ph.D.,
of the Law School of Yale University

1. The Genesis of American Foreign Policy

2. Nature of Early American Policy 234

3. Monroe Doctrine 235

4. Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine 240

5. Foreign Views on the Monroe Doctrine 244

6. Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine 248

7. The Monroe Doctrine and the Far East 251

8. indirect Influence of the United States on World

Politics, Neutrality — Recognition — Freedom of
the Seas — Minor Doctrines, Contributions and

Policies 258

Appendix 295

The Fundamentals in a Scientific
Study of International Relations

THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER I.

THE FUNDAMENTALS IN A SCIENTIFIC STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The reputations not only of individuals but also of
professions have suffered as a result of the Great War.
Probably no profession has fallen more in public esteem
than diplomacy. The accusations against the diplomatist
range from mere stupidity in not foreseeing what the
course of events would be, to deliberate intrigue in bring-
ing about the course of events. Practically every aspect
of diplomacy, its aims, methods, policies, and agents have
been condemned. No course, therefore, on the History
and Nature of International Relations would be complete
without an attempt to discover how modern diplomacy
originated, of what its essential nature consists, whether
its methods are calculated to realize its aims, how far its
agents can be held responsible for results and whether its
defects are so obvious as to suggest proper methods of
reform. It would be futile to try to make an exhaustive
analysis of the subject in a single paper. This chapter,
therefore, will consider briefly certain elements only
which a scientific study should include and the criteria
which a serious student should employ.

I

NATURE OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy is "the art of managing the intercourse and
adjusting the relations between states by negotiation" It

1

2 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

is usually studied as the handmaid of international law,
but it is in greater conformity to the facts of history to
state that international law is the resultant of the working
of diplomacy. Were international law to' be entirely swept
away, diplomacy would still survive, for states must needs
have relations with one another. The attitude adopted by
one state to< another or to others during negotiations is
determined primarily by self-interest. It is the duty of
the diplomatist always to keep the security and dignity of
his state in the forefront of negotiations and to enable it to
attain legitimate ambitions by every justifiable means.
If a state has a settled national policy in foreign affairs his
activities must look to the maintenance of that national
policy. During practically the entire nineteenth century,
the British government had as the cornerstone of its
foreign policy the maintenance of the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire. A British diplomat who, however
much he might disapprove the actions of the Ottoman
government, failed to uphold that policy would have soon
been rejected by government, Parliament and people.
Similarly no place can be found in the American diplo^-
matic service for an official who neglects to maintain the
integrity of the Monroe Doctrine. The diplomatist labors
under the consciousness that every foreign diplomat with
whom he negotiates, labors with an aim in view similar
to his own. The diplomatist works, moreover, in a field
where the unforeseen may modify conditions at any
moment, but he is nevertheless held responsible for results.
He is not a free agent. If he is a representative of
his country abroad, his actions and decisions may be
influenced and even determined by telegraphic orders
from home, however much against his will. If he is in
the Foreign Office at home, he works in the knowledge
that he must carry the legislature or its Committee on
Foreign Affairs with him when he is part of a parlia-
mentary regime, or carry the Senate with him if he is
part of the American system. This may compel him to

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3

follow a policy and agree to decisions for which he
personally has no liking.

"Open diplomacy" is one of the reforms most loudly
demanded today. The complaint is made that diplo-
matists bring negotiations to a conclusion without keeping
the public informed or without consulting the representa-
tives of the people who, they say, have little to do with
the conduct of foreign policy except to ratify whatever
decisions are placed before them. Such criticism neglects
to take into consideration the fact that in foreign affairs
one country is dealing with matters that do not concern
itself alone. It frequently deals with secrets which it
must share with other countries. A premature disclosure
might result in the breaking off of negotiations altogether
by another power, for that other power may follow
methods wholly at variance with freedom O'f discussion
and unrestrained publicity. Diplomatic negotiations,
moreover, are frequently of a delicate nature, involving
national predilections which cannot be overlooked. To
attempt to discuss everything in public would often offend
national pride, arouse international antagonisms and
render impossible the give-and-take so necessary to the
successful conclusions of negotiations, for both sides
have rights to guard and national points of view to real-
ize. A wise diplomat may render during negotiations
the greatest service to the public interest by ignoring
popular clamor for full information even when voiced
in the legislature. Lord Lyons did much to solve a seri-
ous situation when he deliberately and courageously re-
frained from giving any opinion of his own in the Trent
affair.

Then, too, it must not be forgotten that in many cases
diplomatic negotiations have to do with subjects a knowl-
edge of whose technical details requires special informa-
tion or which would have little interest for the general
public, or in which many sources of valuable information
would dry up entirely were publicity given to them. It

4 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

is certainly true that a ministry which neglects to obtain
the support of public opinion whenever possible loses an
immense force in securing the adoption of its foreign pol-
icy. The real statesman is he who will constantly seek
to instruct public opinion in his international policy so
as to carry it with him in time of crisis. Recent events
have shown how readily public opinion will respond to
the activities of the propagandist in such times. States-
men and diplomatists are at least partially informed on
international affairs. There would be little profit in turn-
ing from them to an ill informed public opinion for leader-
ship. Moreover, it is a question whether popular assem-
blies are more likely to keep the peace than statesmen
and diplomatists, especially when laboring under the
stress of nationalist excitement. It did not prove so in
the United States at the time of the Spanish War. It is
a question, therefore, whether even on the grounds of
theory, "open diplomacy" in the extreme sense would af-
fect the conduct of international affairs for the better.
Finally, as will be considered at greater length later in
this chapter, most governmental systems of today afford
the representatives of the people fair opportunity if they
wish to use it, to see to it that the international relations
of the country are carried on not only to advance the
national interests but in accordance with good faith and
honorable conduct.1

II

HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy was originally the servant of war when war
was the normal state of international intercourse. It
was an agency to secure without fighting the ends for
which war was waged. Today the positions are re-

*No student of diplomacy should fail to study carefully the discus-
sions on publicity in the conduct of foreign policy as found in Han-
sard's Parliamentary Debates passim and in the Report from the Select
Committee on the Diplomatic Service, 1861. The latter is an invaluable
statement.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 5

versed, and war, when it takes place, is the outcome of
diplomacy. The present status of diplomacy is the result
of an evolution in which is discernible a movement away
from a condition in which falsehood, chicane, and exces-
sive formalism prevailed in international relations, to one
characterized by honorable conduct among the negotia-
tors, and by business methods in procedure. Diplomacy
is one of the products of the Renaissance. Intercourse
between nations existed, of course, from time immemo-
rial; but diplomacy, as defined in this paper, viz.: "The
art of managing the intercourse and adjusting the rela-
tions betiveen states by negotiations'' dates from the rise
of permanent embassies. Feudalism had little place for
diplomacy, but the Italy of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries anticipated, in miniature, Europe of the nine-
teenth century. Intense rivalry existed between the little
states into which northern and central Italy were divi-
ded, and for self-preservation alliances and ententes were
necessary to maintain the balance of power. This object
could not be accomplished by temporary embassies, such
as those of the middle ages, which were sent to accom-
plish some specific purpose and were disbanded immedi-
ately afterward. Permanent representatives were neces-
sary who were to be "the eyes and ears" of their states
at the foreign courts. Of all these early Italian states
Venice had most at stake and it was natural that she
should first establish permanent embassies and develop
a professional diplomatic class. Her example was fol-
lowed in course of time not only by all the Italian states
but by the national states that slowly developed in west-
ern Europe such as Spain, France and England, and by
the Empire. The permanent embassy had become the
normal agency of international intercourse by the middle
of the sixteenth century. But it was looked upon as a
necessary evil, the home government trusting its repre-
sentative abroad none too much and the government to
which he was sent viewing him with extreme suspicion.
At first, Venetian ambassadors were sent for short terms

6 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

of three or four months, and the term was only gradu-
ally lengthened to three years, at which it remained until
the Republic was abolished by Napoleon. Moreover,
from the very founding of the permanent embassy Venice
laid down rules to be followed by its ambassadors abroad
and required them to make comprehensive reports to the
Senate of their observations and activities.1

The suspicion with which foreign ambassadors were
viewed at first is well illustrated by the practice of the
three great monarchs of the Renaissance, Charles V,
Francis I and Henry VIII of interpreting the phrase
"ambassador near the court" to keep ambassadors as far
as possible away from the court. Nor did these mon-
archs scruple to open and examine the correspondence of
foreign ambassadors. The diplomatist, it must be admit-
ted, had early earned a bad reputation, but it is ques-
tionable how justifiably. The prudent suggestions made
by Machiavelli in The Prince for the guidance of states-
men accurately reflected the spirit of the times though
they frequently were much overstepped in actual prac-
tice by ambassadors. Sir Henry Wotton's definition of
an ambassador, "an honest man sent to lie abroad for
the good of his country" is fairly descriptive of the atti-
tude of his day, that of James I. The Father of Inter-
national Law, Grotius,2 whose great work De Jure Belli
ac Pads was published in 1625, viewed the permanent
ambassador with scant sympathy and maintained that he
had no right of existence. The growth in the impor-
tance of the office, however, is well illustrated by the
statement of Vattel whose La Droit des Gens was pub-
lished in 1758, that, though there is no obligation on the
part of a sovereign to accept a permanent ambassador

1The fifteen volumes into which these reports have been collected
provide invaluable material for the student who can read Italian and
is interested in the history of the states of Western Europe.

'For discussion of Grotius' place in International Law, see Ap-
pendix.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 7

it is necessary as a matter of convenience, comity and
custom.1

The eighteenth century was the period par excellence
when dynastic interests controlled international rela-
tions. The ambassador, as the personal representative
of the sovereign, occupied a place in the affairs of the
day second only in importance to that of the sovereign
himself. The ceremoniousness emphasized in official
life by Louis XIV, and copied from Versailles through-
out Europe, demanded certain qualities in an ambassa-
dor such as smooth and attractive manners, shrewdness
and the art of using personal influence in managing
men. As these could be acquired best at court, the prac-
tice arose of young men of rank becoming attached to
embassies for the express purpose of learning the art
of diplomacy. Diplomacy became an aristocratic pro-
fession. At the same time it became a hierarchial pro-
fession. Down almost to the sixteenth century no dis-
tinction of rank existed among the diplomatic represen-
tatives at a court though various titl.es were used in re-
ferring to them. But the desire of the rulers of big
states to be differentiated from those of little states
caused a distinction between Ambassador and Resident
to develop during that century. The process of differ-
entiation determined not by questions of function but of
dignity continued down to the Congress of Vienna of
1815, when regulations were adopted which were con-
firmed at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818 di-
viding diplomatic agents into four classes:

(1) Ambassadors, legates, nuncios.

(2) Envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipo-

tentiary.

(3) Ministers Resident accredited to the sover-

eign.

'To understand the real status of the ambassador at the beginning
of the eighteenth century, the student of diplomacy should study
Callieres De la Manicrc dc ncgocier avec les souverains, published in
1716 and which still remains authoritative in its field.

8 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

(4) Charges d'affaires accredited to the Foreign
office.1

As these ranks have only ceremonial value, and do
not affect either the functions or powers of diplomatic
representatives, the United States ignored them and ac-
credited all its principal diplomatic agents as ministers
plenipotentiary, i. e., ministers of full power and au-
thority. In 1893, however, Congress enacted legisla-
tion whose practical .effect was to authorize the Presi-
dent to conform to the practice which prevailed among
other nations. During the nineteenth century the heart-
burnings formerly caused by the question of precedence
among diplomatic agents were extinguished by the sim-
ple rule of seniority of appointment and in the case of
signatures to treaties by an appeal to the alphabet.

The French Revolution with its emphasis upon the
political principles of nationality and democracy had a
profound influence upon the qualities demanded of a
diplomatist. The ambassador no longer represents a
sovereign to a sovereign but a nation to a nation. More-
over, the nineteenth century has been one of great in-
ternational congresses in which the duty of considering
the common interests of Europe or of the world has
become a function of diplomacy. A knowledge of his-
tory, geography, international law and political psychol-
ogy became of greater importance in the ambassador
than the personal qualities of suavity and astuteness,
though these are by no means negligible even now.
Again, the Industrial Revolution, emphasizing the place
of the economic element in the affairs of men, has re-
sulted in the need in the diplomatist of today of a
knowledge of such subjects as the laws and conditions
of trade and the general principles of international
finance. It must not be overlooked that the commercial
purposes of diplomacy tend constantly to become more

duties, privileges and functions of these diplomatic agents are
discussed somewhat in detail in chapter beginning on page 157.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9

prominent. These qualities demanded by modern con-
ditions were seldom to be secured by the choice of a
diplomatic agent dictated by favoritism or politics.
Hence in nearly all the great countries of the world
the management of international intercourse has passed
into the hands of a trained diplomatic class. At first
the method of training was that of apprenticeship, but
this gave way later to university preparation followed
by examination. No nation compares with France in
the facilities of preparation for the diplomatic career.
The Ecole Libre des Science politiques with its array of
courses in history, geography, politics, economics, in-
ternational law and history of diplomacy and with its
eminent teachers drawn from the courts, the govern-
ment service, and practical life as well as from the uni-
versity provides today at least eighty per cent of those
who enter the French diplomatic service. In this de-
velopment, the United States, chiefly because of the
comparative simplicity of its foreign relations in the
past, has lagged behind the other great nations. But
her immense commercial expansion and her participa-
tion in the solution of the intricate international prob-
lems that face the statesman of today will compel her to
adopt the reform of her diplomatic service if she is
properly to look after the security, the dignity and the
interests of the nation.1

Ill

THE AGENTS OF DIPLOMACY

The conduct of the international relations of a coun-
try is essentially an executive function. Historically,

xFor the further consideration of the history of diplomacy the stu-
dent is referred to Henry Wheaton. History of the Law of Nations in
Europe and America, 1845; Debidour, Historic diplomatique de
FEurope contcmporaine 1814-1914; J. B. Moore, American Diplomacy,
1905; D. J. Hill, History of European Diplomacy, 1905; and J. W.
Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy, 1906.

10 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the monarch was the state and when his powers were
gradually distributed among the organs of government
the duty of speaking and acting for the state naturally
remained with the executive. Few will deny that legis-
latures are unsuited to originate and determine the for-
eign policy of a country and conduct delicate negotia-
tions, which are of necessity often complicated and
where the issues involved may be momentous. In no
constitutional country; however, is the executive power
irresponsible in international relations. It is everywhere
subject to the intervention of the legislative power,
though the method of intervention differs. This con-
trol, however, extends to particular questions of foreign
affairs rather than to foreign policy generally. In the
United States each administration pursues policies with-
out any legislative control whatever unless the policies
require the passage of treaties or laws. For example,
the Taft administration encouraged the financial con-
sortium in China. The Wilson administration discour-
aged it. And in the countries organized upon the par-
liamentary system, while the legislative control is more
direct, it rarely attempts to interfere with policy.

Under modern conditions the chief agencies acting
for the executive in the conduct of 'international rela-
tions are:

(1) The Department of State or Ministry of For-
eign Affairs.

(2) Regular diplomatic agents of various grades
ranging from ambassadors to charges d'af-
faires.

(3) Occasional or special agents appointed to realize
some particular object.

For the purposes of this paper they need but a very
brief discussion.

(A) The Department of State or Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. The public law of every state, whether

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 11

written or customary, provides for a Ministry of For-
eign Affairs or a Department of State composed of a
trained body of permanent officials headed by a member
of the cabinet whose duty it is to handle the interna-
tional relations of the country. As early as the six-
teenth century most of the European monarchies had
established a special branch of the government for the
conduct of foreign affairs, and the office has steadily
grown in influence and dignity. Though the powers
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs vary according to
the political organization of different -states, he is near-
ly everywhere the regular intermediary between his
country and foreign countries from whom all directions
and communications to foreign states emanate and by
whom all directions and -communications from foreign
states are received. In Great Britain, for example, nei-
ther the sovereign nor parliament can give orders di-
rectly to diplomatic agents. j

(B) Regular Diplomatic Agents Abroad. Since
the status of ambassadors and subordinate diplomatic
agents has already been discussed, only their relations
with the chief of the foreign office -need to be consid-
ered here. Before the invention of the telegraph, the
position of ambassador was undoubtedly one of greater
responsibility than today. A great deal was left to his
discretion and good judgment because by the time in-
structions were received from home conditions might
so have changed as to render them out of date. Fre-
quently he had to act upon his own initiative when a
difficult question arose. Today he can receive telegraph-
ic directions from home. The result has been to en-
able the Minister of Foreign Affairs to have a more
immediate control of negotiations than formerly. Prob-
ably the conduct of Foreign Affairs has thereby become
more steady -and reliable. And yet it is a question
whether the opinion of the man at the distant post,
familiar not only with the facts but with the psychology
surrounding the problem, is not as important today as

12 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

ever. Official correspondence which must be published
has become formal. For example, it is now the general
practice for diplomatic agents abroad to repeat conver-
sations with foreign ministers of state without com-
ment. But there is much unofficial correspondence of
an intimate nature between the agent abroad and the
minister at home, a correspondence moreover which
usually remains private. The importance, therefore, to
the student of diplomacy of a study of the memoirs of
statesmen and diplomatists is obvious. Telegraphic
communication has obviated the necessity of the long
and detailed instructions that were formerly given to
diplomatic agents abroad. One of the unfortunate in-
cidental results for the student was the discontinuance
of such collections as that mine of information the
French Recueil des Instructions donnees aux Ambassa-
deurs et Ministers de France depuis les Traites de West-
phalie jusqu'a la Revolution Frangaise.

(C) Occasional or Special Diplomatic Agents. Dur-
ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, monarchs
frequently sent secret agents abroad, sometimes to real-
ize a, particular object, sometimes to report on condi-
tions without the knowledge of the regular representa-
tive. That the latter practice had not completely dis-
appeared even in our own day was made evident in the
Lichnowsky revelations. Experience justifies the belief
that the practice can hardly fail to affect the diplomacy
of the country unfavorably, making it uncertain and
personal. When a special agent is appointed today for
a particular object, he is usually an expert such as may
be needed to negotiate a treaty of commerce or regu-
late a boundary dispute or other matter outside the scope
of the regular diplomatic representative. When a spe-
cial embassy has a merely ceremonial character, it may
result in the increase of international good-will. When
it is of a political nature, the speculation and even sus-
picion that are roused may render such a result dubious.
A special agent of a political nature is likely also to

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13

rouse resentment among the members of the permanent

embassy.1

IV

LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION IN THE CONDUCT OF IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The student of international relations must not over-
look the fact that the problem of control is one of con-
stitutional law and that his study, therefore, must deal
with the internal structure of the state as well as its ex-
ternal activities. This is particularly important in con-
sidering what is vaguely called "secret diplomacy" , a
term which is variously defined but by which the im-
pression is generally conveyed that the nation may be
committed to policies or decisions by statesmen or di-
plomatists without the knowledge of its representatives.
The justification of the charge can readily be tested by
a brief consideration of the constitutional prescriptions
for the conduct of international relations as found in
the chief states of the world.

France — The French constitution in Article VIII pro-
vides that "the President of the Republic shall nego-
tiate and ratify treaties with foreign countries and com-
municate their contents to the two Houses as soon as it
is compatible with a due regard to the security and in-
terests of the state. Treaties of peace and commerce,
treaties ivhich affect the finances of the state, the status
of persons and the rights of property of French citizens
abroad, are only binding after they have been approved
by a vote of the two Houses. No cession, exchange or
acquisition of territory may take place without a law
being passed to authorize it".

'The whole ground covered thus far in this chapter is fully treated
in Le Guide Diplomatique, Martens (Charles de) which has been the
standard work. It is to some extent superseded by A Guide to Diplo-
matic Practice, Satow (Sir Ernest) 1917; an excellent summary of
the subject is made in Diplomacy and the Study of International Rela-
tions, Heatley, (D. P.), 1919.

14 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Parliamentary control over the conduct of interna-
tional relations is vested primarily in the Foreign Af-
fairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies which re-
ports to the Chamber on all questions which are sub-
mitted to it. It can demand that the Minister of For-
eign Affairs refer to it whatever papers or persons it
wishes to examine. Should the Minister decline to ac-
cede to its request on account of reasons of State, the
Committee usually acquiesces in his view. If the Com-
mittee, however, persists in its demand, the matter is
brought before the Chamber and if the Chamber sup-
ports the Committee, the almost inevitable result is that
the Ministry of the day resigns.

The second element of legislative control resides in
the privilege of interpellation respecting foreign affairs
on the part of individual deputies who usually speak in
the name of some political group. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs may answer at once or he may request
the Chamber to postpone consideration to a later date
or to join the question to others of which notice has been
given so as to form a general debate on foreign policy.
These interpellations and general debates afford excel-
lent opportunity for the instruction of public opinion.

The third element of legislative control resides in the
General Budget Committee of the Chamber, the most
important and powerful of all the legislative committees
which passes upon the budget for foreign affairs. It
seldom rejects it. The Budget Committee, moreover,
publishes at the end of every year a report on foreign
affairs which is a valuable record of French policy.
The report is usually written in a sympathetic and ex-
planatory tone. In fact, because of the delicate and
complicated nature of European diplomacy and the un-
usual need in France of considering the security of the
State above all things, there has been little desire or
attempt on the part of the Chamber of Deputies to
exert control over foreign policy. This has been even
more true of the Senate which has no permanent com-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15

mittee on foreign affairs. Bills submitted to the Senate
concerning international relations are referred to a spe-
cial committee or when the matter is pressing, to the
Senate Finance Committee. The French system ob-
tains in most of the countries of continental Europe.

Germany — The Imperial German constitution in Ar-
ticle II provided that "the Emperor shall represent the
Empire among nations, declare war and conclude peace
in the name of the same, enter into alliances and other
conventions with foreign countries, accredit and receive
ambassadors." Elsewhere it was provided "that the
Chancellor of the Empire, who shall be appointed by the
Emperor, shall be chairman of the Federal Council, and
slwll conduct its business. . . . The commands and de-
mands of the Emperor . . . shall require for their valid-
ity tlie signature of the Chancellor, who thereby as-
sumes the responsibility."

Evidently under the imperial regime in Germany the
conduct of international relations was an attribute of
the Chancellor and his responsibility respecting them
was to the organ of government which gave him his
authority. What that organ was was debatable. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs was merely the subordinate
of the Chancellor. What legislative control of interna-
tion relations was there, if any?

Article VIII of the Constitution provided "there shall
be appointed in the Federal Council a Committee on For-
eign Affairs over which Bavaria shall preside, to be
composed of the plenipotentiaries of the kingdoms of
Bavaria, Saxony, and Wivrtenburg and of two plenipo-
tentiaries of other states of the Empire, who shall be
elected annually by the Federal Council." This commit-
tee existed solely for the purpose of receiving informa-
tion on foreign affairs which was usually given by the
Imperial Chancellor himself and for providing means
for an exchange of views. It had no control, exerted
little influence, and between 1871 and 1908 met but
twice. As a result of Emperor William's celebrated

16 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

interview on the international situation in 1908 which
was published in the London Telegraph and which
caused a demand in Germany that he refrain from, such
disclosures in the future, it became the practice of Ba-
varia to call meetings of the committee in connection
with any foreign question of great magnitude and last-
ing public interest.

Almost as slight was the Reichstag's control in inter-
national relations. It .had no committee on Foreign Af-
fairs. In practice it could deal with questions of for-
eign policy first by means of interpellations. When an
interpellation signed by thirty members was reached on
the order of the day, the President of the Reichstag
asked the Chancellor "whether and when" he would an-
swer the interpellation. If the Chancellor consented to
answer, the interpellator presented his views, the Chan-
cellor or his representative replied and a debate followed
if desired by at least fifty members. But, previous to
1913, motions on the subject of the interpellation were
not permitted. In fact, the knowledge that the Chan-
cellor or his representative would not participate in the
debate on a critical motion, and that, even if the mo-
tion were carried it would be merely an academic ex-
pression of opinion, was an effective check to the pres-
entation of such a motion. Few such motions or inter-
pellations were made in practice.

The other method of exercising legislative control
of international relations was by means of the Budget
Committee of the Reichstag to which the estimates for
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were submitted. The
Committee had not the right, however, to send for per-
sons, papers or records, but it could and often did re-
quest the President of the Reichstag to do so. Confi-
dential communications were made to it at the discre-
tion of the Chancellor. The proceedings of the Com-
mittee were secret but a verbal report was made to the
Reichstag and there frequently followed considerable
debate.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 17

It is obvious that, under the Empire, the German con-
stitution provided but slight opportunity for legislative
intervention in the conduct of international relations by
the executive and that in practice little interference took
place. The Constitution of the new German Common-
wealth gives much greater opportunity for legislative
control. Article 45 reads, "The National President rep-
i\'sents the Commonwealth in matters of international
law. He concludes in the name of the Commonwealth
alliances and other treaties with foreign powers. He
accredits and receives ambassadors.'' Article 35 reads,
"The National Assembly appoints a Standing Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs which may also act outside of the
sittings of the National Assembly, and after its expira-
tion or dissolution until a new National Assembly con-
venes. Its sittings are not public, unless the Committee
by a two-thirds vote otherwise provides." No provision
is made for a similar committee in the National Coun-
cil, which supersedes the Bundesrat of the Imperial
regime. The resemblance to the American system of
control is obvious, but it is too soon to pass judgment
upon the actual working of the German republican sys-
tem.

Great Britain — According to the public law of Great
Britain, the whole conduct of international relations is
vested in the Crown. The Ministry which acts in the
name of the Crown and assumes responsibility for its
acts depends for its tenure upon maintaining a major-
ity in the House of Commons. Its control over foreign
affairs is, therefore, responsible in form and has be-
come in practice more and more prudent. Parliament
has no committee on Foreign Affairs and its interven-
tion in international relations is made first through inter-
pellations. These are answered in person by the Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs or by an Under-Sec-
retary, usually with considerable frankness. The plea
on the part of the Foreign Secretary that fuller infor-
mation would not be for the best interests of the State

18 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

is generally accepted. An adverse vote would mean the>
resignation of the ministry in accordance with the prin-
ciple of collective responsibility. The other method for,
legislative intervention in international relations is
through the voting of the foreign office budget when
international commitments may come under discussion.
Before the war these discussions were not keen and Sir
Edward Grey probably spoke wisely when he said on
the occasion of one such debate "As long as the House
of Commons remains without some great measure of
devolution, its business will be so congested that, with
the best will in the world, the House would never be
able to acquire that control of imperial policy which it
can only acquire by frequent debates on important sub-
jects." In proof of this, one responsible writer has cal-
culated that in the first decade oi the nineteenth century
26 per cent of the debates in the House of Commons
were devoted to foreign relations, whereas in the last
decade but one, the per cent was but eleven.1

Apparently the House of Commons itself believes
that it can exercise effective control over the conduct of
international relations by the ordinary processes of leg-
islation, for in March, 1918, after public opinion had
been much roused over the disclosures of the secret
treaties, it voted down the following motion: "That, in
the opinion of this House, a Standing Committee of
Foreign Affairs should be appointed, representative of
all parties and groups in the House, in order that a
regular channel of communication may be established
between the Foreign Secretary and the House of Com-
mons, which will afford him frequent opportunities of
giving information on questions of foreign policy and
which, by allowing members to acquaint themselves
more fully with current international problems, will en-
able this House to exercise closer supervision over the
general conduct of Foreign Affairs".

*Thomas A. Spaulding, Federation and Empire.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 19

The United States — The Constitution of the United
States provides Art. II, Sec. 2, Par. 2, that the Presi-
dent "Shall have power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Seriate, to make treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public minis-
ters and consuls." No other reference to the conduct
of international relations appears in the Constitution.
In 1789 there was established by law the Department
of State whose functions were and still are to corre-
spond with and to instruct diplomatic and consular
agents abroad and to negotiate with the agents of for-
eign countries in the United States "or to such other
matters respecting foreign affairs as the President of
the United States shall assign to the said department".
In the United States, therefore, the conduct of interna-
tional relations with the exception of treaties, is given
to the executive. What methods of control reside in
the legislature?

The outstanding differences between the parliamen-
tary system of government and the American is that the
President of the United States holds office for a fixed
period by direct commission from the people irrespec-
tive of the legislature while under the parliamentary
system the executive, i. e., the ministry, must retain the
confidence of the legislature or be voted out of office.
In the American system, a cabinet officer is not and
cannot be a member either of the Senate or the House
of Representatives. It follows that the Secretary of
State cannot be interpellated in Congress on questions
of foreign policy. His only connection with either
House is through the Committee of that House which
deals with international relations, the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, of which two the former is by far the
more important and influential. Each House in prac-
tice depends on the judgment of its Committee and as

20 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

a rule votes its recommendations. Either committee
can request and the Senate committee sometimes does
request the appearance of the Secretary of State before
it for information but cannot compel his appearance,
though he seldom refuses to appear.

The President transmits pro forma to the Senate
many papers as "Executive Documents" because they
concern international matters that should constitution-
ally come before it. Either House may call upon the
President for other papers or for information which
the Secretary of State transmits "if not incompatible
with public interest!' Such requests frequently meet
with refusal. This does not prevent Congress from de-
bating the subject should it not agree with the execu-
tive view of the public interest, but its ignorance may
cause it to hesitate to act, as in the case with Mexico
during the last administration. In fact, except where
an executive policy in international relations necessi-
tates the voting of monies by Congress, there is no
way of stopping the President in his course of action
until the end of his term, except of course by the ex-
treme method of impeachment, which is very hard to
apply in practice. Today few will differ from Mr. Bryce
in the judgment he expresses in his "American Common-
wealth'' viz. :

"In all free countries it is most difficult to define
the respective spheres of the legislature and execu-
tive in foreign affairs, for while publicity and parlia-
mentary control are needed to protect the people,
promptitude and secrecy are the conditions of diplo-
matic success. Practically, however, and for the pur-
poses of ordinary business, the President is indepen-
dent of the House, while the Senate, though it can
prevent his settling anything, cannot keep him from
unsettling everything. He, or rather his §ecretary
of State, for the president has rarely leisure to give
close or continuous attention to foreign policy, re-
tains an unfettered initiative by means of which he

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 21

may embroil the country abroad or excite passion at

home."1

This brief summary of the power of legislatures in
constitutional countries to intervene in the conduct of
foreign affairs by the executive, makes it fairly clear
that if the legislature wishes to use its powers, it can
prevent the final disposition of an international question
in a manner contrary to the legislative will. In parlia-
mentary countries this can be done promptly, in the Uni-
ted States it may require prolonged delay. Similarly,
it may be asserted that opportunity exists for the mem-
bers of the legislature to be fairly well acquainted with
the conduct of negotiations. In parliamentary coun-
tries particularly the desire and the need of the ministry
to win the support of the legislature make it anxious
to respond as frankly to legislative inquiries as the in-
terests of the nation permit. The fact is that until the
outbreak of the Great War the majority of the mem-
bers of national legislatures were absorbed in the con-
sideration of pressing domestic problems and had but
slight interest in foreign affairs. This was particularly
true of the more democratic states. It is reasonable to
expect that they will be more interested in the future,
and it is to be hoped that the press and the public will
be also. The statements issued by the State Department,
the publication in the newspapers of important docu-
ments and the summaries of the debates in the Senate
on international questions are sufficient to enable an
intelligent citizen to form his opinion upon it if he is
interested. Few hitherto have been interested.

V

METHODS OF DIPLOMACY

There are manifold methods of diplomatic action,

most illuminating discussion of this whole subject is found in
Parliamentary Papers for 1912, "Treatment of International Questions
by Parliaments in European Countries, the United States and Japan"
from which I have freely drawn.

22 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the most important being the negotiation of treaties and
other forms of international engagements, the arbitra-
tion of controversies that cannot be settled by negotia-
tions, and the summoning of international conferences
or general congresses. The nature of the problem that
has arisen and the magnitude of the interests involved
determine the method that will be employed in any par-
ticular case. The limits of this paper will permit of but
a brief review of certain aspects of the subject which
the student of international relations cannot overlook,1

(A) Treaties. Treaties are in the nature of con-
tracts between states. Unless accepted by substantially
all states, certainly by all the first-class powers, they are
not international law and their "sanctity," therefore, is
simply the sanctity of ,a contract. Because, however,
of the importance of the interests involved in the rela-
tions between states, the violation of a- treaty is re-
garded as a flagrant breach of customary international
law. Prdbably at least ninety per cent of treaties are
of a non-political character dealing with practical prob-
lems that arise in international intercourse and seldom
causing international friction of a pronounced kind. Po-
litical treaties embody the policy of the state, i. e., the
attitude adopted by the state in its international relar
tions to secure its own welfare primarily. Political
treaties are the expression of that attitude as suggested
or permitted by the conditions existing at the time of
their signature. They are the chief determinants of
the reciprocal rights and obligations of states, and dis-
putes arising from them are generally the result of
changed political conditions.

In some states where the constitution provides that
treaties must be submitted to the legislature for appro-
val, a phrase is added that the submission shall be made
as soon as it is compatible with a due regard to the

*These methods form the subject matter of the detailed study con-
tributed by Professor John Bassett Moore, pp. 157.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23

security and interests of the state. This not only gives
opportunity for the negotiation of "secret treaties" but
for legalizing and regularizing them. It is, indeed, a
question how secret a secret treaty is. A secret treaty
between two or more states is usually directed against
a third party and that third party has every reason for
trying to discover its character. The history of the past
fifty years shows that the opportunities for making that
discovery are so numerous that the secret treaty is at
best only semi-secret. The general character of both
the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance was known
long before the Great War. The evil of the secret
treaty is not that its aim and even its contents in a
general way may not be known, but that the states
against which it is directed cannot be certain how much
they know. And since such a secret treaty is almost
sure to generate a secret reply, the reply is likely to be
more drastic in its provisions than the original. Thus
international relations are made worse than ever. To
sweep away the evil, it has been frequently suggested
that the principle be established in public law that se-
cret treaties are void, and Article XVIII of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations was directed to that
end. The most practicable way of abolishing secret
treaties is by amendment of the constitutions of those
states which permit them. The prospect of such a re-
form does not seem any too bright at present.

(B) Arbitration. When a matter in dispute be-
tween nations cannot be adjusted by direct negotiation,
it may be referred to arbitrators agreed upon by the
parties to the controversy or to the permanent tribunal
of arbitration erected by the Hague Conference. Arbi-
tration will naturally receive but a passing reference in
a paper on diplomacy as it is essentially judicial in
character being diplomatic only in origin. Progress in
the means of transportation and communication has im-
mensely increased the intimacy of the intercourse be-
tween nations and has caused the loss involved in war

24 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

to be appalling and widespread. The nineteenth cen-
tury, therefore, has witnessed the growth of a tendency
to employ arbitration as the most economical and endur-
ing method for the settlement of international contro-
versies. During the nineteenth century there were more
than one hundred and thirty important arbitrations and
though the United States Senate did not ratify the arbi-
tration treaties referred to it in 1904 for the submission
of judicial disputes and disputes relating to the inter-
pretation of treaties to the Hague Tribunal, it has, never-
theless, led the way in the employment of arbitration.

The rejection of the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions by the United States and the lack of respect for
some of its political provisions manifested by some
states that have accepted it are fairly good evidence that
the world is not yet ready for an international system
in which there is even a suspicion that the independence,
security, interests or dignity of the individual State is
subject to control or supervision by any external influ-
ence. The recent catastrophe, however, has generated a
horror of war among all civilized nations as a means
of settling international dispute and it may, therefore,
reasonably be expected that arbitration which is volun-
tary in its nature and which avoids the objections
against both international control and war will be
viewed with increasing deference in the years to come.
The rejection by the League of Nations of any exten-
sion of the principle of voluntary arbitration in its com-
mittee's report on the establishment of a Permanent
Court of International Justice is indicative of the exist-
ence of a determined opposition to the obligatory prin-
ciple.

(C) International Congresses and Conferences. A
third method of diplomatic action is the general con-
gress or conference which may assemble to settle ques-
tions which vitally affect several states or involve the
peace of a continent or of the world. The international
congress is partially the result of the existence of the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 25

principle known as the Balance of Power which has
been the most potent single factor in the development
of diplomacy. As a basis of action the principle had
its origin in the sixteenth century and was a result of
the rivalry of the House of Austria and the Kings of
France. The Thirty Years' War in which that rivalry
played a prominent part eventuated in the first Euro-
pean congresses, those of Munster and Osnabriick,
which had produced the Peace of Westphalia of 1648.
Those congresses formed a precedent which has been
freely followed. From the beginning of its history the
Balance of Power has had for its object the mainte-
nance of the independence and the security of all states
by organizing alliances to prevent any one state or
group of states being able to dominate and prescribe
the law to all others. Since the close of the seventeenth
century, Great Britain has been the foremost champion
of the principle. However much the principle may be
condemned, it is in its essence a mere timely provision
against a probable danger and it would be unwise to
assume that it has been superseded. Unless the League
of Nations include all the great states of the world
and unless its principles secure more hearty adherence
in their application from the states which have become
members, there is no reason to suppose that the condi-
tions that necessitated the Balance of Power in the past
will not exist in the future.

The conflict against Napoleon had as one result the
recognition that Europe had common interests and the
series of congresses that followed his fall had as an
outcome the system known as the "Concert of Europe"
wherein the independence of the individual state has
been, in certain matters, subordinated to the general
welfare of Europe as a whole. It would be easy, no
doubt, to exaggerate the effective influence of this sys-
tem, but there can be no doubt that the recognition that
a controversy was a European question to be settled by
''Europe" made for peace. "Europe" in this connec-

26 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

tion meant the Great Powers whose diplomats when
they assembled in a European congress understood func-
tions that were both legislative and administrative in
character. It has been customary for a congress to re-
cord in its protocols the principles upon which its con-
clusions were based, and to invite nations not represented
at the congress to adhere to the results of its delibera-
tions. It is obvious, therefore, what a great influence
upon the spirit and practice of diplomacy the Concert of
Europe has had. As long as it functioned, it maintained
peace and it laid the foundations for an international or-
ganization which extends beyond the confines of Eu-
rope.1

CONCLUSION.

In the study of no subject dealing with human affairs
does the student need a greater equipment of knowledge,
discernment, imagination and impartial judgment than
in the study of diplomacy. He must remember that di-
plomacy deals with the relations between nations, and, to
understand the reasons either for the general policy pur-
sued by a nation over a long space of time or for its at-
titude in a particular international situation, he must know
its constitution, the actual working of its government and
the relative strength of the political parties in it, the na-
tional aims, the national temperament, and the dominant
personalities. In the study of any particular problem he
must try to have access to all the sources on every side and

materials for the study of this caption are very numerous.
The collections of treaties and treaty documents, of which there are
many, are of first importance. Koch et Scholl, Historic abregee des
Traites (from 1648 to 1815) is of value. The standard work is
Martens (G. F. de) Recueil des principaux traites de paix, d' alliance
. . . depuis 1761 iusau'd nos jours (1808), which has been brought
down to our day. Of the very highest value is Hertslet (Edward)
The Map of Europe by Treaty since 1814. This is an invaluable work
for the student. Moore (J. B.) A Digest of International Law is an
exhaustive digest of the international practice of the United States
from its origin up to 1906, which should be constantly consulted by
the student. The same author's International Arbitrations is the
standard work on the subject.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 27

carefully compare them, if he is to approximate the truth.
Moreover, he must understand that despatches and official
documents never tell the whole story and that, however
illuminating the speeches and writings of the day may be
to give an understanding of the psychology of the people
and their leaders, they will not explain what has been in-
tentionally omitted in official documents. Those must be
sought for in the biographies, memoirs, diaries, and pri-
vate letters of statesmen and diplomatists and others who
were in position to know. And even then much must be
left to the inductive imagination.

The student thus equipped is prepared to engage in-
telligently in the study of a wonderful and magnificent
drama. All the instincts and passions of the individual
are in action on a grand scale in the intercourse between
nations. The student will probably learn to admire the
accomplishment of diplomacy rather than to condemn its
failure. And he will, no doubt, conclude that as human
nature, with its mixture of what is instructive and what is
rational, of what is constructive and what is destructive,
is the one constant factor in international relations as it is
in life generally, so diplomacy will ever continue an es-
sential element in the intercourse between states what-
ever world organization may be adopted, just as com-
promises will ever be necessary in the daily relations of
individuals under whatever system of morals and religion
they may live.

STEPHEN P. DUGGAN.

International Relations in the
Ancient World

CHAPTER II.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE
ANCIENT WORLD

SOURCE, MATERIAL AND METHOD OF APPROACH

No exhaustive treatment of international relations in
the ancient world exists in scientific literature. The two
volumes devoted to this subject by Coleman Philippson1
are written by an excellent lawyer, a good specialist in
modern international law, but a dilettante in the domain
of ancient history. On the other hand, many special in-
vestigations written by classical scholars chiefly on the
subject of international treaties and interstatal arbitra-
tion, although exhaustive and sufficient in regard to the
special subject in question, do not cover the whole field
of international relations and are silent on many impor-
tant general questions. I refer to the recent works of
Marcus Niebuhr Tod and A. Raeder on arbitration and
to the book of Taubler on Roman treaties.2 I cannot my-
self give in these two short papers a full account of all
the important and complicated questions connected with
the main problem of the system of international relations
in the ancient world, but I should like to insist on some
fundamental points which unfortunately have been gen-
erally mistreated and misinterpreted. My point of view
is that of a historian, and as such I insist on the treat-

*The International Laiv and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome,
London, Macmillan, 1911.

2Marcus Niebuhr Tod, International Arbitration Among the Greeks
Oxford, 1913; A. Raeder, L 'Arbitrage International ches Lcs Hellenes,
1912; E. Taubler, Turferinne Romanum, Studio cur Entwicklungs-
geschicte des romer Reiches, I Die Staatsvertrage und Vertrags
Verlialtnisse; Berlin-Leipzig, Teubner, 1913.

31

32 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

ment of this question from the historical point of view
without modernization, but, at the same time, without the
tendency to consider the ancient world as an epoch to-
tally different from our own period and important for a
historian only as a matter of historical curiosity.

The first question one may put to me is — why should
we begin the history of international relations with the so-
called classical epoch, and not with the so-called middle
ages, when the system pf European states, totally different
from the system of states which prevailed during the
classical period, was formed? I think the question itself
implies a misinterpretation of historical facts. The sys-
tem of the modern European States is in no way a crea-
tion of the so-called middle ages. Most of the modern
European States are nothing but a development of the
provinces of the Roman Empire. The natural frontiers
of Spain, France, Italy, even Britain of today are the
ancient frontiers of Italy and the western Roman prov-
inces during the Roman Empire. Modern Germany
covers the territory of the Roman province, Ger-
mania, as it was planned by the genius of Caesar and
Augustus. Austrian territory before the war coincided
with the boundaries of the Roman Danube provinces. On
the other hand the foundations of civilized life in modern
Europe were laid during the classical period and the type
of our European and American mentality was inherited
by us from our classical predecessors.

Thus, if we try to understand one or the other of our
fundamental institutions, or if we endeavor to explain the
most important features of our political, economic, social
and intellectual life, we are bound to go back to the main
sources, i. e., to the achievements of our classical prede-
cessors.

International relations and the main ideas which form
the substance of our international law present no excep-
tion to this general rule. I affirm that the type of our in-
ternational relations, the different tendencies existing in
this domain and the most important moral and legal ideas

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33

which form the basis of our international law formed the
foundation of the international relations of the ancient
world as well. I cannot discover any capital difference.
Modern Europe moves on the same lines on which the
ancient world moved for centuries. I do not believe I am
exaggerating. I will endeavor to prove this statement in
this paper, from the historical as well as the system-
atic point of view. But please do not misinterpret my
words. Some of the institutions and ideas I speak of
were fully developed in the ancient world. Others
may be traced at their very beginning only, and it
was the destiny of later epochs to develop them more
fully.

Now the question why some of these institutions and
ideas developed, while others did not, is of the greatest
historical importance. If we know the causes of the
florescence of some institutions and of the comparative
debility of others we may judge, perhaps, of the future
of our own similar institutions and distinguish the con-
ditions under which they are growing or decaying. For,
our own modern world is still in the process of its ascen-
dant movement ; we see no signs of arrest or decay. The
ancient world also had its time of uninterrupted progress
which lasted many thousands of years. But the ancient
world accomplished its circle of evolution and experienced
a period of deep decay, a period of return to very primi-
tive conditions. And it is highly instructive to see which
institutions among those with which we are concerned
in studying international relations have survived and
which died out completely or remained as mere survivals,
and finally, though not least important, it is desirable to
know the causes of this phenomenon.

As I have already pointed out, the most important de-
fect of existing attempts to build up a history of inter-
national relations is the almost complete lack of histori-
cal method in dealing with this question. Most of the
general studies of the history of international law treat
the ancient period as a whole and oppose it directly to

34 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

our modern ideas and institutions. I am not an enemy
of systematic treatment nor of the comparative method in
the investigation of juridical and political institutions.
But I feel that we have a right to require a correct and
fair use of this method. If one uses the antithesis, "an-
cient and modern", I have the full right to ask, "What
epoch in the evolution of the ancient world does he mean
and what time in the evolution of our modern world?"
For in the history o>f the oriental monarchies, to cite one
instance, we have different epochs, as, e. g., the epoch of
the great Pharaohs of the XVIII dynasty in Egypt (II
Millennium), and the epoch of the first five dynasties (IV
Millennium) which differ, one from the other, as much as
the Merovingian epoch differs from the reign of Louis
XIV in the history of the French monarchy. In the his-
tory of the Greek States, the period of the Ionian coloni-
zation, the period of full florescence of Athens in the V
and IV centuries, and the period of the Hellenistic Mon-
archies, present the same enormous differences as, in the
history of America, do the period of colonization, that
of the civil war and that of President Wilson, although
throughout the history of the Greek States the general
political structure of the city-state remains almost un-
changed. Again, contrast Rome of the early republic
with Rome of the time of Cicero and Rome ruled by the
emperors! There is the same people, and there are the
same names for many institutions, but how enormous
are the differences! In the history of Germany, the
period of Arminius, that of Frederick the Great and
that of the last Hohenzollern exhibit striking dissimilari-
ties.

Hence it is that we must be very careful in our com-
parisons between the ancient and the modern world. We
must not forget that the modern world started from quite
different conditions from those prevailing in the ancient
world. The modern world inherited from the ancient
a large stock of ideas and institutions which helped it to
build up its culture on firm and advanced ground.

I

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 35

II

THE ANCIENT AND MODERN VIEW OF WAR

Let me bring forward one example which will lead us
directly into our own subject, "in mcdias res". The fun-
damental conceptions of international relations in the an-
cient and in the modern world are utterly different. The
modern world considers the natural condition of life in
our society to be the state of peace. War is nothing but
a temporary suspending of this natural condition and is
regarded as an abnormal state. Free intercourse between
different nations is normal ; restrictions and limitations of
the rights of foreigners are abnormal and require serious
reasons. Such, briefly, are our ideas as they developed
during centuries of existence of the family of European
nations. But in the ancient world, generally, the natural
attitude of one state towards another was that of poten-
tial and actual enmity. Hence, war, not peace, was the
foundation of international relations. To quote one of the
most authoritative writers on this subject : "In the ancient
world the foreigner, from the political point of view, is an
enemy. The individual, as well as a state, comes out of '
these conditions of natural hostility only by means of a
juridical act, a treaty which makes possible for the citizens
a free intercourse with another state" (Taubler, opus
cited, p. I.)

What are the causes of this fundamental difference?
Have we to assume that ideas regarding peace and war
were totally different in the ancient and the modern
world? Can we affirm that the ancients did not look on
peace as a desirable thing, and as a good in itself? Was
the ancient psychology totally different from our own?
By no means. Like the modern world, ancient thought
regarded peace as the most desirable thing and peace con-
ditions as the ideal conditions of life. They praised peace
in prose and poetry not less than we do, although they
had, as we have, a full understanding of the greatness
of war in itself, of its necessity and the enormous bene-

36 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

fits for mankind which it sometimes brought with itself.
"Polemos pater ton ergon," says one of the greatest Greek;
poets. I cannot trace in the whole ancient literature on
this subject any difference in principle. Like other mat-
ters, we inherited our ideas on peace and war from the
ancient Greeks and Romans.

An explanation of these different theoretical associa-
tions which have had and still have an enormous practical
value must be sought tin the domain of historical evolu-
tion. As a matter of fact, ancient society grew from con-
ditions totally different from those influencing modern so-
ciety. Civilized life formed for a long time small islands
in the ocean of barbarism. Thus, for an ancient civil-
ized state, neighbor was equivalent to foe. The ancient
state evolved through the process of integration of petty
political formations and this process assumed the form
of ever-renewed wars. To this is due the constant state
of war between the different civilized states, even of the
same nationality. The general idea of war as the natural
status influenced the forms of international relations and
shifted from one focus of civilization to another. In this
way the general principle took firm root, although the
actual state of things was very often in contradiction to
this main idea, as, I must add, our theory is so often in
contradiction with the real state of things.

How different the history of international relations
in the modern world! The family of European nations
grew up not from conditions of war of all against all;
modern European nations were children of the mighty and
united Roman Empire, whose main foundation was gen-
eral peace for the whole united civilized world. Orbis Ro-
mamis was for the Romans the Orbis Terrarum. Outside
of it was barbarism, — no law, no right. The natural con-
dition of this Roman world-state was peace — Pax Ro-
mana. It is symbolic that Augustus, the creator of the
Roman world-empire, erected on the campus Martius, the
field consecrated to Mars, the God of War, an altar to the
deified peace, Ara Pacts.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 37

This fundamental idea never died out. It was inheri-
ted and proclaimed by the popes and the emperors of the
middle ages, the exponents of the idea of the Holy Roman
Empire, by the French monarchy, by the Signatories of
the peace of Westphalia and down to our own times.

Although the points of departure of the ancient and the
modern world in the domain of international relations
were so utterly different, the forms in which these rela-
tions were expressed were almost the same, but of course
they were used differently. The treaty as such was the
main basis of these relations in the ancient world. With-
out treaty no established peace was possible and no regu-
lar and formal relations between the citizens of different
states could exist. All was based on treaties; interstatal
intercourse, intercourse between foreigners and the state,
intercourse between foreigners and individual citizens, and
the like. For this reason in the study of international
relations of the ancient world a careful investigation of
the different extant treaties must form the main founda-
tion of our knowledge. It is a pity that we are still wait-
ing for a continuation of the valuable and exhaustive
collection of R. Von Scala containing all extant ancient
treaties.1 Nevertheless we must try to build up the gen-
eral story of international relations on the ground-work
of present available evidence.

Ill

MEANS OF PRESERVING PEACE THE BALANCE OF POWER

IN ANTIQUITY

The ancient world in its international relations aimed,
like the modern, at building up, by all means, a general
and lasting peace. But there are two different ways which
lead to this goal. Both have been used by the ancient and
the modern world, and neither was very successful. The
first was to impose peace by force, a method used by im-

'Rudolf von Scala, Die Staatsvertrage des Actertums, Leipzig, 1898
(Erstes Theil).

38 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

perialistic powers, whose aim was the creation of a world-
state. All the existing states had to disappear in this
mighty world-state and every attempt to recover liberty
and independence was regarded as rebellion and sup-
pressed by force of arms. The second way was that of
mutual recognition and mutual concessions made by dif-
ferent states toward each other. This way led to the
creation of a balance of power, a system of independent
and free civilized states which were bound one to another
by treaties and decided their controversies by means of
peaceful understanding (international or rather intersta-
tal arbitration) or by means of a regular war.

The history of international relations in the ancient
world consists mainly in a record of the shifting of the
balance sometimes towards the first solution, sometimes
towards the second. Both systems failed in the final aim.
As regards the world-state, Rome alone succeeded in
creating for some centuries an almost general peace on
this basis. But the price paid for this general peace was
heavy enough. The results were, first, the stagnation of
all creative efforts, and afterwards a bitter internal strug-
gle which ended in a complete exhaustion and unheard
of decadence of civilized life.

The attempts at building up a system of independent
states, a family of states, were not crowned by lasting
success in their main scope. Nor did they bring about
general peace either. War after war interrupted the
peaceful evolution of the ancient world during the periods
of existence of the balance of power. But yet, whereas
the epochs of the world-states were epochs of stagnation
as regards new ideas and new forms of relations in the
international life, the periods of the balance of power were
great creative periods in all domains, including the domain
of international relations and international law. Differ-
ent forms of treaties and alliances, of federations, of arbi-
tration, all the achievements in the domain of private in-
ternational law were the results of these short periods
when the systems of free and independent states, which

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 39

mutually recognized each other's mutual rights, were pre-
vailing.

Let me give you a short historical sketch account of
this shifting of historical balance. This account will ex-
plain better than any theoretical considerations the rea-
sons for the difference between the achievements of the
ancient and the modern world in the realm of interna-
tional relations.

We are hardly able, in the present condition of our
knowledge, to decide the important question of the origin
and first steps in the development of international rela-
tions in the ancient world. As far as we can judge, the
most ancient legal expressions of international relations,
besides war, were in the field of civil international law,
defining the relations of hospitality between members of
different states and in the domain of public international
law, comprising international or interstate treaties. What
is the origin of those institutions? There are two at-
tempts to solve this question. Some scholars affirm that
these two institutions developed out of attempts to regu-
late international communications in conditions of peace,
with the main aim of establishing commercial, social and
economic relations. Others point out that the most an-
cient forms of treaties rather suggest their rise out of con-
ditions of war, affecting, for example, a mitigation of
the cruel right of the victor over the vanquished, or a
transformation of hostages into guests instead of slaves,
or a change from unconditional surrender to a kind of
treaty in the case of decisive victory, and from a truce
to an equal treaty of peace in the case of an undecisive
contest. I think that of the two factors each had its
importance, but that war and its regulation came first,
chronologically. Considerations of peace relations came
later on. They helped to mitigate the general state of war
of all against all and to establish, on the basis of meas-
ures regulating war, a kind of legal procedure destined
to create a peaceful intercourse.

In every case, as a matter of fact, the very first steps

40 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

of mankind on the way to the development of a civilized
life are marked by some forms which tried to regulate
the interstatal relations. But from this starting point it
is still a long way to generally accepted norms which were
recognized as such by a common understanding of all the
civilized nations and which were based on common relig-
ious sentiment and common moral feeling.

IV

ANCIENT TREATIES

. The very first attempt to create civilized and organized
political and social life in the ancient world, in the first
states of Babylonia and Egypt, those petty tribal city-
states built up by the Sumerians in Babylonia and by the
native population of Egypt, brought about the first at-
tempts to organize the interstatal relations between these
different independent states. Already in the IV Millen-
nium B. C., as we read, on a recently discovered cone of
King Entemena of Lagash, a treaty of delimitation exis-
ted setting the boundaries between the two cities Lagash
and Umma and it is noteworthy that the Kings of these
cities chose as arbitrator of this contest Mesilim, the King
of the neighbor city of Kish.1

This early period of a balance of power did not last
long. Very soon the states of Babylonia and Egypt uni-
ted into huge monarchical states whose main preoccupa-
tion was to defend themselves from the attack of wild
tribes. But gradually along with the two states of Baby-
lonia and Egypt another series of civilized and independent
states arose and effected for the second time a kind of
balance of power. Egypt, the state of the Hittites in
Asia Minor, the Cretan maritime power in the Mediter-
ranean, the powerful state of Mitanni on the upper course

*S. W. King and H. R. Hall, Egypt and Western Asm, 171 ; M. N.
Tod, Journal of Transactions of the Victoria Idshitate, XLIV, 296;
Tod, Arbitration, 171.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 41

of the Euphrates, Assyria, Babylonia, Elam, were the
chief members of this system of states. And around
them were many minor states — Palestine, the Phoenician
towns on the Syrian coast, the Philistines, different Ara-
mean states in Syria and such units. The big states were
almost all equal in power; the small ones sometimes re-
tained their independence by cleverly using the disputes
of the big ones. Long and bitter wars did not end in a
decisive victory for any one of the big powers. Each one
of them was checked by various political combinations,
by different defensive and offensive alliances, by treaties
and by lively diplomatic activities of each of the above
named states. Quite recently we became able to follow
step by step the different phases in the history of this sys-
tem of oriental states. The states-archives of the Egyp-
tian capital, Tell-el-Amarna and later the archives of the
Foreign Office of the Hittite Kings in Bogaz-Kevi offered
an opportunity to read the various diplomatic letters writ-
ten during many decades and to study the fundamental
and quite elaborate treaty of alliance between King Rame-
ses II of Egypt and Hattusili II of the Hittites. The
treaty presents the most elaborate forms and contains even
the clause of mutual extradition of political refugees.
The treaty is dated of the year 1280 B. C.

Let me cite some extracts from this venerable docu-
ment to show you how elaborate it was and how nearly,
mutatis mutandis, it resembles our own documents of the
same type.

(1) Introductory Clause.

"The treaty which the great chief of the Hittites,
Hattusili, the powerful, the son of Merasar, the great
chief of the Hittites, the powerful, the grandson of
Sapulul, the great chief of the Hittites, the powerful,
made upon a silver tablet with Osymandyas (Rameses
II), the great chief of Egypt, the powerful, the son of
Men-mo-re (Seti I), the great chief of Egypt, the
powerful, the grandson of Men-pelte-re (Rameses I),
the great chief of Egypt. It is a good treaty of peace

42 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

and alliance, setting peace (and alliance) between them
forever."

(2) Historical sketch of former relations between
the Hittites and Egypt. War and peace with the
Hittite King Mutalla IV.

(3) Peace. "There shall be no hostilities between
them forever. The great chief of the Hittites shall
not pass over into the land of Egypt, forever, to take
anything therefrom; Rameses, the great chief of Egypt,
shall not pass over into the land of the Hittites to take
anything therefrom forever."

(4) Defensive and offensive alliance. "If another
people (or state) should come, as an enemy, against
the lands of Rameses, the great chief of Egypt, and he
shall send to the great chief of the Hittites, saying
'Come with me with your army against him/ the great
chief of the Hittites shall come, and the great King of
the Hittites shall slay his enemy. But if it shall not
be the desire of the Great Chief of the Hittites to
come, he shall send his infantry and his chariotry, and
shall slay his enemy.

Or if Rameses, the great chief of Egypt, be provoked
against delinquent subjects, when they have committed
some other fault against him, and he come to slay
them, then the great chief of the Hittites shall act with
the lord of Egypt."

The same stipulation is repeated from the point of
view of the Hittites.

(5) Extradition of Political Refugees.

"If any great men of the land of Egypt shall flee and
shall come to the great chief of the Hittites, from
either town, or ... of the lands of Rameses, the
great chief of Egypt, and they shall come to the great
chief of the Hittites, then the great chief of the Hittites
shall not receive them, but the great chief of the
Hittites shall cause them to be brought to Rameses, the
great chief of Egypt, their lord."

Similar clauses in the favor of the Hittites.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43

(6) Religious sanction. Witnesses "of the thou-
sand Gods, of the male Gods and female Gods."1

But once more this period of the balance of power was
but of short duration. Invasions from outside weakened
most of the states and this weakness was used first by the
Assyrians and afterwards by the Persians to build up on
the ruins of the system of states of the second part of the
second millennium two subsequent enormous world-states,
that of Assyria and that of Persia. Swords and arrows
replaced treaties and international arbitration and during
the rule of the Persians, peace reigned over the oriental
world interrupted only by some expeditions against bar-
barians (from the point of view of the Persians) and by
some internal uprisings regarded by the Persians as civil
wars. The Persian world-state seemed to have decided
the future of the ancient civilized world.

Let me stop for a moment at this point in the evolution
of the ancient world. We may see that already the first
steps in the development of international relations pro-
duced the most conspicuous forms generally used even
in the modern world for the purpose of regulating these
relations: diplomatic intercourse, treaties, arbitration.
But can we speak for this period of any international law?
Hardly. Because, as I already pointed out, international
law supposes a kind of general agreement on some prin-
ciples, be they of legal or of moral and religious nature.
This was not the case in the oriental world. The sole de-
ciding force was might. Of course religious sanction
of the treaties appears as a constant phenomenon of the
oriental treaties. And I think this religious sanction was
indeed an important factor.

The economic materialists will of course contest this
statement and stubbornly affirm that the international re-

'The document, engraved on stone, is preserved in Egypt. The
Egyptian text, of which the above is a translation, is in turn, a transla-
tion from a Babylonian original, Babylonian being the diplomatic
language of the II Millennium. Cf. Langdon and Gardiner in the
Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, VI, 1920, pp. 179 and following.

44 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

lations of bourgeois-states, i. e., of all the states known to
history, except the most recent bolshevist Russia, were
the exponents of constant economic struggle caused by
"an insufficient development of productive forces, which
strive to direct towards the external world the system of
violent seizure."1 But the task of arguing with this sect
is a hopeless one, and I think that in the domain of history
they have lost their campaign entirely and finally. On the
question of correlation between religion (and of course
morals) and economics I may quote an incidental remark
of Durkheim :2 "It is impossible to deny that the eco-
nomic factor is very primitive at the dawn of history,
whereas, religious life is luxuriant and all-penetrating.
How therefore could the second proceed from the first?"

But we must take into consideration that religion shows
different stages in its evolution. All the oriental religions
remained purely national. The gods of the different ori-
ental monarchies were friendly to their nation only and
enemies of all other nations. As long, for instance, as the
Assyrian chief god, similar in this respect to our old ac-
quaintance, "the old German God", was a sworn foe of the
Egyptian Ammon and the Persian Auramazda, religious
sanction had but little binding force and the decisive word
was spoken by force of arms. Periods of "balance of
power" were under these conditions based on correlation
of armed forces and military resources only. Morals and
religion had no real importance.

The Persian Kingdom, as I have already pointed out,
seemed to have created a lasting peace for the world in
uniting all the oriental states under the rule of one King.
But the plans of the Persian Kings met, as you know,
with a stubborn resistance in a corner of the ancient world
where they hardly expected it. From the ruins of the
old Aegean civilization a system of petty and proud
Greek city-states arose around the Aegean sea, on the

*Ciccotti, La Filosofia della auerra e la guerra alia filosofia, Milano,
1905.
*Rev. Philos, XLIV (1892), 650.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 45

Balkan peninsula, on the islands, and in Asia Minor. Each
of these states created its own community, had its own
gods, its own institutions, its own laws and magistrates.
They all claimed full independence and were ready to die
for it. Better to be exterminated and sold in slavery than
to submit to the rule of a foreigner !

This land and this nation took up the inheritance of
the oriental world, adopted its forms of international
relations and diplomatic intercourse, but introduced in all
these forms a new spirit, a new conception, which led
to conditions, out of which arose not only international
relations, but a real international law.

RELIGION AS AN INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

The new aspect of international relations in the Greek
world was a result not only of another period of the bal-
ance of power in Greece, but also — and mainly — the re-
sult of great progress made in the domain of religion and
morals. I have already pointed out that the Greek city-
states zealously defended their political and economic in-
dependence. But this defense did not prevent them from
a full recognition of their unity in respect of both nation-
ality and civilization. The unity of the Greek world as it
gradually developed, was based not on an exclusively ra-
cial, but mainly on a religious, moral and cultural foun-
dation. The Greek world, even in its very beginnings,
presented no national unity. From the Greek point of
view, not every man of Greek extraction belonged to the
Greek civilized world, as opposed to the barbarian; but
every one was Greek who believed in the common Greek
gods — the Olympians — for whom Zeus and Apollo were
no mere sources of power, but creators of law and mor-
als, for whom life outside the ordered conditions of a

46 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Greek "polls", that is, outside civilization and political
freedom, could not be imagined; for whom Greek sanc-
tuaries and games were real centers not only of national,
but also of civilized life. We are too ready to forget
that behind the curtain of Greek national life lay the main
force of Greek creative power — the force which had been
able to build up a humanistic civilization, common to all
civilized beings. Hence the cosmopolitan aspect of the
ancient world and the, world-wide spread of Greek civili-
zation.

The first step on this path was made when out of the
ruin of petty tribal cults arose a pan-hellenic religion, the
religion of the great Olympians, whose appearance both
in abstract theory and as commonly portrayed was quite
Greek and cosmopolitan. The statue of the Phidian Zeus
and of his Athena are much more human than Egyptian
and Assyrian gods, and at the same time they reflect in
their superhuman, divine grandeur "the divine" — (To
Theion) — in general much more than the poor symbol of
the Persian Auramazda. It is no wonder that the classical
images of the Olympians became so familiar to the whole
civilized world and that we Christians naturally turned to
the majestic model of the Phidian Zeus when we had oc-
casion to seek an artistic symbol of the Deity. Hand in
hand with this religious development went an enormous
progress made by those deep thinkers, the Greek philoso-
phers, in the domain of morals. One result of both these
progresses was the recognition by all the Greeks of their
religious and cultural as well as national unity. The
manifestation of this recognition was the community of
legal ideas in the domain of both civil and international
law.

Never was the ancient world so near to surmounting the
ancient belief in war as the natural condition of interstatal
life as in the VI-IV century B. C. Never was it so ready
to accept as normal the condition of peace between the
different Greek states, a theory altogether similar to our
own modern concept.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 47

The main question in the domain of international law
was : How to combine political independence and naU?nal
unity. The creative genius of the Greeks tried, beginning
with the VI century, to achieve it by different means, part-
ly borrowed from their oriental teachers in the domain
of civilized life and civilized habits — treaties and arbitra-
tion, religious and political federations (amp hie ti ones) ,
—which prescribed to their members, in place of war,
peaceful solutions of their quarrels by means of arbitra-
tion carried out by the council of the respective federa-
tion,— common sanctuaries of the great gods — the tem-
ple of Zeus at Olympia, that of Zeus at Dodona, those
of Apollo at Delphi and Delos, whose oracles played an
important part in regulating interstate relations — common
games where all the cities came together to honor their
common gods by different athletic contests and the like.
The main attempts were made especially in the VI cen-
tury. It seemed as if the time was at hand when Greece
would succeed in creating a real league of Greek states
and Greek tribes. The sixth century was a great creative
epoch in the domain of international relations. War and
force were still the decisive factors of political life, but
along with them, we notice new ideas and new concepts,
and, at the same time, new forms which converted these
ideas into practice.

Let me deal with some of these forms more at length.
They continued without change during the whole period
from the VII to the III century B. C. The most impor-
tant legal monuments of international relations were of
course, the treaties. Greece recognized and used but one
form of treaty, that of an equal treaty between two free
and independent states. The Greek treaties are real Foe-
dera aequa. Take any example you like in the book of Von
Scala and you will find my statement fully confirmed. The
sanction of all treaties was a religious one. The symbol of
that sanction is the witness of the treaty, the supreme god,
the incarnation of supreme justice — Zeus, the guardian of
oaths and of good faith — (Zeus orkios kai pistios).

48 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

TrePiies were used not only for the purpose of regu-
latr.ig post war conditions, but also as means of creating
regular social and economic interstatal intercourse. Thus,
commercial treaties were common and always assumed
the same form. A treaty in Greece did not usually lead
to relations of friendship or alliance, that is to say, to an
assured federation of different states, but rather to a res-
toration of conditions of peace between two or more states.
This shows how near the Greeks were to the concept of
peace as a normal condition of interstatal life. This es-
tablishment of peace might have been agreed upon to last
forever or for some years only. The most eloquent testi-
mony for the common recognition of a national unity by
all the Greeks is the regular clause in many treaties which
usually appears at the beginning of the document, forming
a kind of introduction. I mean the clause about the mu-
tual guarding of common Greek sanctuaries. Even in the
period when force began to dominate over right, on the
eve of and during the Peloponnesian war, this idea found
an adequate expression in many documents. The first point
in the statutes of the projected league of Greek states
proposed by Pericles in 447 dealt with this common guard-
ianship and a common reconstruction of Greek sanctua-
ries destroyed by the Persians. Just at the beginning of
the treaty between Athens and Sparta of April 12, 421,
which stipulated a peace for fifty years, we read : "Con-
cerning the common sanctuaries : Anyone who wants may,
zvithout impediment, sacrifice (in the sanctuaries) and
consult the oracles and send sacred embassies according to
ancestral custom, by land or sea. The sanctuary and the
temple of Apollo in Delphi and the city of Delphi shall be
autonomous, independent in matters of taxation and of
jurisdiction, both as to the city itself and as to adjacent
territory, according to ancestral custom."1

Only from this point of view are we able to explain
the rather frequent cases of guarantee of inviolability giv-

^cala, Staatsvertr'dge, p. 67, n. 83).

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49

en to different Greek cities through different treaties con-
cluded by them with other Greek cities. Such was, for
example, the case of Teos in 193 B. C. I believe that
inviolability was conceded to Teos because of its holy and
famous temple.

VI

PEACE BY ARBITRATION IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

But the most interesting movement in Greece in the VI-
IV century was the movement towards settlement of in-
terstatal disputes and misunderstandings not by war, but
by international arbitration in a peaceful way. Arbitra-
tion was highly developed in Greece at this period. We
find different types of the procedure. Some cases were
settled by compromise, others as the result of a special
treaty, one of the clauses of which asserted as obligatory
the arbitration of all disputes arising out of the treaty it-
self. Some neutral states, appointed on a common under-
standing of the litigants, \vcre to act as arbitrators. Let
me introduce a brief sketch of the history of this institu-
tion taken from the book of one of the best specialists on
the subject, Marcus Niebuhr Tod (Greek International
Arbitration, Oxford, 1915, P. 174-178).

"That the Greeks were accustomed to arbitration
from an early period in their history, is hardly open to
doubt. Even if Pausanias' story that the Messenians
offered to submit to arbitration their dispute with
Sparta, which led to the outbreak of the first Messenian
war, be rejected as the fabrication of a later age,
reflecting back into the past the procedure familiar to
itself, we can scarcely call in question the substantial
truth of the traditions which tell of the arbitrations
between Andros and Chalcis and between Athens and
Mytilene, both of which episodes belong to the VII
Century, while the arbitral settlement, early in the VII
Century, of the struggle waged between Athens and
Megara for the possession of Salamis is assuredly
historical, however much later imagination may have
busied itself with embellishing the tale of Solon's ad-

50 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

vocacy of the Athenian course. Of any essential
modification in the methods of arbitration between the
earliest times to which our records refer and the close
of Hellenic independence we can discover no traces.
Nor should we be justified in looking for such, since
arbitral awards, though dealing normally with questions
which are legal in their nature, are based not upon law,
at least in the Greek World, which knew no codified
international law, but upon equity, and equity is far
more stable than- law.

"By the middle of the fifth century — how much
earlier than that we have no means of determining —
the Greeks had taken a decided step in advance. In-
stead of awaiting a deadlock and then consenting to
refer it to arbitration, they bound themselves on some
occasions by treaty to deal in this way with any dispute
which should arise out of the failure, alleged or real,
of either of the contracting parties to observe the terms
of the treaty, or indeed with any difference which might
threaten to disturb the peaceful relations between the
states.

"For awhile the sanguine hopes of those who looked
for great results from this stipulation seemed doomed
to disappointment. Time after time during the troubles
which thickened on the eve of the Peloponnesian War,
the Athenians appealed to the compromise clause in-
serted in the Thirty Years' Peace, but in vain, and be-
fore that peace had lasted half its span of years, Athens
and Sparta were again at war. . . . Yet this failure
of arbitration to avert a disastrous war did not, as
some observers may have feared at the time, sound the
death-knell of the institution. It emphasized the truth
that arbitration does not act automatically, that it is an
instrument the efficiency of which lies in its use. Even
in Sparta there were doubtless many who echoed the
words of Archidamus that, since the Athenians offered
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the Peace,
it was contrary to the law to attack them, words which
were probably recalled time and again during the long
years of futile war and harassing anxiety which fol-
lowed. Even those who had voted for war felt, in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 51

their calmer moments, that they had put themselves in
the wrong by refusing the Athenian invitation to settle
the dispute by arbitration, and attributed to this cause
in great part the disasters which overtook them at
Sphacteria and elsewhere. And so we find that arbitra-
tion clauses are inserted in the Year's Truce of 423, in
the Peace of Nicias (421) and in the Alliance of 418
between Sparta and Argos."

In the fourth century our evidence is more scanty, yet
we have some six or seven examples for the time before
Alexander and the scarcity might be explained by the
character of our sources. There is no Thucydides to give
us the text of the more important treaties. Thus, I en-
tirely agree with Tod that "this period was one in which
the employment of arbitration was gradually spreading
over the entire Greek World, and even the smaller states
were becoming more familiarized with this mode of put-
ting an end to disputes with their neighbors." From the
Greek states, the habit extended even to their so-called
barbarian neighbors. The most interesting case is that
of the Romans and the Tarentines. "The Tarentines de-
manded that the Romans and Samnites should desist from
their war-like preparations and submit to them the settle-
ment of their differences." The answer of the Romans to
this proposal is characteristic enough. They paid no at-
tention to those whom they scorned as a "Vanissima
gens'' — the most frivolous of peoples which, although
unable to settle its own domestic revolutions and discords,
thinks itself competent to dictate to others conditions of
war and peace.

VII

DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN ANTIQUITY

It was in the Greek World also that diplomatic relations
not only became constant, but that these relations assumed
regular and generally recognized forms. All interstatal
business was transacted through embassies and Ambassa-
dors. To be sure no permanent embassies were maintained

52 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

by the Greek states in other states ; but such permanent em-
bassies were, in the conditions of Greek life, both useless
and almost impossible. How many embassies was a small
Greek state to maintain, when there were some hundreds
of independent states in Greece alone ? Nevertheless, the
part played by diplomatic representatives in the ancient
world was important enough. It is true, there existed no
professional diplomats in the Greek cities just as there
existed no professional politicians. Every citizen was per-
fectly acquainted with the political situation and was
able to carry out successfully important diplomatic mis-
sions. As a matter of fact, the popular assemblies were
very careful in electing for these missions their most ex-
oerienced citizens, men who possessed a good knowledge
of both the actual political situation and the peculiar con-
ditions of the state to which they were to be sent.

One of the most common tasks of the popular assem-
bly was to send and to receive embassies, to hear and
to criticize the reports of embassies who came home and to
give instructions to embassies going abroad as well as to
discuss the proposals made by foreign ambassadors. I
suggest that you read the vivid and amusing picture of
such an assembly in Athens, drawn by Aristophanes in his
famous play the "Acharnians," where the people are
shown receiving reports from their embassies which have
returned from Persia and Thrace, and questioning the
Persian ambassador, Shamatarbas, the "King's Eye," in
a most searching manner.1

The only difference between the diplomacy of antiq-
uity (Greek and Roman antiquity, not that of the Orient)
and modern diplomacy consisted in the fact that ancient
diplomacy very seldom had recourse to secret proceedings
and treaties; almost all the work was done in co-operation
with the upper house and the popular assembly. It is al-
most needless to add that the ambassadors were inviolable
and exterritorial, that is, exempt from the civil jurisdic-

^otsford, A Source-Book of Ancient History, p. 196 fol.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 53

tion of the place where they -were temporarily residing.
Cicero, using of course Greek ideas, well expresses the
principle of the inviolability of ambassadors, as follows :
"The inviolability of ambassadors is protected both by di-
vine and human law; they arc sacred and respected so as
to be inviolable not only ivhen in an allied country, but also
whenever they happen to be in the midst of the forces of
enemies." (Cicero — in Verr III.)

Of the greatest interest are the measures taken by the
Greek cities to protect the material interest of aliens who
resided in their cities. We may notice even a kind of at-
tempt to create some permanent representatives in foreign
cities whose duties were to watch over the interests of both
the city which they represented and its individual citizens.
I refer to the well known institution of the proxenoi which
developed out of the already mentioned relations of hos-
pitality between individual citizens of different cities.
From the V century on, the proxenoi often became of-
ficial representatives of the city which gave them the
rights of honorary citizenship. They were appointed for
the special purpose of acting as permanent consular
agents. Sometimes they assumed diplomatic duties. One
of their chief functions was to guide the assemblies and to
present them to the magistrates, the council and the popu-
lar assembly of their city. We must not forget, however,
that the proxenoi were always citizens of the city in which
they represented the interests of another city.

Still more significant is the rich development of inter-
national jurisdiction. I cannot deal with this point at
length. You may find a good survey of the different kinds
of this jurisdiction in Philippson. Let me cite a short
quotation from his valuable book. (v. I, p. 208. )*

"Generally speaking, in time of peace, freedom of
intercourse, and especially of engaging in mercantile
transactions (epimixia corresponding approximately

'Philippson, International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and
Rome, Vol. I., p. 208.

54 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

to the Roman ius commercii) was permitted between
the citizens of different states, subject to the payment
of customs duties, port-dues, etc., and in some cases, to
restrictions respecting the exportation and importation
of certain commodities, such as oil, grain, etc. In
most towns, there was a permanent court exercising
jurisdiction over causes to which aliens were parties;
and this judicial organization, as well as the presiding
judges, were variously designated, so that we hear of
the "Xenicon dicasterion" (a general name for the for-
eign court) the "Xonodikoi" (a general name for the
presiding judges), the P demarches (the Athenian
Archon, who took special cognizance of the affairs of
aliens), the "cosmos xenios" (of Cretan towns), and
the like. These institutions and magistracies usually
existed apart from express provisions in international
conventions, but treaties were very frequently con-
cluded either to insure the due and impartial operation
of these tribunals, or to establish a new mixed court
of judges, the coinon dicasterion, and, at the same
time, nominate a third city, as a "court of appeal," in
the sense of a tribunal to which the issues were sub-
mitted for final decision after a preliminary exami-
nation by the court of first instance. As to the law
that was applied in the settlement of conflicting claims,
sometimes the lex loci contractus (the prevailing law
of the place where the engagement in question was
entered into) operated, at other times the lexdomicilii
of the defendant ; sometimes, again, broad and equitable
principles were invoked in order to effect a fair recon-
ciliation between the contending legislations of the
States concerned, and, finally, an express judicial dis-
pensation might be resorted to in virtue of an ad hoc
agreement. At first the alien suitor was obliged to
plead through the agency of the proxenus or his patron,
as the case may be, but with the expansion of commerce
and general intercourse, the increase of litigation and
the more generous attitude that came to be manifested
towards non-citizens, the foreigner was, in actual prac-
tice, and despite strict theory, commonly allowed to
appear in person and address the court, and to install

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 55

advocates to plead for him. Finally provision was
usually made for the hearing of suits within a certain
fixed period, so as to prevent an undue delay of
justice."

Space does not allow me to deal with the new ideas and
institutions given form and effect by the Greeks of this
epoch, in order to mitigate the cruel customs of warfare.
I refer to the different guarantees of neutrality, the regu-
lations of the fate of the prisoners, the treatment of the
hostages, and so on. I hope to be able to devote a special
study to this question.

Such were the achievements of the Greek World in the
domain of international relations. Their main aim was
gradually to transform Greece into a family of states
where right worked beside force, and we must say that
right did not always yield to force. Can we honestly
claim more than that for our own modern conditions ?

VIII

CONFLICT BETWEEN RIGHT AND FORCE

I have already pointed out that the Peloponnesian war
interrupted the quiet development of international rela-
tions based on religion, morals, equity and law. This war
undermined the foundations of international law and led
the world back to the crucial dilemma; — has force to
yield to right, or right to force? We cannot deny that
the triumph of force over right was a result not only of
the political development of the Greek World, but also of
a strong intellectual current headed by the so-called soph-
ists who sought and found theoretical proof for their
thesis as to the dominating part played by force in human
life. In international relations the principle was worked
out as the predominance of the interests of the state over
the interests of law and justice.

Let me bring forward some quotations from different
political speeches of this epoch transmitted to us by Thu-

56 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

cydides. They will show how great was the difference
between the two points of view. The Corinthians, for ex-
ample, had occasion to formulate the old principle of
Greek morals. It was on the eve of the great war, in
433. "Do not say to yourselves that one thing is just, but
that in the event of war another thing is expedient; for the
true path of expediency is the path of right. . . . To do no
wrong to a neighbor is a more certain source of power
than to gain a perilous advantage under the influence of a
momentary illusion."' (Thucydides I, 42.) The new so-
phistical point of view is fully expressed in an answer
given in 432 by the Athenian ambassador in reply to argu-
ments of the Spartan magistrates similar to those of the
Corinthians quoted above. It reminds us on one hand
of the discussion of the same problem by the sophist Thra-
symachus and Socrates in one of the dialogues of Plato
(The Republic I), and on the other hand of so many
proclamations and pamphlets published during the great
war by the Germans.

"An empire was offered to us," said the Athenian
ambassador. "Can you wonder that, acting as human
nature always will, we accepted it and refused to give
it up again, constrained by three all-powerful motives
— ambition, fear, interest? We are not the first who
have aspired to rule; the world has ever held that
the weaker must be kept down by the stronger. And
we think that we are worthy of power, and there was
a time when you thought so too; but now, when you
mean expediency, you talk about justice. Did justice
ever deter anyone from taking by force whatever he
could?" (Thuc. I, 76.)

The prevailing of these ideas brought with it very im-
portant results. First Athens and then Sparta domina-
ted the Greek world. The balance of power seemed to be
gone forever and force appeared to have triumphed over
right. And yet it was not so. Although might was the
deciding factor it was never supported by public opinion.
The oppressor was always recognized as such and this
moral censorship made certain the weakness of all im-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 57

perialist attempts based on force alone. We have already
seen that treaty-making and arbitration were being de-
veloped in spite of frequent wars and we are not sur-
prised therefore that Sparta's victory over Athens did not
create a lasting hegemony for her. A kind of balance
of power was soon re-established. But the balance of
power of the IV century B. C. was more like a state of
political anarchy than an order by system of independent
states — an anarchy which considerably weakened Greece
as a whole and enabled first the Persian King, and later
the Kings of Macedonia, to dictate their will to the dif-
ferent political combinations which appeared and disap-
peared in Greece like mushrooms. This process of com-
plete disintegration was ended first by the so-called peace
of Antalkides (386 B. C.), which made Greece subject
to the Persian King, and later by the battle of Chaeron-
aea which established Macedonian domination in Greece.
And yet this troubled period in the history of Greece, full
of wars, social unrest and revolutions, was an epoch of
important progress in the domain of international rela-
tions. Hand in hand with the growing process of disin-
tegration went the process of varied attempts to settle in-
terstate conflicts in a peaceful way. I have already spo-
ken of arbitration. We may notice the same evolution in
other domains. Diplomatic intercourse was never before
so lively or so elaborate. Warfare was better regulated
by international understandings and by the force of pub-
lic opinion than in the VI and V Century. New and pro-
gressive forms of relations between governments were
created, such as the different federations of Greek cities
(the Achaean and Aetolian federations).

IX

PERIOD OF CONSTANT FLUX

The next stage in the political evolution of the ancient
world was the reestablishment of the world-state by Alex-
ander the Great. This was the substitution for the Per-

58 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

sian domination of a world-domination of Greek elements
united around the Macedonian state. The world-mon-
archy of Alexander was in no respect a new political
form. Alexander preserved all the peculiarities of the
Persian empire. The only change brought in by him was
the substitution of a new dominating class for the old
one. The Greeks and Macedonians replaced the Iranians
as the ruling element. Greece remained legally free, but
in fact it was simply a portion of the new world-state. In-
deed, the "freedom" of Greece was strongly emphasized
by the new ruler, but this freedom meant of course pro-
tection, like the freedom of the peace of Antalkides and
subsequently the freedom of the peace of Flamininus.
Alexander's world-empire did not last long. The disin-
tegrating forces within the empire were too strong to
maintain the artificial unity of the Greek Occident and the
multi-national Orient. Alexander's empire soon fell to
pieces and out of its ruin arose many powerful Graeco-
Oriental states. The leading powers were — Syria, Egypt,
Macedonia.

Two processes might be noticed during the so-called
Hellenistic period. One led towards the reintegration of
the Persian and Macedonian World-empire, while the
other opposed this movement towards centralization by all
means and resulted in separating from the big states new
political formations, both kingdoms and city-states: Per-
gamon, Bithynia, Galatia, Pontus, Cappadocia, Comma-
gene, Armenia, Parthia, on one side and Rhodes, Sparta,
Athens, and the Achean, Aetolian and Lycian federations
on the other. Thus there once more reappeared the
balance of power which lasted this time about two cen-
turies and which was as creative in the field of internation-
al relations as had been the earlier balances of power, —
that of the second millennium B. C. and that of the Greek
city-states of the VI-IV century B. C. Diplomatic re-
lations were lively and constant. Never before was ex-
change of embassies and special envoys so regular and the
matters discussed by them so complicated. Never before

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59

were concluded so many treaties, which of course were
broken sometimes within a few months of the dates of
signature. Never before and never after was international
arbitration in such constant use, to be sure, principally
between the legally "free" but practically "protected" pet-
ty Greek states. Those who acted as arbitrators were
generally the mighty protectors, the kings of the great
Monarchies. Wars were conducted in the most chival-
rous manner, were of short duration, and led generally to
new political combinations defined by elaborate treaties.

The most important process during this period was that
of a gradual formation of a world civil law, of a Reichs-
rccht or Jus Gentium^ The extreme mixture of races in
all the new states, the constant emigration from one cen-
tre to another, the numerous colonies of "foreigners" in
all the Hellenistic states like the Jewish colonies in Egypt,
Asia Minor and Greece, called imperatively for the crea-
tion of a system of law equally intelligible to all the con-
stituent parts of the cosmopolitan states of this epoch.
An intensive world-commerce everywhere required stand-
ards calculated to facilitate commercial relations and
based on generally accepted principles.

The main outline of this new international law was
taken from Athens, whose world-commerce preceded that
of the Hellenistic epoch. The different codes of laws
published in different countries were practically all based
on the Athenian laws. Just as in matters of language,
a kind of juridical common agreement (Koine) guided
the decisions of the different courts which acted in differ-
ent countries. This enormous work was not carried out to
the extent of formulating an international civil law, but
it went far enough to enable Rome during the period of
her world-domination to build up her system of world-
civil law on a basis of equal application throughout the
constituent parts of the Roman Empire.

In one branch, however, we may notice quite positive
and practically definite results. I mean the general mari-
time law, elaborated and put into general circulation by

60 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Rhodes, which acted in this respect as a kind of manda-
tory of all the Hellenistic powers interested in the
safety of the seas and in an undisturbed maritime com-

merce.1

Nevertheless, we must confess that the Hellenistic
epoch was by no means a triumph of right over might.
Force and fortune were the watchwords of this epoch.
But the period in itself had its great importance. Besides
the development of civil international law which grad-
ually assimilated witH the civil law in general, we witness
during this period a spread of Greek ideas over all the
world. What had been an interstate law of Greek city-
states then became the unwritten code of rules and cus-
tom, forming a kind of foundation for the international
relations of the whole civilized world both in the Orient
and in the Occident, in Syria and Egypt as well as in
Carthage and in Italy. Force and the interests of the
States played, of course, the predominant part in the
complicated life of this period. But the standard-bearers
of this force were Greeks. They belonged to the Greek
World and were brought up in the principles of Greek
civilization. Their mentality and their education were
Greek and their ideals as well. We- can readily under-
stand why Greek ideas on international relations formed a
kind of subconscious stratum in the acts of the political
rulers of the Hellenistic world. It must be borne in mind,
however, that the most important feature of the Hellenis-
tic age was not any new achievements in the field of in-
ternational law, but the gradual transformation of its
principles into institutions which helped to organize the
internal life of the vast and complex states of this
epoch. I need only mention again, in this connection,
the use of international arbitration and civil inter-
national law.

'S. W. Ashburner, The Rhodian Sea Law, Oxford, 1909, treats not
the Hellenistic Law of Rhodes but a Byzantine derivation, as I incline
to think, of the Hellenistic original. On the Hellenistic law, see Van
Gelder, Geschichte der Alt en Rhodier.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 61

X

THE ROMAN THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This process was further developed by Rome, who in-
herited from the Hellenistic world not only the main ideas
of world-power, but also the various legal forms used by
the Greeks. But the whole system of Rome's interna-
tional relations, although influenced by Greek achieve-
ments, was peculiar and independent. Greek influence did
not change its main character. Generally speaking the
Roman system, though quite elaborate, was based on
more primitive and more elementary conceptions than
those elaborated by the Greeks. The main Roman idea
was the ancient one of war as the natural status of inter-
national intercourse.

The difference between Greece and Rome as regards
international relations found an adequate expression in the
utterly different treatment by Greece and Rome of inter-
national treaties which formed the basis of international
relations in both countries. The Roman treaty was never
a treaty which contented itself with restoring peace be-
tween herself and another state, that is, their previous
normal relations. Rome's treaties always created one or
another kind of perpetual relation between the two par-
ties, either of friendship or of alliance. Both of these
relations were certain to give rise to a definite legal status
between the two states. Of course, originally these legal
relations were elaborated on a basis of equality, and the
form of the Roman treaty is that of an equal treaty (foe-
dus aequum) between independent states. But gradually,
by means of clauses added to the body of the treaty, the
treaty of friendship became transformed into a treaty
which effected vassalage, the treaty of alliance into a
treaty of dependence. Both forms of treaties were, of
course, intended to last an indefinite time. Thus it came
about that Rome did not know treaties limited in time,
but only treaties of supposedly unlimited duration.

62 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Another fundamental point in Roman international
practice and theory was that Rome, in her estimate of
justice or injustice, of legality or illegality, of all acts
of an international character, took not an international but
exclusively the Roman point of view. The sole question
for Rome is always : Does one or another act correspond
to the political and juridical standards prevailing in
Rome? Does it or does it not fulfill the requirements of
Roman morals and religion? For Rome justum bellum
"the righteous war" was a war declared by Rome with due
regard for the usual religious and legal forms and with all
the formalities prescribed by the body of international
and religious customary principles elaborated and inter-
preted by the College of Fetiales. Every war must have
had some legal cause, but legal from the point of view
of existing Roman law. Therefore, the Romans were
right in declaring that they never conducted any but
legal wars (iusta bella). "Legal" meant in their mind
both legal from the juridical point of view and "just"
from the moral point of view. The treaties concluded by
the Romans were always formulated according to a cer-
tain type elaborated once for all by themselves. This type
was regarded as, and intended to be, a foedus aequum—
an "equal treaty". But it also would frequently comprise
supplementary clauses, which might change the whole
character of the treaty. Nevertheless, from the legal point
of view the treaty was always to be regarded as one con-
cluded with due regard for all the forms of the law of
Rome.

From the same point of view, Rome guided the civil
intercourse between herself and other cities. The so-
called jus gentium of the Romans was nothing but Ro-
man civil law adapted to the regulation of the relations
of Roman citizens and citizens of other cities which were
friends and allies of the Roman people. With men who
did not belong to these two categories, Rome was sup-
posed not to have any legal relations whatever. We read,
for example, in the Digest 49, 15 : "If with certain na-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 63

tions we have no connection of friendship or hospitality
and no treaty concluded in order to establish friendship,
the men of these nations are not our enemies (hostes)
(a concession to Greek ideas) but if anything belonging
to us happens to come into their possession, it becomes
their own and a free man of ours taken captive becomes
their slave ; the same in the case of anything belonging to
them if it comes into our hands."

When Rome came in close contact with the Greek world
she adopted many details of the Greek international usage.
Rome made her own the Greek system of diplomatic rela-
tions ; she modified many expressions in her treaties, she
used the procedure of international arbitration, as Persia
and the Hellenistic monarchies had used it before her, ex-
clusively regulating relations between her Greek allies.
But Rome never modified the essence of her international
principles and never adopted the fundamental ideas of
Greek international law.

By force of arms, Rome secured for herself a unique
position in the family of civilized nations. As the Roman
forms of international law were well adapted to this para-
mount position, Rome never seriously contemplated
changing them, but retained them throughout her history.
She ordered and expected to be obeyed. Even when she
acted as arbitrator, she expected to be obeyed. Let me
cite but one example. Antiochus IV, King of Syria, at-
tempted to conquer Egypt. He was with his army in
Egypt and was moving towards Alexandria. Suddenly
his way was barred by the Roman praetor, Popillius, with
his staff, but without an army.

"Popillius, the Roman praetor," says Polybius
(XXIX, II) (2, 27), "was greeted at a great distance
by the king; he did not accept the hand which was
stretched towards him, but gave the king tablets, on
which was written the Senatus-consultum; he de-
manded that the king should first read the Senate's de-
cision. . . . After having read this senatus-consultum

64 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the king answered that he must confer with his friends,
as to how to act. But Popillius . . . who happened
to have in his hand a vine-stick traced a circle in the
ground around Antiochus and required the king to
give an immediate answer. The king, struck by this
haughty behavior, after a brief period of hesitation,
declared that he would do all that was ordered by the
Roman people. ... It was set forth in the senatus-
consultum that the king was immediately to end the
war against Ptolemy."

It was thus that Rome created her world-state. But
we must not forget that this state was built up by incor-
porating in it all the Hellenized parts of the ancient world
and that the western parts of it were shaped according
to Greek models. In the internal structure of her world-
state Rome introduced many principles which had been
evoked in the international law of the Greeks, for the
Roman world-state was an international state. Moreover,
Rome brought to a point of realization many Greek as-
pirations which could never have been accomplished by
the Greek World. Common peace became a reality, like-
wise a world system of civil law.

It is evident that even after having established her
world empire Rome had to deal with neighbors, both in
time of war and in time of peace. Therefore diplomatic
relations with them never ceased to exist.1 But from the
point of view of international law, Rome never recognized
the legal existence of the German or Iranian states. She
never treated them as her equals.

Let me conclude this paper on the international law
of the Ancient world by quoting the words of Augustus,
the founder of the Roman Empire, as to his international
achievements. In his statement to the Roman people,
which he himself carefully composed and ordered to be

'One of the most interesting institutions of this epoch is the corps
of diplomatic interpreters, the forerunners of our "dragomans" in
Oriental countries. Cf. J. Snellmann, De Interpretitus Romanorum,
Leipzig, 1920.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 65

engraved, after his death, on bronze pillars posted before

his mausoleum, he said :

"I extended the frontiers of all the Roman provinces
which are bordered by peoples not subject to our
dominion." After having enumerated these conquests
of his, he proceeds: "To me there were often sent
embassies from India, such as had never been seen by
any one of the Roman commanders. Our friendship
was besought by embassies of the Bastarmians and
Scythians, of the kings of the Sarmatians, who dwell
beyond the Tanais and further to the east, of the king
of the Albanians, as well as by emissaries of the kings
of the Iberians and the Medes." . . . "To me,
Phraates, the son of Orodes, sent all his sons and grand-
sons, although not vanquished in war, but in order to
ask our friendship by giving us his sons as hostages.
During the time I held the office of princeps, peoples
that had never before had any exchange of embassies
and friendship with us were acquainted with the good
faith (fides) of the Roman people."

The words of Augustus in which the Roman concep-
tion of her supremacy over the world were so proudly
expressed became a kind of gospel for his successors.
The Roman theory which did not recognize any equals
to the Empire, — the only "legal" world-state, — remained
unchanged as long as that empire endured.

Such are the essential features of the development of
international relations in the ancient world. Like our own,
they very often change their aspect. Antiquity had its
epochs of creative work and its periods of stagnation and
decay. But some fundamental concepts and some gen-
eral ideas, once accepted, were never forgotten. Al-
though apparently the modern world began its evolution
in somewhat primitive conditions, we must not forget that
these conditions had as their foundation all the most im-
portant ideas of the ancient world, and, first of all, the
Romano, and the common Christian faith.

MICHAEL ROSTOVTSEFF.

Medieval Diplomacy

MEDIEVAL DIPLOMACY

THE MEDIEVAL HERITAGE

In spite of calumny against the Middle Ages on the part
of a past generation of modern historians and in the teeth
of the resultant popular prejudice nowadays against the
very word "medieval," there has been in the last century
an ever-growing appreciation among scholars of the vast
debt which we moderns owe to the Middle Age. The Mid-
dle Age is the bridge between the Roman Empire of antiq-
uity and the national states of modern times. It is the
medium through which antique culture has been transmit-
ted to our contemporary world. Nay, more ; it is the liv-
ing organism in which have germinated and developed
the cardinal institutions and customs of the present day.
In a real sense the Middle Age is the mother of modern-
ity.

We moderns usually admit, since the time of Chateau-
briand and Schlegel and Ozanam, that the artistic and ro-
mantic heritage of the Middle Age has been considerable
— Gothic architecture, illuminated manuscripts, tapestries
and embroideries, the songs of the troubadours, the paint-
ings of a Giotto, the poems of a Dante. But this is only
one aspect of what present-day scholars recognize as our
debt to the Middle Age. Mr. Rashdall has attributed to
it the genesis of our ideas of university-organization and
university-education. Dr. James J. Walsh has ascribed to
it the patronage of experimental science and remarkable
progress in astronomy, engineering, and medicine. The
late Professor Maitland emphasized the medieval charac-
ter of the English common law and administrative pro-

69

70 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

cedure as well as the essential medievalism of our institu-
tions of representative government and trial by jury.
Moreover, contemporary political scientists are making
the Middle Age the field of their researches into the nature
of sovereignty and functional representation ; and leaders
of the present gild socialist movement in England are
seeking to solve social and economic problems by re-
course to medieval ideas and medieval practices. And no
sooner is a League of Nations projected than students
of international relations and diplomacy turn back to the
times which witnessed the most fruitful growth of these
things — the Middle Ages.

Before undertaking to appraise the influence of the
Middle Age upon the evolution of diplomacy and inter-
national relations, it is important that we recognize cer-
tain outstanding characteristics of the period itself. One
of these characteristics is the absence of any political in-
stitution uniting all civilized peoples in a common secu-
lar bond, such as the Roman Empire had been in ancient
times, and the substitution of a most bewildering pro-
vincialism and localism. In the fifth and sixth centuries
of the Christian era the Roman Empire finally fell a prey,
so far as central and western Europe was concerned, to
the spasmodic incursions and constant immigration of
semi-barbarous Teutons from the forest and swamps to
the north. These Teutons, like all primitive peoples, were
clannish and quarrelsome; devoted to their own folk-
traditions, they cared little for the traditions of cultured
Greeks or cultivated Latins ; they had neither the natural
bent nor the intellectual equipment to enable them to main-
tain intact the might and majesty of the universal Roman
Empire. As the Teutons settled down within the confines
of the Empire — Angles and Saxons in Britain, Franks
and Burgundians in Gaul, Visigoths in Spain, and Lom-
bards in northern Italy — they acknowledged no political
obedience save to their tribal kings and to their military
chieftains. At the same time they modified the landown-
ing and agricultural system of the Roman provincials in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 71

accordance with their own customs and adapted it to their
own uses. And gradually, from this juncture of circum-
stances, there evolved the distinctively medieval institu-
tions of the manor and of feudalism, and the almost equal-
ly distinctive practice of private warfare. There is a basic
truth, as well as a pun, in the statement that the feud
was a natural accompaniment of feudalism.

In other words, local dominion supplanted world do-
minion in the Middle Age. The principle of universal
law was pushed into the background. And instead of re-
cruiting and utilizing legionary soldiers for the preserva-
tion of a Pax Romana, the kings and dukes and counts
of innumerable medieval principalities armed their re-
spective retainers and waged war freely with one an-
other.

As the Middle Age progressed the worst of these feat-
ures of localism tended to disappear. The Teutons were
gradually civilized; feudalism was slowly subjected to a
central political authority; and private warfare was
curbed. Yet so ingrained was the spirit of provincialism
in the hearts and minds of medieval men generally from
the fifth to the fifteenth centuries that these later achieve-
ments paved the way not for the restoration of universal
empire and universal peace, but for the establishment of
sovereign national states on the basis of the tribal king-
doms and for the development of a regular system of in-
ternational relationships, not least notable among which
was the relationship of war.

One of the major characteristics of the Middle Age,
then, is localism. But it is localism in fact rather than in
theory. For such medieval persons as cared for theories
—and there were very many such persons — world domin-
ion still appealed with irresistible force and logic as an
ideal. Paradoxical as it may seem, the ancient idea of
universal empire dominated the Middle Age side-by-side
with actual feudalism and tribal monarchy. The theory
was far more conservative than the fact, and both were
equally characteristic of medieval Europe.

72 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Long after the disruption and deliquescence of the Em-
pire of the Caesars, the Roman imperial concept survived.
Greek rulers at Constantinople called themselves Roman
emperors and laid claim to secular supremacy until the
final extinction of their little state by the Ottoman Turks
in 1453. The stalwart Prankish Chieftain Charlemagne
temporarily federated divers Teutonic tribes and had him-
self crowned as Roman Emporer in 800. And in 962 the
German prince, Otto the Great, was so impressed with
the imperial concept that he, too, appropriated the impe-
rial title and, in effect, created that Holy Roman Empire
of the Germans which endured throughout the whole Mid-
dle Age and as a fiction, down to the time of Napoleon
Bonaparte in 1806. The pretensions of this medieval
Holy Roman Empire to secular supremacy and world-
dominion were as pompous and embracing as its actual
position was preposterous. Neither the Holy Roman Em-
peror in Germany nor the Graeco-Byzantine Emperor at
Constantinople would recognize as equals the sovereigns
of the kingdoms that were growing up about them; and
without at least a theoretical equality of independent sov-
ereign states international relations in the modern sense
were impossible. Localism, one characteristic of the
Middle Age, tended to prepare the way for internation-
alism ; the survival of the imperial concept, a second char-
acteristic of the Middle Age, tended to block or impede
that way.

The third and last of these medieval characteristics to
which I would especially invite your attention is the ec-
clesiastical. Throughout the entire period from the fifth to
the fifteenth centuries the great bulk of Europeans with
whom we have to deal were members of the Catholic
Church, inheriting the religious truths and moral pre-
cepts of Jesus of Nazareth, that Divine Revolutionist in
the midst of the ancient Roman Empire, and living in
their own day under their priests and bishops graded in
a vast hierarchy up to the bishop of Rome, the Pope,
Christ's vicar on Earth. Amid all the changes which at-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 73

tended Teutonic immigration and incursion, there was one
form of authority which did not change, except to in-
crease its importance. Not only did the Church pre-
serve ancient culture and convert and civilize the bar-
barians hut it was the only bond of union which still held
together the fragments of the old Roman world. The
Teutonic kingdoms tended toward local isolation, but the
Church supplied a medium of general intercourse. Every-
where in the West its traditions and interests were iden-
tical, and the turmoil and upheaval of the time only
strengthened its sense of solidarity.

This point cannot be stressed too emphatically. Just
when the Roman Empire was disintegrating and when
feudalism was developing with its localism and private
warfare, the persistent longing for universality found
fruitful expression not so much in a Byzantine Empire
or in a Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation as in
the concept of Christendom. And Christendom was a
fact, not a theory. For the Catholic Church of the Mid-
dle Age, especially its central agency, the Papacy, di-
rected the conscience of Europe, legislated for the newly-
converted peoples, and drew to itself the representatives
of every civilized tribe, and in doing all these things the
Papacy could not fail to impress on Christian peoples,
whether of Scotland or Italy, whether of Spain or Hun-
gary, a sense of their common faith. It was the Papacy
which, therefore, at one and the same time, by treating
each nation as a separate unit, expressed in a primate with
his suffragan bishops, and yet by legislating identically
in matters of faith and morals for all the "nations, ex-
pounded a two-fold thesis of nationalism and interna-
tionalism. The Catholic Church was by all odds the most
important distinctive institution of the Middle Age, and
the Catholic Church never ceased to insist that the na-
tions were separate individuals, yet members of a Chris-
tian brotherhood, that they were moral persons yet sub-
ject to the common law of Christendom.

74 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

II

MEDIEVAL CHURCHMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Politically Europe was divided during the greater part
of the Middle Age into two Empires — the Byzantine and
the Holy Roman — and a large number of tribal king-
doms. Socially during the same period Europe was sub-
divided into principalities and baronies — the estates of
feudal nobles. If these divisions and subdivisions are
viewed as centrifugal forces in Christendom, the Papacy
and the Catholic Christian Church which it represented
and for which it authoritatively spoke, must be consid-
ered as a counterbalancing centripetal force. All Chris-
tendom continued to look to Rome as the centre of world
unity, albeit now it was the Rome of the popes rather than
the Rome of the emperors.

The words of Christ to Saint Peter and the tradition
of the popes as bishops of Rome and successors to the
Prince of the Apostles would suffice to explain why the
papacy was generally recognized and honored as the re-
ligious and moral head of Christendom. But apart from
strictly religious and theological considerations, the influ-
ence of the papacy was undoubtedly strengthened by a
curious political and territorial situation. It so happened
that the only state in the Middle Age which had direct
continuity with the ancient Roman Empire was that com-
monly known as the Byzantine Empire, with its capital at
Constantinople; and Rome was so far away from Con-
stantinople and so separated from it by restless Teu-
tonic tribes that the Byzantine emperors were never able
to subject the popes to their political sway. The result
was that fairly early the bishops of Rome came to exercise
political, as well as strictly ecclesiastical, power in central
Italy. Moreover, the reestablishment of an empire in the
West, whether of Charlemagne or of Otto the Great, was
effected by papal action. And when it is borne in mind
that most of the Teutonic tribesmen were converted to
Christianity by missionaries despatched from Rome, and

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 75

that practically all medieval kings were crowned by
bishops of the Catholic Church, it is easy to understand
how and why the Catholic Church and the Papacy, instead
of becoming mere adjuncts to secular governments, rose
superior to them and served not only as spiritual cement
but also as political mortar.

Christendom of the Middle Age, like the Roman Em-
pire of ancient times, was, in a sense, a federation of many
nations for the purpose of preserving peace both within
the federation and against barbarians outside. But while
the ancient emperors were primarily political and mili-
tary autocrats who incidentally utilized religion to serve
their ends, the medieval popes were first and foremost re-
ligious and moral leaders, who from the exigencies of the
times exercised political and even military power.

There was another contrast between the ancient Ro-
man Empire and the Medieval Church of special signifi-
cance to us. The Roman Emperors exercised direct polit-
ical sway over so many nations that they could recognize
no international law in its modern meaning. In their
time there was hardly an international society; the Ro-
man and Parthian Empires between them divided the civil-
ized world in which international relations on anything
like an equal footing were possible. And the justly cele-
brated Roman jurists, who conferred upon posterity the
heritage of the Roman civil law, never worked out a sys-
tem of international law. To be sure, the jurists ex-
pounded the ius gentium (the "law of nations"), but it
was common" law based on the ins naturale (the "law of
nature"), for the benefit of foreigners living within the
Empire, rather than international law in its modern sig-
nificance. On the other hand, the Catholic Church of the
Middle Age exercised universal political dominion so in-
directly and with so many qualifications that it could not
and would not arrest the growth of theoretically equal
and sovereign states throughout Europe. Such state con-
stituted potentially an international society within which
real international law could develop.

76 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

It was, in fact, the Catholic Church which laid and
blessed the corner-stone of modern international law. A
famous Spanish churchman early in the seventh century,
Saint Isidore, archbishop of Seville, in his great encyclo-
pedic work popularly called "The Etymologies" reserves
the term ius gentium for what we should now describe as
international law, so that here for the first time we find
that term fairly translatable by "law of nations." All the
remaining matter of the ius gentium of the Roman jurists,
namely, the law common to all nations (ius commune om-
nium nationum), he incorporates in ius naturale. In other
words, Isidore of Seville distinguishes clearly between the
ius naturale and the ius gentium. The latter, he says, has
to do with "the occupation of territory, the building and
fortification of cities and castles, wars, captivities, enslave-
ments, the recovery of rights of postliminy, treaties of
peace and others, the scruple which protects ambassadors
from violence, and prohibitions of marriage between per-
sons of different nationality."

Isidore's definition of ius gentium and his distinction
between "natural law" and the "law of nations" were of
lasting importance, because they were accepted by his
numerous later commentators and in the twelfth century
were incorporated in Gratian's great code of canon law.
Henceforth they were truisms of ecclesiastical jurispru-
dence.

In numerous ways the Catholic Church contributed in
the Middle Age to the development of international law.
Aside from sanctioning Isidore's distinctions and defini-
tions, the Church performed a peculiarly significant serv-
ice by her constant efforts to curb private warfare and to
impress upon the minds of her children the value of law
and of peaceful methods of settling disputes. The pax ec-
clesiae, which as a definite institution is first heard of at
three ecclesiastical synods held in different parts of south-
ern and central France in 990, was intended to lessen the
evils of private warfare by placing non-combatants under
the special protection of the Church ; it forbade, under pain

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 77

of excommunication, every act of private warfare or vio-
lence against ecclesiastical buildings and their environs,
and against certain classes of persons, such as clerics, pil-
grims, merchants, women and peasants and against cattle
and agricultural implements. The pax ecclesiae speedily
spread throughout France and Burgundy, and diocesan
leagues began to be organized for its maintenance. The
bishop or count on whose lands the peace was violated
was vested with judicial authority, and was directed, in
case he was himself unable to execute sentence, to sum-
mon to his assistance the laymen and even the clerics
of the diocese, all of whom were required to take a sol-
emn oath to observe and enforce the peace.

Ill

THE TRUCE OF GOD, CHIVALRY, PAPAL AMBASSADORS

A most interesting supplement to the pax ecclesiae was
provided in the eleventh century by the formulation of
what is known as the Truce of God. In 1027 at the call
of their bishop a synod of local clergy and laity met in
the country of Roussillon, in the Pyrenees, and agreed
that no man should assail another on the Lord's Day. In
1040 a larger assembly of prelates and nobles, under the
presidency of the archbishop of Narbonne, extended the
truce from the Wednesday evening to the Monday morn-
ing of every week, as well as during the seasons of Lent
and Advent, the three vigils and feasts of the Blessed
Virgin and those of the Twelve Apostles and a few other
saints. The Truce of God in this form was decreed for
Flanders in 1063, was introduced into Germany in 1082,
and was instituted in southern Italy in 1089. In IO95
Pope Urban II decreed it for all Christendom, adding a
guarantee of safety to all who might take refuge at a
wavside cross or at the plough. The Truce of God was
reaffirmed by many councils, such as that held at Rheims

78 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

by Pope Calixtus II in 1119, and the Lateran Councils of
1123, 1139, and 1179.

The means employed for enforcing the Truce of God
remained essentially the same : spiritual penalties, such as
excommunication, special ecclesiastical tribunals, sworn
leagues of peace, and assistance from the temporal power.
Pope Urban II, for example, prescribed that the oath of
adherence to the truce be taken every three years by all
men above the age of twelve, whether noble, burgess,
villein or serf.

Of the pax ecclesiae in general, and of the Truce of God
in particular, the direct results were disappointing. For not
only was the diocesan militia always very imperfect, but
feudal society, so long as it retained political power, was
inherently hostile to the principle and practice of private
peace. The indirect results, however, cannot be overes-
timated. For what in this sphere the Church failed to do
itself, it eventually inspired the rulers of the several states
to do, and "ecclesiastical peace" proved to be the fore-
runner and prerequisite to "royal peace." The provisions
of the Truce of God were often incorporated verbatim in
municipal and district statutes, such as the laws of Barce-
lona (1067). In 1085 Henry IV approved the extension
O'f the truce to the Holy Roman Empire, and in the fol-
lowing century imperial laws prohibited private warfare
altogether. In 1257 Saint Louis forbade all private wars
in his French lands.

Not only by the Truce of God, which during these cen-
turies the Church endeavored to impose upon the bellicose
feudal barons, but in the realm of justice also, a like in-
fluence was exerted both by precept and example. In the
courts of the feudal lords, the judgment of God was
sought by the trial of battle, where litigants, witnesses,
and judges decided the case by some form of physical
combat. But in the ecclesiastical courts, justice was de-
termined by the methods and prescriptions of the canon
law, which always relied upon reason and equity. And
here again, prior to the revival of Roman law in western

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 79

Kurope, the canon law of the Catholic Church must be
credited with inspiring and fostering the growth of royal
justice and royal law.

Hand in glove with the Truce of God and with the
Canon Law went the Catholic teaching of chivalry and the
Catholic preaching of the Crusades. While the Church
was using its authority and example to ameliorate the
abuses of private warfare in Europe, it was elevating and
consecrating the power of the sword by means of the cru-
sades and the spirit of chivalry. "By its protection of the
helpless and innocent, which was made the ambition of the
Christian Knight, chivalry was at the same time ennobling
the practice of arms and preparing the forces which were
to overthrow feudalism as a social institution. The rec-
ognition of the rights of the humble, the association of
the crusaders in a common cause, the formation of codes
of honor, the emancipation of men from feudal obliga-
tions as a reward for their heroic deeds, the return to
their places of origin of a new class of free men, were all
to constitute a new leaven for the reorganization of so-
ciety. A new spirit, more refined and more enlightened,
was borne back to feudal Europe from the battlefields of
Asia." (Hill, History of Diplomacy, I, 27^?) The Cru-
sades which made war a weapon of common defence
rather than an instrument of mutual destruction, tended
in conjunction with the operation of the canon law and
the pax ecclesiae, to supplant the reign of force by a reign
of law.

It was not alone in securing the supremacy of law or
in laying the foundation for international law, that the
Catholic Church of the Middle Age performed most sig-
nal services. Diplomacy, too, owes much to the Church,
especially to the Papacy. From early times it became cus-
tomary for the pope to despatch special envoys (legati)
from Rome to attend ecclesiastical councils or to investi-
gate conditions in outlying provinces, and as time went
on and the papacy found itself compelled to assume cer-
tain political and judicial powers, its legates discharged

80 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

political, as well as strictly ecclesiastical, functions. In view
of the special importance attaching to the relations between
the Papacy and the Byzantine Empire, particularly after
the Teutonic invasions, the popes maintained more or less
permanent ambassadors at the imperial court at Constan-
tinople, who were called apocrisiarii or responsales. The
first of these apocrisiarii seems to have been Julian. Bishop
of Cos, accredited by Saint Leo the Great to Emperor
Marcian (450-457). Thenceforth for three centuries, un-
til relations between Rome and Constantinople were sev-
ered on account of the iconoclastic troubles, there were al-
ways, apart from a few brief intervals, papal apocrisiarii
at the Byzantine court. The pope likewise maintained a
permanent apocrisiarius at the court of the exarch at Ra-
venna; and in turn, at least during the reign of Gregory
I, the archbishop of Ravenna had a special responsalis at
the papal court. That the procedure and etiquette attend-
ing the diplomatic intercourse of the Byzantine Emperors
with other rulers throughout the Middle Age, owed much
to ecclesiastical influence, is clearly demonstrated on the
pages of that curious manual and guidebook De ceremo-
mis — a monument in the history of diplomacy — which
the Emperor Constantine VII (Porphyrogenetus) dicta-
ted in the tenth century.

Throughout the later middle ages the popes frequently
sent special ambassadors (legati a later e, if they were car-
dinals; legati missi, if they were below cardinalitial rank)
to the Holy Roman Emperor and to the kings of Eng-
land, France, Castile, Aragon, Naples, Hungary, etc. Al-
though these ambassadors were sent for particular eccle-
siastical purposes, the monarchs to whom they were ac-
credited gradually adapted the practice to their own ends.
In diplomacy, as in the establishment of law and the sup-
pression of private war, the European states profited by
the example of the Catholic Church.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 81

IV

THi: CATHOLIC IDEAL OF UNIVERSAL PEACE

Midway in the Middle Age — let us say in the twelfth
century — one might have been justified in concluding,
from what has been said, that a most promising interna-
tional society was taking form under the auspices of the
Catholic Christian Church. Tribes were becoming crys-
tallized into nations. Nations were becoming consoli-
dated as independent and sovereign states under kings.
The kings, in concert with the ecclesiastical authorities,
were building up, within their respective dominions, a sys-
tem of law and justice, and were curbing private welfare.
Among the new states, moreover, commercial and diplo-
matic intercourse was developing, and already there ex-
isted the embryo of an international federation, a league of
free Christian nations. For such a league the ground-
work was prepared in the community of national inter-
ests provided by the common Catholic faith and by the
universal similarity of institutions and methods through-
out Christendom, in the great co-operative enterprise of
the Crusades, and in the growing practice of submitting
international disputes to papal arbitration.

It is, from my standpoint, a tragedy of the Middle Age
that on this groundwork no superstructure of an effective
international league was reared. The tragedy, as I con-
ceive it, or the simple failure, as we can all agree to call
it, may be explained fairly easily. It is traceable to three
major facts.

^ In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the
Catholic Church of the Middle Age, as of antiquity or of
modern times, was primarily a spiritual and moral teacher.
Only incidentally did it concern itself with political and
economic and international questions. If it had devoted
itself as insistently to political science and public law as
to moral and dogmatic theology, it might conceivably have
accomplished as much in fashioning a League of Nations
as in Christianizing and civilizing barbarous Teutonic

82 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

tribesmen. But such was not the commission which the
Catholic Church received from its Divine Founder. Un-
der the circumstances it is astonishing that the contribu-
tions of the Church and the Papacy to international rela-
tions and diplomacy were as great and lasting as they
were, rather than that they were not greater still. When
one recalls the primitive and warlike nature of the Euro-
pean peoples with whom the Church had to deal at the
beginning of the Middle Age, and when one remembers
that throughout the whole period there were no railways
or steamships or telegraphs or telephones and only a few
good roads and a most imperfect postal system, one can
appreciate how miraculous would have been the creation at
that time of an effective League of Nations. That sort
of miracle did not occur, even in an age of faith.

Secondly, the tendency of the Teutonic tribes to be-
come national independent states, theoretically equal, and
the contemporaneous tendency of the Catholic Church to
serve as a cement holding these national states together,
were alike impeded by the surviving concept of universal
secular dominion, especially by the pretensions and am-
bitions of the Holy Roman Emperors. In particular after
the revived study of the Roman Law in the twelfth cen-
tury, the old imperial notions were resuscitated and ex-
ploited by persons who were seeking to undermine the
popular foundations of national monarchy or to abridge
the customary rights of the Church. It was this spirit,
for example, which induced the Emperor Frederick Bar-
barossa in 1158 to reaffirm as his cardinal principle the
dictum of the Roman Civil Law that Quod principi placuit
legis habet vigorem. It was unnoted at the time that the
pretensions of Frederick Barbarossa not only were in con-
tradiction to both the Teutonic and ecclesiastical tradi-
tions, but were even in excess of the powers which, in
strict legality, had belonged to the ancient Roman Em-
perors, for those powers had been limited by the theory in
back of the Roman Civil Law, that the emperors' au-
thority was ultimately derived from the people.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 83

In general contention for the new imperial claims as
against those of the pope or of the national monarchs,
many celebrated medievalists employed tongue and pen.
Among their number were Dante (1265-1321), Marsi-
lius of Padua (c. i2jo-c. 1342), and William of Ockham
(c. I28o-c. 1349). The Church and the Papacy did not
lack defenders, but the ecclesiastical champions, such as
Bernard of Clairvaux (10901153), Augustinus Trium-
phus (d. 1328), and Aegidius Romanus (c. 1247-1316),
were so obsessed by the controversial spirit that some-
times they grossly overstated papal ambitions. But it was
in action as well as in words that the struggle between
popes and emperors was joined. Developing under Pope
Gregory VII in the eleventh century, it raged almost con-
tinuously during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and
far into the fourteenth. An Innocent III, a Boniface
VIII, and a John XXII, labored to secure a vast theo-
cratic federation on the one hand, while on the other a
Henry VI, a Frederick II, and a Louis IV, endeavored by
every means at their disposal to erect a world-dominion
to which church and nations alike would be subjected.

The Emperors failed dismally in their conflict with the
Popes. Thanks to ecclesiastical opposition, Europe was
saved from a return to Caesarism ; and the Holy Roman
Empire endured only as a shadowy bond of union for the
German nation. But the Papacy had to pay dearly for its
victory. It had to pay with exile from Rome, with the
"captivity" at Avignon from 1309 to 1377, with a great
schism from 1378 to 1417, and with resulting loss of in-
fluence and prestige. And the protracted struggle be-
tween emperors and popes powerfully aided the city-
states of Italy and the national states of western Europe
to consolidate each its own power, and to repudiate not
only any world-dominion on the part of a Holy Roman
Empire, but any theocratic federation of Christendom
which the Catholic Church might champion.

Herein is to be sought the third major fact which mili-
tated against the fruition of earlier medieval dreams. It

84 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

is the intensification of nationalism and national exclu-
siveness. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries both
the city-states of Italy and the national monarchies of
Western Europe evolved in the direction of jealous ex-
clusiveness and autocracy. The development of vernacu-
lar languages and literatures and the invention of printing
served to render people in a given country conscious of
what was peculiar to themselves rather than of what was
common to all peoples throughout Christendom. At the
same time improved means of communication and the in-
troduction of firearms enabled monarchs to centralize their
administrations and to consolidate their realms. The era
of absolutism was approaching.

But still the surviving concept of imperialism bore fruit.
For Italian city-states were no sooner freed from foreign
domination than they reached out, like Venice, to establish
by force of arms an empire in Greece and in the East ; and
the national monarchies of the West were no sooner con-
solidated at home than the kings utilized their augmented
resources to wage wars of aggrandizement against fellow-
monarchs. An illustration of the change which had come
over European minds in this connection is afforded by
pamphlets of that French lawyer and reforming "crank,"
Pierre Dubois, who lived in the first part of the four-
teenth century. Dubois had in mind the truly medieval
purpose of recovering the Holy Land from the Moham-
medans, and for this purpose he urged the cessation of
war within Christendom and the co-operation of all Chris-
tian peoples. But he departed fundamentally from ear-
lier medieval ideas when he advocated as head of his
league and leader of his crusade neither the Pope nor the
German Emperor, but the king of France. French princes
were to be seated on the thrones of Europe and the East ;
the Church was to be secularized and subordinated to the
state; and France was represented as divinely chosen to
execute God's will in exterminating the infidel, in reform-
ing the papacy, and in bestowing peace upon the world.
The federation of nations and the Crusades themselves

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 85

were to be undertaken for the greater glory of France.
This is fierce nationalism ; this is rampant imperialism.
It is essentially modern, not medieval.

Feudal warfare practically ceased in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, but international and inter-im-
perialistic warfare took its place. To the cessation of the
former the Catholic Church had contributed potently.
Against the rise of the latter the Church, weakened by
its conflict with the Holy Roman Empire, was now pow-
erless to act. At the fag-end of the Middle Age ap-
peared the European state-system, with its balance of
power, its vague ius gentium, and its diplomatic usages.

EVOLUTION OF PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY

Professional diplomacy was one attribute of the new
order of international society which the close of the Mid-
dle Age ushered into Europe. There had been embassies
and negotiations, of course, throughout the entire Mid-
dle Age, as in ancient times, but the embassies in the
main had been only temporary missions directed to a
particular end and conducted by ecclesiastics or nobles
of a dignity appropriate to each occasion ; these were nei-
the permanent diplomatic agents nor a professional dip-
lomatic class. So long as Europe was predominantly feu-
dal, there was little room for diplomacy.

In northern and central Italy, however, feudalism had
never taken root and in the struggles of the peninsula
diplomacy had early played a part as important as war.
There had been alliances and counter-alliances, veritable
balances of power, so that medieval Italy anticipated in
miniature the modern state-system of Europe. As the
Italian cities increased in wealth and importance as a
result of their growing commerce with the East during
the later Crusades, their diplomacy waxed more signifi-
cant and the diplomatic career became correspondingly
more honorable and more attractive. In the thirteenth

86 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

and fourteenth centuries Florence counted among her en-
voys Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, and subsequently
could boast of agents such as Guicciardini and Machia-
velli. Papal Rome, too, continued to be, as in earlier
centuries, a nursing-mother of diplomatists. But in me-
dieval Venice the immediate origins of modern secular
diplomacy are to be sought.

Venice occupied a strategic position in respect of the
Byzantine Empire, the city-states of Italy, and the coun-
tries of western Europe. From Constantinople undoubt-
edly the Venetians learned much of the conduct of diplo-
matic missions, and as early as the thirteenth century the
Republic began to lay down a series of rules for the
guidance of its ambassadors. In 1236 envoys to the court
of Rome were forbidden to procure a benefice for any
one without the approval of the Doge. By a law of 1268,
an ambassador was not allowed to be accompanied by his
wife, lest she divulge his business, but he was required to
take his own cook, lest he be poisoned. By another law
of the same year, any present received from a foreigner
was required to be deposited with the state, until the en-
voy's return from his mission. No diplomatic agent was
sent into a foreign territory where he had property, nor
was he allowed a single day's absence from his post.
In 1288, it was decreed that ambassadors should de-
posit, within fifteen days of their return, a written account
of the replies made to them during their mission, together
with anything they might have seen or heard to the honor
or in the interests of the republic. This decree, renewed
in 1296, 1425, and 1533, was the origin of the famous
reports of the Venetian ambassadors to the Senate, which
now constitute a store-house of information for the his-
torian of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

In the thirteenth century, two or three months were
considered a very long period for an ambassador to reside
at a foreign court. In the fifteenth century Venice ex-
tended the period of an embassy to two years, and in the
sixteenth century to three years. The first known instance

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 87

of a permanent embassy was that established at Genoa, in
1455, by Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan. Thence-
forth a regular diplomatic service developed rapidly
throughout Christendom. For example, in 1460, the duke
of Savoy sent a permanent envoy to the papal court ; in
1494 Milan is already represented by a permanent ambas-
sador at the French court; and in 1496, Venice is sim-
ilarly represented both in England and at the court of
the Emperor Maximilian.

The art of diplomacy, developed by Venice and other
Italian cities in the later middle ages, was eagerly seized
upon by those monarchs of western Europe who were zeal-
ously undertaking, at the close of the fifteenth century
and the beginning of the sixteenth, to consolidate and
aggrandize their national states — Louis XI of France,
Henry VII of England, and Ferdinand and Isabella of
Spain. These monarchs practiced statecraft unburdened
by the weight of too many conscientious scruples. By
hook or by crook they willed to increase their personal
power and to extend the frontiers of their states. If diplo-
macy failed them, they went to war. If they were un-
successful in war, they resorted to diplomacy. And
whether in war or in diplomacy, the first instrument was
stratagem and dissimulation. "To reign is to dissimu-
late," was the principle laid down by Louis XI, and in
sending ambassadors to the dukes of Guyenne and Brit-
tany the French king's instructions were, "If they lie to
you, lie still more to them."

Twenty-five years after the death of Louis XI, Ma-
chiavelli, the Florentine historian, publicist and diploma-
tist, gathered in The Prince and The Discourses on Livy
the principles which underlay the practice of his day;
namely, that ordinary rules of private morality are not
applicable to public affairs and particularly are not ap-
plicable to intercourse between states. In vain did the
Pope condemn the teachings of Machiavelli (1559). Fran-
cis I, the French monarch who allied himself in the
sixteenth century now with German Protestants and now

88 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

with Mohammedan Turks, and who was the first mon-
arch to establish a completely organized diplomatic ma-
chinery, did most to give Machiavelli's principles a Euro-
pean extension. By the close of the sixteenth century
diplomacy had become frankly "Machiavellian." Despite
ecclesiastical protests, "Machiavellian" was generally ad-
mitted in theory as well as in practice. Etienne Dolet,
who was burned for atheism in 1546, in his De officio le-
gati (1541), advises ambassadors to surround themselves
with close-mouthed servants, to employ vigilant spies,
and to set afoot all manner of fictions, especially when
negotiating with the papal court or with the Italian
princes. Germonious, archbishop of Tarantaise, another
precursor o>f Grotius,1 in his De legatis principum et popu-
lorum (1627), after a vigorous denunciation of lying in
general, argues that special lies are permissible for the
safety or convenience of princes.

The Protestant Revolution of the sixteenth century and
the consequent disruption of Christendom split and weak-
ened the one force which might possibly have offered
resistance to rampant nationalism, greedy imperialism,
and immoral diplomacy. With the revolt of northern Eu-
rope against the Papacy and the Catholic Church, the last
bulwark of medieval internationalism went down in ruins,
and there arose full-grown in its stead the state-system
of modern Europe with all its faults and all its vices. The
events of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries brought
into bold relief the truth, as Mr. David Jayne Hill puts
it, "that, as in the constitution of single states the disso-
lution of monarchy presents no other alternative than
anarchy or self-government, so in the relations of inde-
pendent sovereignties, war and diplomacy become the in-
evitable substitutes for empire" (Hill, 1158). When the
Holy Roman Empire failed to exercise a general secular
dominion, as it failed in the fourteenth century, and when
the Papacy was no longer universally recognized as a
tribunal of last resort, as befell in the sixteenth century,

*For discussion of Grotius, see Appendix.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 89

the security of nations henceforth became wholly de-
pendent upon armed force on the one hand, or upon intel-
ligent association for mutual safety upon the other. Un-
happily for modern Europe, the aspiration after territo-
rial aggrandizement became the passion of the greater
states at the very moment when the Catholic Church, the
traditional guardian of peace and international comity,
was least able to defend the rights and liberties which it
had sought to protect. Intelligent association for mutual
support was accordingly pushed into the limbo of for-
gotten dreams. And international war has loomed larger
than international peace in the annals of modern history.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES.

The Development of Modern
Diplomacy

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN DIPLOMACY

POPULAR CONCEPT OF DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMACY

We are all more or less familiar with Sir Henry Wot-
ton's definition of an ambassador as "an honest man, sent
to lie abroad for the good of his country/' This famous
jest, looked upon as an indiscreet revelation of the truth,
was written by the British Ambassador to Venice, in an
album of a friend, in the Year of Grace 1604. It cost
the witty diplomat his post, and has tended not a little
to the discredit of diplomacy.

The ambassador does not stand or "lie" alone, as Wot-
ton would no doubt have put it. "To lie like a physi-
cian" is a well-known charge in Latin as well as in Eng-
lish, and we of the law are frequently reminded of the
epitaph intended no doubt as a compliment in a special
case, but applied generally and humorously to a class :
"Here lies an honest lawyer". The doctor and the lawyer
may object to the company which the proverb makes them
keep. The ambassador, however, given the suspicion in
which he is held, may well be content to associate upon a
footing of equality with these worthies, for in the popu-
lar mind he is and always has been primus inter pares.

And yet it is only fair to say of each and of every
'group of persons forming a class or profession, that
they are not only the outgrowth of their day and genera-
tion, but that they represent the standard of their times
and that they are as they are because that standard makes
or allows them to be so. An ambassador who represented
a Court in the Middle Ages or in the last few hundred
years is not to be blamed if his standard is not higher
than that of the Court whose servant or agent he is. In

93

94 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the natural course of things we can not expect water to
rise above its level. It is better, although harder, to dis-
infect the source than to criticise the stream.

We are attracted by virtues or defects, particularly the
latter, that strike the eye of the careless observer. Most
of us do not take the time or the trouble to look below
the surface of things. An ambassador, we say, is a use-
less sort of person because, like the mole, he works in the
dark, or more elegantly expressed, his usefulness is hidden
from the public eye. Truth is not in him, we are inclined
to add, because betimes acting under instructions from his
superiors, or with their approval, he goes beyond the
truth, is found out and is taxed with a lie. Of course
such conduct can not be justified, and yet, as long as we
permit two standards- of conduct — one for the State and
one for the individual — we need not be surprised if a pub-
lic servant, in what he conceives to be the interest of his
country, will permit himself to do and to say what no
amount of pressure or profit would force him to do or to
say as an individual. It is not long since that a distin-
guished statesman, one Bismarck by name, forged a tele-
gram to produce a war, boasted of it in his lifetime and
stated the circumstances in his Memoirs, to be published
after his death.

Some say that an ambassador is an idle, frivolous person,
to whom trifles are the serious things of life, because in
times past he has been over-mindful of his dress and of
his personal appearance, has been a stickler for prece-
dence, and has been ostentatious beyond the standard of
his critics. These are matters of form, not of substance.
They are trifles in themselves, but they are not little things
when States are concerned. Precedence claimed by one
whose qualities do not entitle him to it is indeed foolish ;
precedence to the same person as the representative of a
State is a different matter. In this day and generation,
men of breeding give to women the place of honor, but
the President of the United States and every diplomatic
representative in the City of Washington assumes the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95

place of honor as the representative of his country. There
is a reason for most things, natural or artificial, and al-
though we may not share it we should not deny it.

Finally, it is said that diplomacy is a failure. It does
fail betimes, but its failures are known and chronicled —
its many successes pass unnoticed. It is, however, not
too much to say that the timely intervention of the
diplomat settles many a claim which might become a
dispute, settles many a dispute quietly without any knowl-
edge of it reaching the public, and that the cases which
diplomacy fails to adjust are few in number and are so
difficult that human ingenuity is unequal to the task, or
the conflicting interests of States prevent agreement.
It is only the noise that the ear notices.

II

TRUE FUNCTIONS OF DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMACY

The truth is, the diplomat is a necessity, he is not merely
an ornament, if there is to be more than one State in the
world. The State, being an artificial person, can not com-
municate of itself with another State. It speaks by the
mouth of an agent. Two States existing must come into
contact. The relations external to themselves are foreign ;
they are international relations. And there are not two,
there are many States. When intercourse was the excep-
tion, not the rule, an agent, whether he be called an am-
bassador or a minister, could be sent for the special occa-
sion. When the States became numerous and their con-
tact frequent, embassies or missions were correspondingly
frequent. When it was recognized that an ambassador
or a minister residing within a country permanently or
for an indefinite period of time, might prevent the dis-
putes which special missions were sent to adjust, nations
began to appoint ambassadors or ministers to reside per-
manently in those countries with which they had most
frequent intercourse. The Church was first drawn upon,
as its members possessed the qualities required ; then law-

96 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

yers, in an age in which the Church was less powerful,
and the relations of nations were determined according to
rules of law. We thus have a class, and, the class justify-
ing itself, we have a profession, so that today every State
recognized as a member of the Society of Nations, has
a diplomatic service. In the older States it is a career ; in
the younger States appointments are frequently made from
the outside, and even in the other States, they are some-
times so made. And there will be a diplomatic service
notwithstanding the fact that the minister of foreign af-
fairs directs foreign relations and in many instances con-
ducts them, and notwithstanding the annihilation of dis-
tance through the telegraph, and the telephone, as long as
men transact their business by word of mouth and face to
face. The method of conducting foreign relations may
change ; it has changed to meet changing conditions, but
the trained man with the trained mind, in open as in se-
cret diplomacy, in democracies as in other forms of gov-
ernment, will be needed, and if we are wise, will be em-
ployed and prized.

Whatever may have been the conception of diplomacy
in the past, whatever criticism may have been made of its
practitioners, it is today what Sir Ernest Satow, formerly
an able envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary
of Great Britain, has declared it to^be: "The application
of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations
betzveen the government of, independent states, extending
sometimes also to their relations with vassal states."

Ill

THE MODERN STATE SYSTEM AND THE LAW OF STATES

Using diplomacy as "the principles of international law
applied to the relation of States" , and such it assuredly is,
we, in modern times, find ourselves confronted with two
terms requiring consideration.

The State slowly came into being during the Middle
Ages and was recognized much as it is today by the Con-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 97

gress of Westphalia. The law of nations slowly came
into being during the same period, because, as the law of
States, it pre-supposes their existence, and the modern
law of nations was recognized at approximately the same
time in the form and shape given to it by Grotius1 in "The
Laiv of War and Peace" published in 1625, that is to say,
during the Thirty Years' War which the Congress of
Westphalia ended.

There could be no States in the modern sense of the
term when the Holy Roman Empire, which has been
wittily said to have been neither holy nor Roman, claimed
not merely the first place, but that all States were subor-
dinate to and dependent upon it. There could be no States
in the modern sense of the te/m when a great spiritual
organization claimed supremacy not merely in matters
spiritual, but in material matters as well. Out of the con-
flict of these two great organizations, and from the incon-
sistent claims of the States of the then world, taking sides
and changing sides as their interest dictated, the modern
State emerged. By the Treaty of Westphalia, or of
Mimster (the Catholic powers negotiated at Munster—
the Protestant at Westphalia, two cities some fifty miles
apart/ but signed the same 24th day of October, 1648) the
new order of things was recognized.

For the present purposes, it is sufficient to say that
a territory, large or small, with a population large or
small, under a government of a monarch, prince or eccle-
siastic, was recognized as a State and entitled to all the
right of a State; that is to say, the State, irrespective of
its origin, irrespective of its religion, irrespective of its
form of government, was recognized. Primarily the boun-
daries of Germany were settled, and with slight changes
they remained as then settled until the dissolution of the
I Julv Roman Empire in 1806. The independence of Hol-
land, long a fact, was recognized as such; the indepen-
dence of the Swiss Cantons, long a fact, was likewise

"For discussion of Grotius, see Appendix.

98 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

recognized as such. All of the European States with the
exception of Great Britain, Poland, Muscovy and Tur-
key, were parties to the agreement, and even of these,
Great Britain and Poland were considered as allies and
thus were brought within the influence of the treaty.
It was intended to be a universal settlement and it largely
was; it was intended to be a permanent settlement and
it was, for upon its foundation reposes the modern State
with the modern law, of nations.

With the conflicting claims to supremacy, lay or spirit-
ual, law was impossible, because the superior could pre-
scribe the rule of conduct which we call law, for the
inferior States according to its pleasure. The inferior
States might have been equal in the sense of the Roman
Law which truly and brutally says that "slaves are equal
among themselves"; but they would not and could not
have been equal with their superiors, and the funda-
mental principle of international law is the equality of
right of every State with territory large or small, with
a population large or small, under a government of its
own choice. This law grew with and as the State; and
the system of law, like the system of States, came into
being approximately at one and the same time. We date
both from Westphalia.

How was the system of States, and how was the sys-
tem of law, to be preserved? This has been the great
problem since Westphalia. It is still the problem. There
are apparently two ways of solving it — one by force, the
other by justice. The world has tried the first, the bal-
ance of power through force; it is beginning to try the
second — the administration of justice through the instru-
mentalities of justice. This is a generalization, and I am
aware of the witty remark of a French professor, that
"all generalizations are false, including this one."

First, as to the balance of power. For whether we
speak of the equilibrium of Europe, or whether we speak
of the European concert, we speak in terms of the bal-
ance of power, and the principle of the balance of power

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 99

is inevitable, unless States are organized upon some other
method than power. They can only escape from it by
sonic organization upon a different principle. We would
have had the theory and practice of the balance of power
in this Western World of ours had not the representa-
tives of the States in conference assembled at Philadel-
phia, in 1787, rejected size, rejected power, and formed
the Union of States upon principles of justice, with ap-
propriate agencies for its administration. Before the law
all men are equal; before the law all States are equal.
In the domain of justice there is neither large nor small,
powerful nor weak. There are only equals in right,
equals in duty, and the rights and duties are not deter-
mined by the sword, but weighed in the balance of jus-
tice. Will the world ever take America seriously?

IV.

THE BALANCE OF POWER ITS NATURE AND APPLICATION

If the world consisted of but a single State, there
would be no external questions and there would be no
question of the balance of power. If the world were com-
posed of two States, they would have disputes, but they
would not dispute as to the balance of power. If there
were three States coming into contact, they might and
they would. With every addition to the States, the bal-
ance of power would become more pressing and more
complex. Alliances would be formed to maintain it, war
would be made to re-create it. The principle is apparently
as old as the first three States.

What is this principle and how is it applied? Let
Hume answer the question. In his Essays — Moral, Polit-
ical, and Lit entry, published in 1752, he speaks of the
balance of power, asking "whether the idea of the balance
of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether
the phrase only has been invented in these later ages?"
The answer which he gives, supported by an unfortunate

100 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

wealth of illustrations, is that the idea was ancient and
that the phrase only was modern:

In all the politics of Greece, the anxiety, with regard
to the balance of power, is apparent, and is expressly
pointed out to us, even by the ancient historians.
Thucydides represents the league, which was formed
against Athens, and which produced the Peloponnesian
was, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the
decline of Athens, when the Thebans and Lacede-
monians disputed for sovereignty, we find, that the
Athenians (as well as many other republics) always
threw themselves into the lighter scale, and en-
deavoured to preserve the balance. They supported
Thebes against Sparta, till the great victory gained by
Epaminondas at Leuctra ; after which they immediately
went over to the conquered, from generosity, as they
pretended, but in reality from their jealousy of the
conquerors.

Such was the practice of the Greeks. The principle
upon which they relied is stated by Hiero, King of Syra-
cuse, who, although an ally of Rome, sent assistance to the
Carthaginians during the war of the auxiliaries :

"Esteeming it requisite," says Polybius, "both in
order to retain his dominions in Sicily, and to preserve
the Roman friendship, that Carthage should be safe;
lest by its fall the remaining power should be able,
without contrast or opposition, to execute every pur-
pose and undertaking. And here he acted with great
wisdom and prudence. For that is never, on any
account, to be overlooked ; nor ought such a force ever
to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the
neighbouring states from defending their rights against
it."

Upon this statement of principle Hume himself says, and
rightly : "Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out
in express terms." And here are some examples of it in
modern politics : In the Sixteenth Century, the House
of Hapsburg as King of Spain, with its vast dominions,
and as Holy Roman Emperor, lay heavy upon the world
and threatened to crush it. Francis I of France, drawing

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 101

upon the Eastern World, as Canning undoubtedly would
have put it, to redress the balance of the Old, — meaning
Europe, concluded a Treaty with Turkey to make head-
against the House of Hapsburg. It was checked, but
it was not humbled. It was still a menace.

The partition of the empire which took place upon
the abdication of Charles V, of Germany, of Charles I,
as he also was of Spain, simplified the problem. A branch
of the House of Hapsburg, however, had the empire
which had become hereditary in the family; a branch of
the House of Hapsburg had the Spanish dominions. The
Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659, between Spain and
Erance, left Spain indeed a factor, as the Treaty of
Westphalia had left Austria and the Empire a factor,
but not a menace as of other days. A new sun had
arisen, and so conscious of its power that the monarch
of this new menace called himself Le roi soldi. Louis
XIV of France, for the reference is to him, sought to
wield the sceptre which during the centuries has fallen
from the grasp of world conquerors. He sought to
overrun and to annex the Spanish provinces now form-
ing the kingdom of Belgium. He sought to annex Al-
sace, in which he succeeded and to extend his domains
to the Rhine, in which he failed in large part. Wherever
he turned, a coalition to preserve the balance of power
faced him, and eventually broke his haughty spirit. Had
he thought less of his family and more of France, he
could have rounded out his domains with the consent of the
Powers of that day, without disturbing what they would
have considered under the circumstances, the balance of
power. He married Maria Theresa, daughter of the
otherwise childless King of Spain, and renounced the
Spanish throne for their offspring, on condition that the
dowry should be paid. It never was.

The situation was simple. The Spanish monarch did
not want the dismemberment of Spain. Louis XIV
wanted Spain for a descendant and was more than willing
to accept for himself certain portions of the inheritance.

102 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Europe was as unwilling to have the Crowns of France
and Spain united as it had been to have the Crowns of
Austria and Spain united on the same head. To prevent
this a Treaty of Partition proposed by Louis XIV was
signed at The Hague in 1698, between France and the
then maritime Powers, England and Holland, by which,
to quote Mr. Wheaton, "Spain, the Indies, Belgium and
Sardinia were assigned to the electoral prince of Bavaria;
the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, the Spanish places and
islands upon the coasts of Tuscany, the marquisate of
Final, and the province of Guipuzcoa, to the Dauphin of
France; and the Milanese to the Archduke Charles"

The King of Spain, Charles II, resented this attempt
to dispose of his dominions while he was still living, and
made a will by which he appointed the Electoral Prince
of Bavaria his universal heir, hoping to preserve the in-
tegrity of the Spanish monarchy at the expense of the
German branch of his own house. However, the Prince
of Bavaria died, upsetting the plans alike of France, Eng-
land, and Holland on one hand, and Charles II of Spain,
on the other. Therefore, a second Treaty of Partition
between the same parties was concluded in 1700, by which
the Archduke Charles was substituted for the Prince of
Bavaria who had previously died, in the inheritance of
Spain, the Indies, Belgium and Sardinia. The Dauphin
of France received the spoils under the first treaty, to
which were added for good, or rather for better measure,
the duchies of Lorraine and Bar. But Charles II of
Spain was again dissatisfied and for the same reasons.
He therefore made a second will, this time in favor of
the Duke d'Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV and grandson
of his own daughter, Maria Theresa. Charles II had
no male heirs, hence the treaties of the European Pow-
ers, hence his own testaments.

But again the unexpected happened. The Holy Roman
Emperor Joseph I died without male heirs, and his broth-
er, the Archduke Charles, succeeded him. If the second
Treaty of Partition should stand, the German branch of

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 103

the House of Hapsburg would unite Austria, the Empire,
and the Spanish dominions under his scepter. The result
of it all was a change of front, the Partitioners accept-
in- as the lesser of the two evils, the grandson as the
King of Spain, with, however, the express provision that
the Crown of Spain should never be united to that of
1 -Vance. Louis XIV had been so worsted in the war
that he was glad in his old age to accept and to retain
the kingdom of France, somewhat enlarged indeed by
his previous conquests, but shorn of the conquests which
he had hoped to make. The Spain of the grandson like-
wise suffered. Belgium, Milan and Naples were severed
from the Spanish monarch and settled upon the house of
Austria.

"The peace of Utrecht," Mr. Wheaton says, "was for
France what that of Munster had been for the house of
Austria." It was unfortunate for France, perhaps it was
unfortunate for the world, that Louis XIV accepted the
throne of Spain for his grandson, instead of contenting
himself with the spoils of Partition which the Powers
of the day were willing to accord him. The French his-
torian, Mignet, with whom impartiality was a religion,
with accuracy as a necessary consequence, has shown in
the introduction to his edition of the Documents Relating
to the Spanish Succession, that Louis XIV not only vio-
lated the faith of treaties in accepting the Crown of
Spain for his grandson, but that he departed from all
sound rules of policy. "Louis XIV had," to quote Mig-
net, "to choose between a Crown for his grandson or an
aggrandizement of his domains maintained by Europe; be-
tween the expansion of his system in the Pyrenees and
the Alps by the establishment of a branch of his house in
Spain and in Italy, and an expansion of his own proper
Power; between the honor of the royalty and the advan-
tage of his kingdom; between his family and France."

Just as the treaty of Westphalia was renewed and con-
firmed in every treaty of peace between the Central States
of Europe until the French Revolution, so the Treaties

104 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

of Utrecht were renewed and confirmed in every succes-
sive treaty of peace between the great continental and
maritime powers until the Peace of Luneville, in 1800. It
was omitted for the first time in the Peace of Amiens,
concluded in 1803, when a new and a greater sun had
arisen upon the political firmament.

Such is the practice of Europe. What was the theory
by which it was justified? Let one of the greatest mas-
ters of international law answer the question, just as an
appeal has been made to Hume, a noted philosopher.

In his Law of Nations, published in 1758, Vattel has
this to say:

It is asked whether the aggrandizement of a neigh-
boring State, in consequence of which a Nation fears
that it will one day be oppressed, is a sufficient ground
for making war upon it; whether a Nation can with
justice take up arms to resist the growing power of
that State, or to weaken the State, with the sole object
of protecting itself from the dangers with which weak
States are almost always threatened from an over-
powerful one.

This just man felt that the question presented difficulties
of a perplexing nature to "those who seek at all times
to unite justice with prudence," but that it presented "no
difficulties to the majority of statesmen." His answer to
the question "whether war may be maintained for this
purpose" is that

Since war is only permissible in order to redress an
injury received, or to protect ourselves from an injury
with which we are threatened, it is a sacred rule of the
law of nations that the aggrandizement of a State can
not alone and of itself give any one the right to take
up arms to resist it.

But he did not stop with this statement. He went fur-
ther, saying:

As soon as a State has given evidence of injustice,

greed, pride, ambition, or a desire of domineering over

its neighbors, it becomes an object of suspicion which

they must guard against.

He next puts the pertinent question which is indeed the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 105

crux of the matter : "Are we to delay averting our destruc-
tion until it has become inevitable?" And in this con-
nection he refers to a familiar illustration :

Had Charles II, King of Spain, instead of settling
the succession upon the Duke of Anjou, appointed
Louis XIV himself as heir, had he thus tamely suf-
fered the union of the House of Spain to that of
France, it would have meant, according to all the rules
of human foresight, nothing less than delivering all
Europe into servitude, or at least putting it in a most
precarious condition.
He next asks :

If an unknown man takes aim at me in the middle of
a forest, I am not yet certain that he wishes to kill me ;
must I allow him time to fire in order to be sure of his
intent? Is there any reasonable casuist who would
deny me the right to forestall the act? But presump-
tion becomes almost equal to certitude if the Prince
who is about to acquire enormous power has already
given evidence of an unbridled pride and ambition.
In the imaginary case mentioned above, who would
have dared counsel the European states to allow Louis
XIV to make such a formidable addition to his power?
Vattel now speaks as a man "zvho seeks at all times
to unite justice uith prudence" and resolves the doubts
which he has raised in the series of questions which he
has put; he supposes that the powerful State is both just
and prudent in its conduct, and he asks if, under such cir-
cumstances, we should idly look upon its rapid increase
of power and lay ourselves open to the designs which it
may seek to realize.

The example of the Romans is a good lesson for all
sovereigns. If the most powerful States of that day
had united together to watch over the movements of
Rome, to set limits to her progress, they would not
have successively become subject to her.
However, Vattel as a lover of justice and prudence
did not advocate force in first instance :

"There are gentler means, which are always lawful.
The most efficacious of these is an alliance of other less

106 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

powerful sovereigns, who, by uniting their forces, are
enabled to counterbalance the sovereign who excites
their alarm." This could be accepted by all the states
of his day.

"Europe forms a political system in which the nations
inhabiting this part of the world are bound together by
their relations and various interests into a single
body. . . The constant attention of sovereigns to all
that goes on, the custom of resident ministers, the con-
tinual negotiations that take place, make of modern
Europe a sort of Republic, whose members — each in-
dependent, but all bound together by a common interest
— unite for the maintenance of order and the preserva-
tion of liberty."

"This," he adds, "is what has given rise to the well-
known principle of the balance of power, by which is
meant an arrangement of affairs so that no State shall be
in a position to have absolute mastery and dominate over
the others."

To maintain the balance, "no State should be much
superior to the others", and "all the States, or at least
the larger part, should be about equal in strength." How
can the balance be preserved? As it was impossible, he
recognized, to trim the States so that they would be ap-
proximately equal, nations would have to rely upon al-
liances— the method of Europe, he said, "at the present
day", or a method soon to be tried, and now again on
trial. "Confederations would", in his opinion, "be a sure
means of preserving the balance of power and thus main-
taining the liberty of nations, if all sovereigns were con-
stantly aware of their true interests, and if they regulated
their policy according- to the welfare of the State."

This may be said to be the language of the theorist,
although Vattel was a diplomat by profession, speaking
from experience and with a knowledge of practice. How-
ever, Count Kaunitz, Chancellor of Austria, was cer-
tainly a man of affairs and in his circular note of July
17, 1791, he advocated that the Powers make common
cause against the French Revolution for the purpose of

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 107

preserving "public peace, the tranquillity of States, the in-
znolability of possessions, and the faith of treaties."

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN MODERN TIMES — THE HOLY

ALLIANCE

It is immaterial to present purposes whether the wars
of the French Revolution were provoked by Europe or
were declared by France. The victory of French arms
brought with it an aggressive policy. The generous ideas
of the first days spent themselves. Bonaparte mastered
the Revolution, and he set about to master Europe. He
succeeded for the time, but he ultimately went the way
of the world conquerer. Coalition after coalition was
formed to prevent the aggrandizement of France, and in
the end, they were successful. The victors met at Vienna
in the course of 1814 and 15, just a century after the
Congress of Utrecht, and almost a hundred years before
the Conference at Paris. Austria, Great Britain, Prus-
sia and Russia set about the reconstruction of Europe.
The victim was at first excluded from their councils, but
the skill of Talleyrand opened the door of the Council
Chamber to France. These five Powers proceeded to re-
dress the balance and Alexander of Russia, in language
which sounds strangely familiar to us of the present,
argued that the outcome of the war was to be not only
the liberation of France, but the universal triumph of
"the sacred rights of humanity/' "To attain this it ivould
be necessary 'after hazi'ng attached the nations to the
greatest interests of their subjects, to fix the relations
of the states amongst each other on more precise rules,
and such as it is to their interest to respect.'"

A general treaty was to form a basis of the relations
of the States composing the "European Confederation,"
and although "it was no question of realizing the dream
of universal peace, would attain some of its results if, at
the conclusion of the general war, it were possible to es-

108 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

tablish on clear principles the prescriptions of the rights

of nations."

And in both the form of question and answer, which

sounds but of yesterday, the Autocrat of all the Russias

continued :

"Why could not one submit to it the positive rights
of nations . . . insert the obligations of never begin-
ning war until all the resources which the mediation
of a third party could offer have been exhausted,
having by this means brought to light the respective
grievances, and tried to remove them? It is on such
principles as these that one could proceed to a general
pacification, and give birth to a league of which the
stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of
the law of nations, which sanctioned by the greater
part of the nations of Europe, would without difficulty
become the immutable rule of the cabinets, while those
who should try to infringe it would risk bringing upon
themselves the forces of the new union."

Such is the origin of the Holy Alliance, drafted by
Alexander I of Russia, approved in first instance by the
Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, proclaimed on
September 26, 1815, at a great review of the allied troops
on the Champ des Vertus, near Paris. To the Treaty or
Declaration of the Holy Alliance, the name of every
European sovereign with the exception of the Pope, the
Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain is subsequently ap-
pended.

Mr. W. A. Phillips, a leading authority on this sub-
ject, and whose masterly work on the "Confederation of
Europe" issued in the first month of 1914, was at the
disposal of statesmen of that day, says:

"In popular parlance, which has found its way into
the language of serious historians, the 'Holy Alliance'
soon became synonymous with the combination of the
great powers by whom Europe was ruled in concert
during the period of the congresses, and associated with
the policy of reaction which gradually dominated
their counsels. For the understanding of the inner

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 109

history of the diplomacy of this period, however,
[ear distinction must be drawn between the Holy
Alliance and the Grand or Quadruple (Quintuple)
Alliance. The (irand Alliance was established on defi-
nite treaties concluded for definite purposes, of which
the chief was the preservation of peace on the basis of
the territorial settlement of 1815. The Holy Alliance
was a general treaty — hardly indeed a treaty at all—
which bound its signatories to act on certain vague
principles for no well-defined end ; and in its essence
it was so far from necessarily reactionary that the
emperor Alexander at one time declared that it in-
volved the grant of liberal constitutions by princes to
their subjects. Its main significance was due to the
persistent efforts of the Czar to make it the basis of the
"universal union" or general confederation of Europe,
which he wished to substitute for the actual committee
of the great powers, efforts which were frustrated by
the vigorous diplomacy of Castlereagh, acting as the
mouthpiece of the British government."
We have just emerged from a great war, in which
the most powerful of European States — certainly from
the military point of view the most powerful State of
the world — deliberately attempted to impose its domina-
tion, its culture, its conception of liberty, upon the rest of
the world. This war had been foreseen. To the Triple
Alliance, which included Germany, its satellite, Austria-
1 1 ungary, and its questionable ally, Italy, three other Pow-
ers, France, Great Britain and Russia, opposed the Triple
nte. The assassination of the heir apparent to the
throne of Austria-Hungary and his morganatic wife by a
subject of that monarchy, although of Serbian race, led
Austria- Hungary to incriminate Serbia, and alleging a
lack of compliance with an ultimatum demanding an ac-
ceptance within forty-ei^fht hours, Austria-Hungary de-
clared war against Serbia on July 28, 1914, although
that little country offered to submit the outstanding dis-
pute to arbitration. Russia espoused the cause of its Slav
neighbor: Germany appeared in shining armor at the
side of its ally, and declared war against Russia on the

110 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

ist of August. On the 3rd of August, Germany de-
clared war against France, without any aggressive action
on the part of that country, invaded Luxemburg and Bel-
gium, whose neutrality it had promised to preserve, be-
cause of which Great Britain declared war against Ger-
many on the 4th of August, and little by little the world
was at war.

The German army rushing through Luxemburg, rush-
ing through Belgium, in its effort to strike at the very
throat of France, unprepared for an attack through these
neutral countries, was checked at the Marne, on the ever
memorable sixth day of September, 1914:

"Who knows," said Duruy, writing in 1873, when
his devoted country lay prostrate at the feet of Bis-
marck, "who knows but that the broken sword, left in
our hands after a sudden misfortune, may not one day
be required to defend universal liberty against brutal
ambitions?" And, "France has at least," he added,
"the right to remember that she succeeded three times
in arresting or breaking a menacing power, that of
Charles V, of Philip II, and of Ferdinand of Austria."

An armistice was accorded Germany at her own re-
quest on November n, 1918, and the world is slowly
emerging from the shadow of German domination.

The power of Prussia has indeed been broken. How
is the balance of power to be restored and maintained?
The Conference at Paris proposed a League of Nations
which at present seems to be a military and economic al-
liance of the four Great Powers. Will it succeed ? Pos-
terity alone can tell.

VI

THE CONTENT OF MODERN DIPLOMACY

"Now that is an intolerable doctrine, which some
authorities have handed down, that by the Law of
Nations arms may rightly be taken up in order to
weaken a power which is increasing and which, if in-
creased too much, might inflict injury. I confess that
in a deliberation about war this may also come into

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 111

consideration, not from the point of view of justice,
but from the point of view of utility; so that, if a war
be just on other grounds, it may likewise be judged
to have been undertaken prudently on this ground;
and this is precisely the meaning of the authorities cited
on this matter. But that the possibility of suffering
violence gives the right to inflict violence, is contrary
to every notion of equity. Such is human life, that
complete security is never apparent to us. Protection
against uncertain fears must be sought from divine
providence and blameless caution, not from force/' J

In these words, a great Dutchman, whose name is fa-
miliar to us in its Latinized form of "Grotius",2 pays his
respects to the principle of the balance of power, and to it
opposes a principle which, although not so popular, is,
nevertheless, making its way in the world.

Force has been opposed to force, and force in large
or small quantities has not maintained peace. It can
not, unless peace is in some way connected with force,
so as to emerge from the clash of opposing force. Force
is material, and its fruits are material victories. Peace,
we have at least learned within national lines, is the con-
sequence of justice. It is the perfected fruit of justice,
and agencies exist in abundance for the administration of
justice, or at least that portion of it which we call rules
of law.

Grotius states that "protection against uncertain fears
must be sought from divine providence and blameless
caution." Whether Divine Providence will listen to us
in our distress, is not for us to determine, although we
may hope for protection if we conduct ourselves in ac-
cordance with the dictates of Divine Providence. "Blame-
less caution" he does not define, and we need not dwell
upon it. We would not be straining language if we
should say that it implied having our quarrel just and
then settling it by justice. Grotius himself was in favor

'Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, Lib. II., Cap. 1, Sec. 17.
2For discussion of Grotius, see Appendix.

112 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

of arbitration; he was also a believer in the submission
of disputes between nations to conferences of the States.
Tested by its fruits, the balance of power did not seem
to him to be an agency of peace. On the contrary, peace
is the offspring of arbitration between nations, just as
peace within nations is the inevitable outcome of judicial
decision. It is often a consequence of conferences. Arbi-
tration developing into judicial decision, irregular confer-
ences developing into conferences of the nations, meeting
at stated periods, are the content of modern diplomacy,
and are destined, as we hope, to succeed where the balance
of power has failed.

I shall now ask your attention to each of these in turn.

VII

ARBITRATION DEFINITION AND HISTORICAL APPLICATION

Probably there is no better definition of arbitration —
certainly there is none from a higher source, than that
given by twenty-six nations of the world in the confer-
ence assembled at The Hague in 1899, and approved
eight years later by forty-four nations, in the Second
Conference of The Hague. According, therefore, to the
consensus of opinion, international arbitration is, to quote
the exact language of these two bodies: "the settlement
of differences between States, by judges of their own
choice, and on the basis of respect for law."

Arbitration has an ancient and honorable history. In
this very course of lectures you have heard to what ex-
tent it flourished chiefly among the Greek States of antiq-
uity, and how it was resorted to in the Middle Ages. It
is said to be the shield and buckler of the weak, and
yet, curiously enough, the chief treaties of arbitration con-
cluded in the Seventeenth Century were those to which
Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of England, was a
party. The first treaty of arbitration in the modern se-
ries was the Jay Treaty, concluded by the United States
with Great Britain in 1794, in the course of a war or

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 113

scries of wars, from which Great Britain was to emerge
as the strongest of nations. And the strength of Great
Britain has not declined, for in our own day, with our
own eyes, we have seen it with its back to the wall, emerge
from a desperate conflict stronger than ever. It is a fact
that of all countries, Great Britain has to its credit more
arbitrations than any other nation. The United States
may have been weak in 1794, when it proposed that Great
Britain and the United States should arbitrate their out-
standing differences. It has grown with the years, and
in its strength, as well as in the days of its weakness, it
stands for arbitration, and, with the exception of Great
Britain, has more arbitrations to its credit than any other
nation. These two together made modern arbitration;
they have been its chief practitioners, and the world has
been the beneficiary. Therefore, it is not fair to say that
only weak nations desire arbitration, although that would
be a sufficient justification for it.

There were some powerful nations in the Nineteenth
Century and in the first fourteen years of the Twentieth,
who regarded it as the refuge of the weak. Germany
prevented a general treaty of international arbitration
from being concluded at the Second Hague Conference.
Its then powerful Ally, Austria-Hungary, supported it
against the opinion of the world. They tried the sword.
Republican Germany and mutilated Austria, if it remains
independent, will doubtless be willing to try arbitration
in the future.

But to come back to Cromwell. On April 5, 1654,
he concluded the so-called Treaty of Westminster, be-
tween England and the Netherlands, in which, among
other things it was provided : that the losses suffered by
the seizure and detention of English effects in Denmark
since May 18, 1652, were to be made good according to
an appraisement of certain "arbitrators indifferently cho-
sen", and, in case of a failure to adjust differences within
a period of three months, they were to be submitted "to
the judgment and Arbitration of the Protestant Swiss

114 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Cantons". An award was rendered by the Commissioners,
and under the 3Oth article of the same treaty, losses of
the East and West India Companies were settled in the
same manner. It is worth while noting, in passing, that
in those days Holland was very far from a "weak" coun-
try.

Another treaty of Westminster was concluded on July
10, 1654, between England and Portugal, providing that
demands on account of losses were to be referred to arbi-
tration for settlement. The Commission was to be com-
posed of two Englishmen and two Portuguese, and on
failure to agree, the cases left undecided were to be re-
ferred to a member of the Lord Protector's Council, to be
nominated by the Protector himself, and whose decision
was to be final. Portugal was, at this period, a weak
power, otherwise it would not have accepted such person
as Cromwell should be pleased to appoint.

The case was different with the Treaty of Westmin-
ster of November 3, 1655, between Cromwell, of the
British Commonwealth, on the one hand, and Louis XIV,
on the other. However, the two High Contracting Par-
ties agreed, by article twenty-four, to submit to three
Commissioners the legality of captures made by the two
countries from 1640. In case of their inability to agree,
the City of Hamburg was to delegate Commissioners,
whose award was to be made within four months, and
was to be final.

Finally, the Treaty of Westminster, of July 15, 1656,
between Cromwell, it may be said, on the one hand and
Sweden on the other, provided that three Commissioners
should be delegated on each side, to adjust differences and
to settle the losses arising from capture made during the
war between England and the Netherlands.

It would be a waste of time to speculate what might
have happened if the views of that great man had domi-
nated the conduct of nations, — less interesting perhaps,
but certainly as useless as Pascal's statement to the ef-
fect that "If the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter, the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 115

whole face of the earth would have been changed." Crom-
well's practice was not followed, and Cleopatra's nose was
— as it was.

In the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century, these
United States of America came into being, and with them
the doctrine that government derives its just power from
the consent of the governed, and that justice should ob-
tain between States as it does between men. The recog-
nition of the independence of these States was contained
in the Treaty of 1783, between Great Britain and the
United States. It was alleged that neither of them lived
up to their obligations under this treaty, and that acts
of lawlessness were committed by each, which brought
them to the verge of war. To avert this calamity, Presi-
dent Washington, who believed and said that all dis-
putes between nations should be settled by peaceful means,
sent John Jay, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
to England, to effect, if possible, a settlement. This he
did, and the treaty which appropriately bears his name,
provided in its fifth article for a Commission to decide
which was the River Saint-Croix intended by the Treaty
of 1783. In this the Commission was successful. The
sixth article provided that a Commission should deter^
mine the losses suffered by British creditors because of
the failure on the part of the American States to live up
to the agreement of the Treaty of Peace. The Commis-
sion awarded three hundred thousand dollars, and broke
up. The United States subsequently paid, in addition,
a lump sum of three million dollars, in satisfaction of all
these demands. The seventh article provided that the
claims of Americans for unlawful capture or destruction
of their property upon the high seas, committed by Great
Britain during the revolutionary wars then raging, should
be submitted t«> a commission of five, and that the claims
of British subjects for a failure of the United States to
protect them within their jurisdiction, or because of the
failure to prevent France from making unlawful captures,
should be submitted to the same commission. The various

116 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

claims were to be decided upon their merits and accord-
ing1 "to justice, equity, and the laws of nations". Awards
were made in favor of and against each. The five Com-
missioners,— of whom the Chairman, John Trumball, was
curiously enough a former Colonel in the Continental
Army and Aid-de-Camp to General Washington, and Mr.
Jay's Secretary of Legation at the time of his appoint-
ment, and a portrait painter of repute — were so success-
ful that they not only settled the disputes between the
two countries justly, but convinced nations of the advan-
tage of arbitration.

Since then there have been many treaties of arbitra-
tion during the course of the Nineteenth Century, there
have been innumerable cases adjusted by arbitration, and
in the first decade of the Twentieth Century the world
was, as it were, surrounded with a net of arbitration
treaties. The instrument of peace was there, but it was
not a self-starter; it needed to be set in motion. Unfortu-
nately, it could be said of arbitration as Cardinal Fleury
said to the Abbe St.-Pierre anent his plan for perpetual
peace : "You have forgotten an essential article, that of
sending missionaries to touch the hearts of princes and to
persuade them to accept your views."

VIII.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, THE IDEAL OF SIMON
BOLIVAR

To quote again the first expounder, if not the father of
International Law, our friend Grotius,1 who says in his
book on The Law of Nations, published in 1625, during
the Thirty Years War :

"It would be useful and indeed it is almost necessary,
that certain Congresses of Christian Powers should be
held, in which the controversies which arise among
some of them may be decided by others who are not

*For discussion of Grotius, see Appendix.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 117

interested ; and in which measures may be taken to
compel the parties to accept peace on equitable terms."
The remedy prescribed by the physician was tried in
the Congresses of Westphalia and Munster, in 1648, which
put an end to the Thirty Years' War. It has also been
tried on later occasions, notably in the Congress of Utrecht
and of Vienna; and in a series of congresses in the
Nineteenth Century, one at Paris in 1856, ending the
Crimean War, another at Berlin ending the Russo-Turk-
ish War, and culminating in the Conference at Paris of
1919. In all of these congresses or conferences, some
principles of international law have been discussed, laid
down, and accepted. But these principles were few in
number; they were incidental, showing at most what a
conference could do if it met in time of peace for this pur-
pose, instead of meeting at the end of war. They were,
howrever, war congresses, animated by a spirit of venge-
ance, in which indeed, measures were taken, to quote Gro-
tius, "to compel the parties to accept peace". They were
not, however, his kind, as the peace imposed was not "on
equitable terms". Grotius evidently meant a conference
meeting under circumstances when equities could be con-
sidered. Controversies between some of the nations were
to be submitted and decided by these conferences, not by
the parties in dispute, but by others, which were not in-
terested. In his conception, the States of Europe were
looked upon as members of a great family, or great so-
ciety, or great commonwealth, or of a great republic —
the term is indifferent — and because of the fact that all
were affected to a more or less degree by a resort to arms,
the powers affected, though not parties to the controversy,
were to determine the conditions of peace upon equitable
terms, because of the general, not of the specific inter-
It was not to be a Congress meeting at stated terms,
it was to meet from time to time, in case of need, but
when it did meet and was in session, it was apparently
to be an assembly which could treat a dispute of a legal
nature according to rules of law, and of an equitable na-

118 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

ture according to what would be considered just and fair.
There have, unfortunately, been very few gatherings of
this nature, in accordance with the spirit of his proposal.
The best example was but of yesterday, when, in 1884, a
conference of interested Powers met at Berlin, under Bis-
marck's presidency, to settle the disputes between Powers
claiming African territory, laid down rules of conduct
for such Powers, and provided for their peaceful settle-
ment. This Conference proved that the idea of Grotius
was not Utopian, and it is perhaps not too much to say
that it has kept the peace in Africa which might have
been broken, and given rise to wars, as was the case for
generations in the recently discovered and thinly settled
tracts of America.

However, the idea which Grotius may have had in
mind was more clearly expressed and brought to the at-
tention of thinking people by one who was not, like Gro-
tius, a writer on international law and a master of inter-
national relations. He had not held, as Grotius, the post
of an Ambassador. This obscure person was from the New
World. His voice was the voice of the New World;
his spirit was of the New World. He was the mouth-
piece of the new diplomacy and he proposed the confer-
ences of nations to be held in time of peace, to preserve
peace — to take from the large domain of justice, its prin-
ciples, and to state them in rules of law for the conduct
of nations. His plan has been tried and found workable,
although perhaps those who called into being the confer-
ence which he advocated were unconscious that such a
man as William Ladd ever lived.

What was the plan ? The precedent which caused Ladd
to propose his plan was American. Simon Bolivar, the
Liberator of South America, as he is called, proposed a
meeting of the Latin-American States, hardly out of the
cradle. The meeting of their representatives was to be
held at Panama. The United States was invited, and,
after much controversy, our participation in the confer-
ence was authorized, but our delegates were appointed

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 119

when it was !<><> late. The conference failed. From the
I '.-mama incident. "Y7/r inference to be deduced," Mr.
Ladd said, "is, that the gmrnuncuts of Christendom are
wiling to send delegates to any such Congress, whenever
it shall be called by a respectable state, well established
in its own government, if called in a time of peace, to meet
at a proper place."1 He was not, however, satisfied with
representatives of the Christian powers. Perhaps he had
doubts as to their Christianity. Ambassadors were to be
appointed in addition, of "civilized nations", which might
care to send them. He did not prescribe "the proper
place." The Czar of all the Russias did that forty-eight
years later, in 1898. However many ambassadors or rep-
resentatives a nation might send, it would only have one
vote. They therefore were to meet on a plane of equality.
They would discuss measures, and only such were to be
adopted as all the nations should agree to, and those States
only were to be bound which should subsequently ratify
them. Certain subjects were not to be discussed.

"The Congress of Nations is to have nothing to do
with the internal affairs of nations, or with insurrections,
revolutions, or contending factions of people or princes,
or with forms of government, but solely to concern them-
selves with the intercourse of nations in peace and war."1
What measures were to be discussed? Mr. Ladd did not
leave his readers in doubt, and it will be obvious to you
that he outlined the program of the two Hague Confer-
ences.

The purpose of the conference was to settle "the prin-
ciples of international law by compact and agreement, of
the nature of a mutual treaty, and also of devising and
promoting plans for the preservation of peace, and amelio-
rating the condition of man."2 Here is his program :

1 . To define the rights of belligerents towards each

"William Ladd, An Essay on a Congress of Nations for the Adjust-
ment of International Disputes Without Resort to Arms, 1840, Edi-
tion of 1916, New York, p. 57.

'Ibid. Advertisement, p. xlix.

120 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

other; and endeavor, as much as possible, to abate the
horrors of war, lessen its frequency, and promote its
termination.

2. To settle the rights of neutrals, and thus abate
the evils which war inflicts on those nations that are
desirous of remaining in peace.

3. To agree on measures of utility to mankind in a
state of peace; and

4. To organize a Court of Nations. These are the
four great divisions of the labors of the proposed Con-
gress of Nations.1

IX.

THE HAGUE CONFERENCES

The first of these congresses, called The Hague Con-
ference, met in 1899, in a time of profound peace, and did
settle some of the principles of the law of nations "by com-
pact and agreement, of the nature of a mutual treaty".
It expressed itself strongly and unequivocally in favor of
arbitration for the settlement of disputes, and it created
the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is in
reality a list or panel of judges, from which a special tri-
bunal or commission can be appointed, whenever States in
dispute may be wise enough to lay their disputes before
judges of their own choice, for the decision of their con-
troversies upon the basis of respect for law.

The second of the Conferences met at The Hague in
1907, and attempted in accordance with Mr. Ladd's
fourth division, "to organize a Court of Nations." The
Court was not made, but progress was. A draft conven-
tion for the so-called Court of Arbitral Justice was adop-
ted by the Conference, with their recommendation to the
Powers to agree upon a method of appointing the judges,
and thus constitute it.

A Committee of Jurists met at The Hague the sum-
mer of 1920 to do this. The Council of the League of

1Essay on a Congress of Nations, pp. 10-11.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 121

Nations adopted their project with slight modifications, on
October, 2jth 1920, and the Assembly of the League of
Nations adopted the project, with some changes on
December 13, 1920. By rejecting the principle of com-
pulsory jurisdiction, they reverted practically to the
proposed Court of Arbitral Justice of 1907.

In one respect, this is to be regretted, as the Court of
the Nations might have been constituted like the Supreme
Court of the United States, in which State may sue State
without a special agreement to the question in dispute
which is often difficult to frame. It is unfortunate, like-
wise, that a nation can not, as a State of the American
Union can, sue a State and obtain a judgment against the
defendant even though it does not appear and answer.

However, the first step was taken in 1907, and our
French friends tell us that "It is only the first step that
counts". A second step was taken in 1920, and a very
long one, for an agreement was reached in the Advisory
Committee and approved by the Council and the Assem-
bly of the League of Nations, upon an acceptable method
of appointing the judges. Many a step remains to be
taken to supply law for the Court and to enlarge its juris-
diction. But peace can only result in this practical world
of ours, from an infinite series of little steps. The na-
tions are unwilling to make a leap in the dark. They fear,
as do the sensible people of which they are composed,
to fall in the ditch. Many conferences of the nations
must be called to meet to take these steps. A third of
The Hague series was due in 1915 — that is to say, eight
years after the adjournment of the Second, in 1907, as
the nations had agreed to a third at approximately this
time. But the war came instead.

Will further conferences take place? If so, when
and what will be their general program? The Advisory
Committee of Jurists that drafted the Court project at
The Hague last summer, unanimously recommended a
series of conferences to be called "Conferences for the
Advancement of International Law", to meet as succes-

122 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

sors to the first two Hague Conferences, at stated times,
to continue the work left unfinished; and the Committee
recommended further that the first of the series be held
as soon as practicable for the purposes which they were
bold enough to state as follows :

1. To restate the established rules of international
law, especially, and in the first instance, in the fields
affected by the events of the recent war.

2. To formulate and agree upon the amendments
and additions, if any, to the rules of international law
shown to be necessary or useful by the events of the
war and the changes in the conditions of international
life and intercourse which have followed the war.

3. To endeavor to reconcile divergent views and
secure general agreement upon the rules which have
been in dispute heretofore.

4. To consider the subjects not now adequately
regulated by international law, but as to which the
interests of international justice require that rules of
law shall be declared and accepted.

If the world wants these conferences to meet at stated
periods to take up the work of the world interrupted by
the war and where the war left it, they may do so.

In 1787, our own Benjamin Franklin wrote to a friend
in Europe :

I send you enclos'd the propos'd new Federal
Constitution for these States. I was engag'd 4 Months
of the last Summer in the Convention that form'd it.
It is now sent by Congress to the several States for
their Confirmation. If it succeeds, I do not see why
you might not in Europe carry the Project of good
Henry the 4th into Execution, by forming a Federal
Union and One Grand Republick of all its different
States & Kingdoms ; by means of a like Convention ;
for we had many Interests to reconcile.1
We are inclined to dwell upon our rights, at the ex-
pense of our duties, which, however, our neighbors do not

'Letter of Benjamin Franklin to Mr. Grand, October 22, 1787.
Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. IV., pp. 341-342.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 123

always overlook. Nations which are made up of the same
men and women, more or less artificially grouped, are
likewise inclined to look upon their rights as free, sover-
eign, and independent States. We must not, however,
deceive ourselves. We have rights, but they are use-
less unless it be the duty of others to recognize and re-
spect them; otherwise, we would live in a state of an-
archy. It is the same with nations, and for the same
reasons. Therefore, a problem of the new diplomacy is
to devise some form of organization, — call it a society, an
association, or a league of nations, if you please — which,
while recognizing the right of nations, and safeguarding
them, shall at the same time, state the duties of nation
to nation, to the end that we may live in an ordered world
— ordered, be it said, not from above, not from below,
but by the States themselves, in the exercise of their free-
dom, sovereignty, and independence.

Many attempts have been made to reach this goal;
by men of vision, whom the world calls dreamers; by
statesmen usually out of office and spending the rem-
nant of their days in dignified retirement; latterly, by
hard-headed men of affairs, with the vision of the dream-
er, but without the experience of the statesmen. Persons
interested in this sort of thing are familiar with the
"great design of Henry IV", devised by his great Minis-
ter, Sully, living in retirement after his master's death;
with Penn's "Plan of a European Diet" at the close of
the seventeenth century, by which the forces of the mem-
bers were to be united in one strength, and to be used
against the recalcitrant bent upon breaking the peace;
with the project of the good Abbe de Saint-Pierre, in the
first quarter of the eighteenth century, which he, like Sul-
ly, foisted upon Henry IV, and which is a tractate on
perpetual peace, which he snu^lit to usher into a war-
ridden world: with Kant's "Perpetual Peace", appearing
during the French Revolution and during the last dec-
ade of the eighteenth century, advocating republican, that
is, constitutional or representative government; with the

124 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Holy Alliance of Alexander I of Russia, proposing a
League of Nations, the members of which were to be
kept in order by armed force; and with the more modest
proposals of The Hague Conferences, by which the na-
tions regarded themselves as forming a society to be gov-
erned by justice and equity, recorded in instruments nego-
tiated by them, and to be applied in their mutual inter-
course. These projects, however much they differ, have
one point in common; that all provide for a union of
States, with duties as well as rights.

But I do not intend to speak of these projects or any of
them. I would crave your indulgence for some closing
remarks upon the one Union of States, extending over a
vast area, controlling the actions of multitudes of men
and women which, surviving its framers and standing the
test of time, may profitably be considered when questions
of international organization are discussed.

X.

THE UNITED STATES AS AN EXEMPLIFICATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Thirteen British colonies of North America, from New
Hampshire on the North, to Georgia on the South, de-
clared, on July 4, 1776, their independence by deputies
duly authorized thereto and representing them at the time
in that distinguished Revolutionary body known as The
Continental Congress, then in session at Philadelphia.
Heretofore, they had been colonies, and called themselves
such; hereafter, they were States, and called themselves
such. They were united, some say, in 1774, by the Ar-
ticles of Association — others that they were united by the
Declaration of Independence. The purpose, however, for
which they were united was to secure under the Articles
of Association a redress of grievances ; under the Declara-
tion of Independence, a recognition of their independence
by the mother-country. The union was temporary. It

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 125

was not satisfactory. They felt that they needed to be
drawn together closer and upon a permanent basis. There-
fore, a Committee of Congress drafted Articles of As-
sociation for a league of friendship, permanent in its na-
ture, which they called the Articles of Confederation, and
in the second article the States declared themselves to be,
"sovereign, free and independent", and possessed of every
power which they did not expressly grant to the United
States in Congress assembled.

The important point to bear in mind is that these States
thought themselves to be free, sovereign and independent,
and therefore, they stated themselves to be such. The Ar-
ticles of Confederation bound each State only from the
date of its approval. The last of the thirteen States ap-
proved of them on March i, 1781, from which date there
was a union in law, as well as in fact, of the thirteen
American States.

The union, however, had many grave defects, the chief
one being that it did not work, or at least that it did not
work to their satisfaction. The farsighted among them
therefore proposed a more perfect union. And what was
this to consist? Of States, in place of the less perfect
union of States.

For this purpose each of the States, with the excep-
tion of Rhode Island, which abstained in the exercise of
its sovereignty, freedom and independence, sent delegates
to meet other delegates of the States of this imperfect
union, in order to make the Articles of Confederation ade-
quate for the exigencies of the Union. They were to
have met on the second Monday in May, in Philadelphia.
A majority of the States were not represented until the
2 55th, when they met. The delegates were appointed by
the legislatures of the different States ; they acted under
notions from their respective States. Their first act
was to elect a Chairman, one George Washington, Dele-
gate from Virginia, and a Secretary. They thereupon
proceeded to examine the credentials of the different mem-
bers, in order to see that they were entitled to represent

126 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

their States for the purpose in mind. Little by little,
the Delegates of all the States arrived, with the exception
of Rhode Island. Twelve States were therefore repre-
sented. The Conference, called the Federal Convention,
adjourned on September 17, 1787, having drafted the Ar-
ticles of Union which we call the Constitution of the Uni-
ted States.

The Delegates of this memorable assembly apparently
had trouble with the Preamble, inasmuch as only twelve
of the thirteen States were represented, and feared that
some of the States might not ratify the instrument, for
it was to be presented to each of the States to be consid-
ered by a convention in each of the States, specially called
for that purpose.

The Constitution had made the ratification of nine States
necessary for the government thereunder to go into ef-
fect— not for all of the States, but merely for the nine
or more which might have ratified it. Two held out, and
were therefore foreign States. One of these, North Caro-
lina, came in in 1789. Rhode Island toddled in in 1790.

How was the Preamble to begin? All the drafts save
the last reported by the Committee on Style, on Septem-
br 12, began with "We the People of the States of New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island", etc., down to
and including Georgia. That is to say, they enumerated
the thirteen States, beginning with the most northern and
ending with the most southern. Should the thirteen be
included, when only nine might ratify, and when, as a
matter of fact, two out of the thirteen did not, until after
the Constitution and the government under it went into ef-
fect? Some clever draftsman, probably Gouverneur Mor-
ris, who was a member of the Committee of Style and
Arrangement, and to whose facile pen the excellent liter-
ary style of the instrument is accredited, solved the diffi-
culty by striking out all the names of the States, and
inserting, "United" before "States", so that the Consti-
tution, instead of reading, "We the People of the States
of New Hampshire", etc., read now, reads and ever will

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 127

. "We the People of the United States". We should
not, however, overlook the fact that it was the people of
the States; it was the people of each of the States that
ratified the Constitution; it is the people of each of the
States that elect the members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, and it is the electors chosen by the
people within each of the States who elect the President
of these United States.

As that Prince of Jurists, the great Chief Justice Mar-
shall, said in one of his greatest cases, decided in 1819 :l

No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think
of breaking down the lines which separate the States,
and of compounding the American people into one
common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they
act in their States.

Because of this, their experience is valuable to people
of foreign States, who also act, when they act, within their
States. Each State of the American Union has two Con-
stitutions. One is local, dealing with those matters that
begin and end within the boundaries of the State. It
may be amended whenever the people so desire. The sec-
ond Constitution is not local, but general. It deals with
matters that may begin within a State, and extend be-
yond it, or which arise without the States, and yet affect
them, as in the case of foreign affairs. This constitution
is the Constitution of the United States, ratified by each
of the States, and declared by Article 6, Section 2, thereof,
to be the supreme law of each of the States. It cannot
be amended or modified, or varied by any State. They
adopted the Constitution as a whole, Article 5 of which
provides that amendments to the Constitution, to be
effective, must be "ratified by the Legislators of three-
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-
fourths thereof." The Constitution is not, therefore, to be
like the law of the Medes and the Persians. It changes
with the changing moods of three-fourths of the States.

WcCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316, 403.

128 HISTORY AND NATURE OF,

The States created the government of the United States
as their agent for the purposes which they stated expressly
or by necessary implication, and for none others. Addi-
tional powers may be added by amendment. The Legisla-
tive branch, consisting of a Senate and a House of Rep-
resentatives, has certain specified powers; the Executive
branch, whereof the President is the head, has prescribed
duties ; the Judicial branch, of which the Supreme Court
is the head, has certain jurisdiction. Any group of for-
eign States wishing to follow the example of the Ameri-
can states can. They do not need to confide so many
powers upon the government of their creating unless they
want to do so. But there are two things of fundamental
importance which they should do, if they want their union
to outlive its makers : they should eliminate the question
of large and small States, as the wise men of the Federal
Convention did, by providing that one of the chambers,
which we call the Senate, should represent the States
equally, and that a second chamber, which we call the
House of Representatives, should represent the States
according to population. In this way, each branch would
have a veto upon the abuse of power by the other, and by
means of a conference committee between the two houses,
there would be passed under the pressure of public opin-
ion such legislation as was needed.

The second requisite is that to the extent of its granted
powers, the government of the Union should act upon each
member of the State. States cannot act themselves, they
must act by agents. An agent attempting to do an act
contrary to the fundamental law can be restrained. As
the act, therefore, is not committed by the State, but by
an individual, the State is not involved, merely the person
claiming authority which he does not possess, whether
that be under the statute of a State in conflict with the
act of Union, or due to a false interpretation of the act
of Union. This simple principle, new in political science,
when it was devised by the wise men of the Federal Con-
vention, has made it unnecessary to coerce sovereign

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 129

States, which the wisest of that assembly, Messrs. Mason
and Madison, Hamilton and Ellsworth, knew was impos-
sible, and said so both in and out of Convention.

To interpret the Act of Union and, in so doing, to assure
to the government of the Union its full rights, to protect
the States of the Union in the exercise of their rights, and
to define the duties of each, in their appropriate spheres,
we have the Supreme Court of the United States.

The nations have made a beginning. We are familiar
with conferences at The Hague. They can meet at stated
intervals, submitting their acts to each nation for rati-
fication, and binding only those that so ratify. This would
prove itself to be in the course of time no mean legisla-
ture. A committee appointed by the nations might act
in the interval of the conference, and exercise such powers
with which the nations in conference should vest it. A
Court of the Nations could be created, indeed, it ap-
parently has been created by act of the Assembly of the
League of Nations, on the I3th day of December, 1920.

If Europe should wish to follow Dr. Franklin's advice,
the way is still open. Should all the nations wish to fol-
low in the footsteps of the conferences which have met at
The Hague, and, without creating a close union, organ-
ize the world upon the basis of justice and the rules of law,
this can also be done.

In either event, the experience of the United States will
be helpful. For this country of ours was founded, as
James Russell Lowell has so beautifully said, "By men
empires in their brains."

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

Economic Factors in International
Relations

ECONOMIC FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

I.

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Of our domestic issues perhaps eight out of ten are dis-
tinctly economic in character. Likewise, in our interna-
tional relations the proportion is probably as great. Eco-
nomic forces directly affect the course of trade between
different peoples, the intercourse of their governments and
the activities of their consular and diplomatic representa-
tives. The very fact that a country becomes commercially
great in itself creates wider and more important relations
with the rest of the world, in the management of which the
best trained economic minds are constantly needed.

It was economic development, a growth of wealth and
commerce, that brought Venice to leadership in the Medi-
terranean. "He hath an argosy bound to Tripolis," said
Shylock, "another to the Indies; I understand, moreover,
upon the Rialto he hath a third at Mexico, a fourth for
England." This international character of her trade and
the diversity of the world's coins which poured into her
markets directly forced the solution of a common means of
payment and the first issue of notes by the Bank of Venice.
It was the hunt for wealth and the precious metals which
sent Columbus adventuring to the New World. The con-
sequent stream of silver from America and its effect on
Europe during the reign of Charles V. set in train the
theory of a favorable or unfavorable balance of trade (de-
pending on whether or not a country maintained an excess
of imports in specie), the error of which has not disap-
peared even to this day. Then, again, international con-
tacts were made by the Hanseatic League, with its seat

133

134 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

at Lubeck; and later the wide-flung fleets of the Dutch
brought new international relations, especially with Eng-
land. In recent years, the most prominent example of all
has been the extension of British economic relations with
every country in the world. So that, at least as one of the
reasons, diplomatic missions to the Court of St. James
become of the most conspicuous importance — that is, when
we are not considering mere social relations. Why is it
that contracts and bills of exchange all over the world,
in every port of the distant seas, have been drawn in terms
of pounds sterling? The most casual observation thus
shows us how economic forces function in endless variety
between nations.

Indeed, it is difficult to see how a mere adroit politician
and bargainer, even though trained in the formal diplo-
matic conventions, can properly handle the issues con-
stantly arising out of the increasingly economic character
of international forces. Either he must be economically
competent, or he must rely on the so-called "expert" on
subjects in which he may easily be deceived. With the
yearly expansion of industry and wealth, of rapid means
of communication and transport, these economic mat-
ters push to the fore with such dominating persistence
that they will not be denied.

We have a striking illustration in point at the present
moment in the difficulty of settling on the amount of the
reparation to be paid by Germany to the Allies. In the
beginning of the discussions at Paris as to what could be
exacted from the defeated enemy, a grave error was com-
mitted by attempting to fix the amount by reference to
Germany's wealth and income. As a consequence very
exaggerated sums became possible to the imagination of
the victors. French financial policy was seriously affected
by false expectations ; and Lloyd George went to his elec-
torate in the memorable election of December, 1918,
promising them indemnity for the largest part of British
war expenditures. The report by the economic section,
however, showed conclusively that the sum must bear direct

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 135

relation not to statistics of wealth but only to Germany's
producing power. It is obvious that a proportional part
of German wealth in the form of mines, furnaces, mills or
farms could not be handed over as reparation. There
could be taken only a part of the output from these and
other productive sources. Nor could she pay in this out-
put of goods unless she could get the cotton, copper, rub-
ber, and like materials to be used in her productive
processes. Eggs cannot be laid if hens are cut off from
food. On the settlement of this matter of the German
reparation and the removal of the uncertainty attached to
it hangs much of the economic readjustment of Europe;
and the solution would directly affect the foreign ex-
changes and our own industrial recovery. The insistency
of an economic understanding of the most pressing and
practical international question today is only too painfully
evident.1

II.

MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION

When we seek the fundamental economic forces under-
lying our necessary international relations we come first
to the movements of population. These are primary
causes of international reaction. Impelled by the pressure
of numbers on subsistence there were the early incursions
of the Goths and Vandals over eastern and southern
Europe and the surge of the northern Teutons over Ger-
many, France and Spain. But in modern days, questions
of immigration and emigration touch very sensitive inter-
national nerves. These are so numerous and so obvious
that it is not possible to be exhaustive in this paper. At
the best we can only hope to be suggestive in a way to
stir reflection and open the path to individual study.

One interesting* form of international relations arising

*Cf. J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (19),
and Bernard Baruch. There is a review of Baruch's book by Keynes
in the New York Evening Post, Dec. 4, 1920.

136 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

out of immigration to the United States from Italy and
its reaction on the foreign exchanges has appeared since
the European War. The Italians who have come to the
United States and to South America have been indus-
trious and thrifty. A part of their savings have in the
past been sent back to Italy. From the United States some
$80,000,000 and from Argentina some $50,000,000 have
been annually returned home. During the war Italy
placed an external loan with the United States and Great
Britain of about $2,500,000,000, the interest on which,
at 5 per cent., would amount approximately to the sum
which she could expect as a credit in the international
account from her emigrants. That is, Italy needed to
import coal and raw materials to keep her industries going
and her workmen employed. It was vitally important for
a country with a surplus of labor to be able to send emi-
grants to other countries and to receive back their savings,
especially in this critical time of readjustment. But at the
present time, either as a protection against Bolshevistic
immigrants, or as a means of reducing the competition for
employment, attempts have been made to stop immigra-
tion for a period. Such measures, however, are not
simple in their effect and are certain to complicate our
international relations.

One other case may be mentioned wherein the ques-
tion of immigration has created at this very time a diffi-
cult international situation. Inter-racial problems have
been introduced by the coming of the Japanese, Chinese
and Hindo immigrants to the Pacific Coast. In the pas-
sage by California of legislation discriminating against
Asiatic immigrants in regard to property and civil rights,
internal economic issues openly clashed with our interna-
tional relations.1 The agitation against the Japanese
laborers originated with the labor unions. Their purpose
was obviously to restrict the numbers of those who might

*Cf. H. A. Millis, The Japanese Problem in the United States
(1915); J. F. Steiner, The Japanese Invasion (1917).

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 137

compete with American laborers. It was a contest be-
tween economic standards of living. As contrasted with
Americans the Japanese were superior in thrift and often
in industry and patient agricultural skill. Willing to sub-
sist on less and to work harder, they excited the animosity
of those who believed that when beaten in open competi-
tion they could protect their economic position by legisla-
tion. The fundamental error in this attitude, quite too
common in the policies of the leaders of ''organized labor,"
is the supposition that employment is increased by restric-
tion of production. It is folly to hold that there is only
a limited amount of work and that it can be distributed
among a restricted monopoly of laborers in the form of
higher wages, for each. On the contrary, greater effi-
ciency and lowered cost of production have been proved
by long economic experience to be the basis and reason
for higher wages. If the Japanese increase productive
efficiency and turn out more wealth at lowered costs, they
enlarge the volume of goods, thereby increasing the mar-
gin from which capital can be saved, increasing also the
trade and commerce of the country, its transportation and
shipping, and inevitably extending the demand for labor
of all kinds. For temporary freedom from competition
(which is, after all, not real) the labor organizations are
willing to lose a future gain arising from enlarged general
prosperity and greater employment.

The statesman, however, in acting upon public ques-
tions, is obliged to consider not only the economic, but the
ethical and political elements of the case. Unfortunately,
while the appeal to economics gives an unequivocal an-
swer, racial prejudice and selfish politics have entered into
the local problem so as to confuse the issue. Moreover,
under our form of government, in making treaties with
foreign countries, the United States cannot control the
action of a State in certain reserved powers. Hence an
individual State on the sea coast may greatly interfere
with a national foreign policy. From the Japanese point
of view, their direct opposition is to the discrimination

138 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

as to civic and property rights against them which does not
hold against other people. We have allowed Germans to
hold property and obtain civic rights in our land. Why
not the Japanese?

III.

FOREIGN TRADE AND SHIPPING

As we enter further into our subject we find that the
immediate and inevitable economic contact of one country
with another is through its foreign trade and its shipping.

From the very beginnings of our national existence
equality of treatment between American and foreign ships
became a burning issue. To meet the British Navigation
Acts, we discriminated in 1789 in favor of our ships by
tonnage duties, and in the same year by customs duties.
The regulations against foreign vessels in our coastwise
trade have been so stringent that since 1817 Americans
have maintained a strict monopoly in that trade. In the
foreign, as contrasted with our coastwise, shipping, we
soon found we could not apply discriminating treatment in
our favor without meeting with drastic retaliation from
foreign countries. When our ships entered foreign ports
they were likewise met by discriminating duties against us.
The crass assumption that we could sell without buying
was finally given up about 1830. It reappears now only
in the occasional offer of a bill by some callow statesman
from Buncombe County.

During the Napoleonic wars the Order in Council of
1793, the Blockade of 1806, the Berlin Decree, another
British Order in Council, and the Milan Decree, inflicted
heavy losses on neutral American shipping. Thereupon,
Jefferson, with an exaggerated conceit as to the impor-
tance of our commerce to European combatants, created
the Embargo Act of 1807, which ruined our commerce
but did not prevent war. Then came the Non-Intercourse
Act (1809), followed later by the War of 1812. Nor did
we get the principle that "free ships make free goods"
inserted in The Treaty of Ghent. We tried the experi-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139

ment of extreme nationalism, but without much of the
gain that might have arisen from a more flexible system
of economic co-operation with the rest of the world.1

On matters of shipping, the American mind has re-
mained largely provincial and unprogressive. The whole
story is too long to be taken up here ; but it may be per-
mitted to present one modern instance of the way in which
our international relations are at this very moment being
shaken by questions involving our shipping policy. A
vigorous chauvinism on our part has led to an attitude on
Panama Canal tolls for American ships that is very much
questioned by foreign countries. Just as the Suez Canal,
so does the Panama Canal touch the shipping and com-
merce of all nations. If we wish equal treatment for our
ships passing through the Suez Canal, other commercial
countries would likewise expect equal treatment for their
ships passing through the Panama Canal. In the Clay-
ton-Bulwer Treaty (April 19, 1850) between the United
States and Great Britain, it was agreed as a matter of
course that in any canal between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans "any rights or advantages in regard to commerce
or navigation" shall be offered "on the same terms to the
citizens or subjects of the other" (Art. 1.) ; and that "its
neutrality shall be guaranteed so that the said Canal may
forever be open and free" (Art. V). This convention
was superseded by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of Novem-
ber 1 8, 1901. Following the rules of the Suez Canal (as
of October 28, 1888), the United States agreed that (Art.
III., i):

"The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of
commerce and of war of all nations observing these
rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be
no discrimination against any such nation, or its citi-
zens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges
of traffic, or otherwise.

On this solemn international covenant, the United States
'Coman, Industrial History of the United States (1910), Ch. V., VI.

140 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

was given a free hand in the construction, "as well as the
exclusive right of providing for the regulation and man-
agement of the canal" Art. II).

It will be recalled that by our navigation laws only
American ships were allowed in our coastwise, as dis-
tinguished from our foreign, trade. Then, in preparation
for the .opening of the canal August 15, 1914), Congress
passed the Panama Canal Act, August 24, 1912, which
provided (Sec. 5) that, "No tolls shall be levied upon ves-
sels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States",
Such a provision, of course, raised the question whether,
by excepting these American ships from tolls, we had vio-
lated our solemn agreement of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty
of 1901. Could it be said that the termini of the Panama
Canal were coastwise ports of the United States? Evi-
dently not, for foreign ships were admitted. On what
grounds could we justify the exemption? Whatever the
basis, this exemption was repealed by Congress in the Act
of June 15, 1914. Senator Elihu Root's speech (63d
Cong.) showing that we were morally bound to repeal
this exemption will remain one of the remarkable pro-
nouncements in a very exciting debate. The repeal went
through by the influence of President Wilson (in spite of
the Baltimore platform) in favor of freer trade. At this
period, also (August 18, 1914), an Act was passed to
encourage the regisration of foreign-built vessels under
the American flag by suspending the age of vessels (five
years) applying for registry, and other restrictions as to
nationality of officers, survey, inspection and meas-
urement.

We know that President Harding, while President-
elect, visited the Panama Canal with the purpose (if cor-
rectly reported) of recommending the restoration of the
exemption, which was mentioned in the Republican plat-
form. The position of Mr. Harding is evidently that of
the protectionists who have long worked to eliminate
foreign competition both in ship building and in ship oper-
ation. The presence of this matter in the platform was

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 141

not to satisfy any hostility to Great Britain, but to give
cheaper rates to the lumber industry and a few other inter-
ests on the Pacific Coast. Very few members of the com-
mittee on resolutions at the Republican convention knew
this plank was in the platform. In order to give an ad-
vantage to certain Pacific Coast interests, at the expense of
others in the Mississippi Valley, on the general theory of
protection, a domestic economic question has been allowed
to create an embarrassing policy inconsistent with our
treaty relations with Great Britain.

Now that the end of the war-stimulation of ship build-
ing is past, and a surplus of ships is lying idle in our ports
as well as in many ports throughout the world, we are
likely to hear more of the protectionist measures to aid
shipping by subsidies and bounties,1 which have hitherto
been repudiated by American voters.

IV

ECONOMIC POSTULATES OF FOREIGN TRADE

The very existence of foreign trade between nations
arises from fundamental economic principles. One of
the earliest developments in industry was the recognition
of the advantages flowing from division of labor, which,
of course, are familiar to you all. It was an expression
of the need for men to overcome the innate centrifugal
tendencies of individualism in favor of co-operation in
work, which would result in greater satisfactions for less
effort. That one man, or one group, should specialize and
gain skill in producing one article or even a certain part
of one article, has enormously multiplied the productive
power of industry and added uncounted comforts even to
the poorest ranks of society. International trade is but an
application of the principle of division of labor to the
wider industrial operations of different countries with their

*W. T. Dunmore, Ship Subsidies (1907).

142 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

various characteristics of soil, climate and racial devel-
opment.

There will be no such trade unless there is a mutual
gain. Hence international trade arises out of the fact
that one country possesses a relative advantage in the pro-
duction of one commodity (A) while another country has
a relative advantage in a different commodity (B). By
exporting A to pay for an import of B the first country
gains by not having to produce B in which it has the rela-
tive disadvantage ; and the other country gains conversely
by putting its productive effort into B, in which it has a
relative advantage, and obtaining the imported commodity
A at the cost of producing B. This operation, based on
reciprocal advantages in some articles relatively to others
at home, is what is known as the working of the Doctrine
of Comparative Costs. It is the cause of the existence
of all international trade. Under it, the vast exchanges
of goods between nations goes on, and the international
relations arising from this commerce have become numer-
ous and intricate; but yet they must conform — whether
we realize it or not in our daily transactions — to the sim-
ple economic principle just described. Any domestic
policy adopted in ignorance of its working is sure to be
visited with inevitable failure.

As usually happens in the experience of both men and
nations the definite and unequivocal results of purely eco-
nomic forces are not allowed to take place unhindered by
the interference of selfish, private or nationalistic inter-
ests. The reciprocal gains from international trade are
fully reaped only when no obstacles are introduced to
check the free movement of goods between countries. But
tariffs on the importation of foreign goods, export duties
on home products, restrictions on the movements of the
precious metals used in settling international balances —
to say nothing of resolutions and actual warfare — all
work to reduce the mutual gains naturally issuing from
foreign trade. There comes a conflict between economic
forces and those of a nationalistic, political, or racial char-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 143

acter. In the long run economic forces assert themselves,
but for the time being there is usually a perturbation due
to the conflict of these forces. As a consequence interna-
tional relations are in a constant state of unrest, requir-
ing of those in charge of foreign affairs a penetrating eco-
nomic insight.

For instance, the moment the United States Congress
takes up the question of imposing protective tariffs on the
products of Argentine seeking a market here, a serious
conflict of interests arises. If one of our industries wishes
to shut out competition from an exporter in Argentine,
then an Argentinian firm in another industry has a basis
for asking his country to keep out an American commodity
by import duties. There can be no economic or interna-
tional gain by such retaliation. It cuts directly at the
operation of the principle of comparative costs. If we do
not admit the goods of other countries in which they have
an advantage they cannot pay for our exports to them.
No country can expect to sell abroad any and all com-
modities, and then, if pinched by high costs in certain
goods in which we are at a relative disadvantage, ask for
protective duties or subsidies on them. If costs are rela-
tively high, that alone proves we are employing our labor
and capital at a disadvantage, and to keep on is kicking
against the pricks. Therefore, that industry, which asks
for artificial support in protective duties under a false
chauvinism is working against our national welfare as a
whole just as much as he who burns up a warehouse.
What he is paid for, by insurance or by taxes, the country
as a whole loses.

At this very time, also, politicians, representing the un-
thinking demands of our farmers, propose to lay duties
on imported farm products. Here comes in the working
of comparative costs. We have a relative advantage in
wheat and corn because of our extensive cultivation and
the liberal use of agricultural machinery as compared with
Europe; but hemp and flax, for example, require much
labor in intensive cultivation and make little use of ma-

144 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

chinery. Our farm labor yields more wheat and corn for
its efforts than it does in growing flax and hemp. Hence
we import hemp and flax for fine goods, even under protec-
tive duties.1 Protective duties on wheat and corn would
be futile, because we export them. Such duties would not
raise the prices to our farmers, because they are fixed in
the markets of the world, and yet it is seriously proposed
by heavy duties to prevent Canadian wheat entering our
country. The proposal is absurd. Two rivers flowing
side by side into the gulf affect the level of the sea just
the same as they would if one river were diverted into the
channel of the other and poured out their joint volume
through one mouth. Canadian wheat will enter the
world's market by its own channels and affect the world
price just as much as if it travelled part of the way on our
railways and ships.

Any producer of goods can go on only if he finds a
buyer. Under division of labor one man's product is his
means of buying the goods of another. In our modern
industrial organization no industry can live in and for
itself. It can exist only by a system of exchange of goods
one for the other. That is, the interdependence of indus-
tries one upon another is the logical and inevitable con-
sequence of that separation of occupations with its inten-
sive specialization which is the characteristic difference of
modern from primitive industry. Successful and in-
creased production of desired goods by one means an
increased effective demand for the goods of all others.
The prosperity of the one stimulates prosperity of the
others in the chain of exchange; the disaster of the one
brings loss to the others.

This interdependence of our domestic industries one
upon the other holds quite as truly of one commercial
nation upon another. America cannot sell, if Europe and
foreign lands cannot buy. Never was that simple truth

»Cf. F. W. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, 4th Ed.,
pp. 364-409.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 145

more evident than it is today when we look abroad over
the turbulent countries lately emerging from the World
\\ ar. Our products need foreign markets. In no better
way can we illustrate the active influence of economic fac-
tors in our international relations than by an examination
and explanation of the present commercial and industrial
conditions affecting our trade and credit relations with
foreign countries. We shall not have to proceed far before
we come to see that the complicated political and interna-
tional questions now up for settlement by the League of
Nations are entirely dominated by fundamental economic
considerations.

V.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE

In the settlement of transactions between nations a
peculiar language has sprung up descriptive of interna-
tional payments naturally different from that in use in our
domestic operations ; but the functions to which they apply
are essentially the same. Instead of dollars and checks
at home, we hear in international usage of pounds, francs,
or crowns and bills of exchange. In our domestic trade
the values of goods are offset against each other by the
clearing of checks drawn on deposit accounts ; but in inter-
national trade the instrument used is a bill of exchange.
It keeps the international account open, while debits and
credits on all kinds of items are allowed to be offset,
saving the transmission of gold on industrial transactions,
and allowing its shipment only for the settlement of bal-
ances. The economic relations between different coun-
tries at any given time can be read clearly in the state of
the foreign exchanges and its rates. At the present day
the working of the market for bills of exchange between
the United States and Europe is a matter of vital con-
cern. If A sells coal to France or Italy, in what is he to
be paid? Gold will not be sent him, for various reasons
I need not go into. As compared with our dollar, francs

146 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

and lire are now at a very heavy discount. A has a claim,
say, for $10,000, the price of his coal. By a bill of ex-
change drawn on the foreign buyer he can sell that claim
to a New York bank dealing in foreign exchange. That
number of dollars would today be worth 140,000 to
170,000 francs (instead of 51,800 at the pre-war par).
To pay three times as many francs as before the war for
the same coal, solely because of the higher rate of ex-
change between francs and dollars, makes coal very high
to the French. The same process goes on for all imports
into France or into other countries whose exchange is at
a discount. Such a situation produces great distress.

If, however, a Frenchman could export to New York
silk goods worth here $10,000, he could by a bill of ex-
change drawn on the American buyer sell his claim on
New York to the French buyer of coal and the import
would be paid for by the export. The value of one ship-
ment would offset the other. Or, as generally explained,
if all exports and imports just balance, exchange would
(other things being equal) remain at par. But the prac-
tical operations are not so simple as that. Besides the
movement of goods, bills are drawn on other items in the
international account, such as the sale of securities, trav-
ellers' expenses, freight charges, or settlement of debts;
and when all these credits and debits are offset, even the
balance may be carried along without a shipment of gold.

Now, if all these items were today in equilibrium, would
the rate of exchange between France and the United
States settle about par ? I think not. There are two dis-
tinct elements now affecting the rate of exchange, (i)
If French imports greatly exceed her exports she can
normally settle that balance against her only (a) by send-
ing goods, or (b) sending gold, or (c) obtaining credit
by the sale of bonds to the creditor country. France and
all the belligerents need the food and raw materials we
export in order to produce the goods which they can send
out in payment. As everyone knows, exceptional efforts
are being made through the formation of foreign finance

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 147

companies to give Europe long-term credits when buying
materials and food from us. Only in that way can she
increase her exports of goods. There is already a very
marked gain in English, Belgian and French exports.
But even when these exports of goods begin to equal the
imports of goods, we will not have seen the end of the
great discounts of foreign exchange. On this very point
there is need of an important concentration of attention
both here and in Europe.

The reason why the heavy discount on foreign exchange
is likely to remain, even after production of exports has
grown, resides in the second element affecting the ex-
charge. (2) That is the depreciation of the current
money in Europe due to inconvertibility into gold. In
France (to revert to our illustration) redemption of Bank
of France notes was taken away in August, 1914. In
addition, mainly through making advances to the State,
the issue of these notes was increased from 6 to 37 bil-
lion francs (or, at nominal par, from $1,210 to $7,536
millions) from June 30, 1914, to January 15, 1920.
Until these notes can be so reduced in quantity, through
repayments by the State to the Bank, that the gold reserve
°f 5»579 million francs (or $1,116 millions) is sufficient
to maintain redemption of the notes in gold, these incon-
vertible notes will circulate at a discount. Such redemp-
tion is likely to be delayed from 10 to 20 years. Mean-
while, bills payable in francs — whether there is an equi-
librium between French exports and imports or not — will
be worth no more than the value of the inconvertible paper
francs in which they are payable. Consequently, the
American who exports goods worth $10,000 to France
will expect to receive for his bill as many more than the
par of 51,800 francs as will give him an equivalent for
his $10,000 in gold. If a Frenchman can buy a dollar
with 8 francs (instead of 14 to 17, as now), even after
such a recovery, he will have to use 80,000 francs to buy
a bill on New York for $10,000. That, of course, means
an equivalent discount on French bills of exchange. And

148 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

this discount in the exchanges will exist for reasons wholly
independent of the equilibrium between exports and im-
ports; for these reasons have to do with the possibility
of redemption of the franc in gold. The bill of exchange
— the medium of exchange in international trade — will
remain at a discount unless it is redeemable in gold, just
as any domestic medium of exchange (like our green-
backs) would, if not convertible into gold. In short,
while it is of the first importance to aid Europe by credits
to rehabilitate her industries and increase her exports, with
which she can pay for her imports, the difficulties due to
the depreciation of the franc as compared with our dollar
will still remain. Very little recognition seems now to be
given to this second element affecting the rate of foreign
exchange. It will continue to increase the cost of her im-
ports to Europe and afford a premium on our exports.
It would be much as if a gold standard country (like the
United States) were trading with a country having a
fluctuating silver standard.

VI.

FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL OBSTACLES TO INTER-
NATIONAL PEACE

As a final illustration of the influence of economic fac-
tors on our international relations we find it in the over-
whelming difficulties now checking the industrial recov-
ery in Europe and the settlement of the terms of peace.
Those of us here, in the comparative prosperity and secur-
ity of the United States, have little conception of the pro-
digious tasks — financial and industrial — which confront
the peoples of the belligerent nations. Great Britain and
Belgium have made the most progress; but France and
especially Italy, with central and southeastern Europe,
are face to face with tasks to daunt the ablest statesmen.
To top it all, they are treading on the red-hot gridiron of
radical revolutionary excitations. We are fast reaching
the point when it is beginning to be generally understood

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 149

that the diplomatic and political policies must be mainly
subordinated to, and interpreted by, economic considera-
tions. At the bottom of the deplorable European uncer-
tainly and confusion lies the question of the economic re-
habilitation of industry. What methods can be adopted
to bring it about?

Behind the courteous language of diplomacy we must
understand that there is no sentiment in the negotiations
for peace and the economic readjustment. We are wanted
in Europe because it is hoped we can be induced to bear
the burden of financing its people during this critical
period. And although we spent in the war about $34,000,-
000,000, without hope of any recompense but safety from
the aggressions of Germany, Europe still looks to our
comparative superiority in resources for rehabilitation.
It is not because we are liked, but because we can grant
credits, that we are sought for. It is practically an eco-
nomic matter. But, besides a moral obligation to succor
distress among neighbors it is wise for us to see the facts
just as they are. Whatever we do we need not expect
gratitude.

Stand with me, if you please, in the town of Lens, in
the coal district of northern France, a short time after
the armistice. Where once there stood 11,000 houses there
are only roads cleared through a desert of battered bricks
and ruins; not one house is standing; not one coal shaft
can be worked. In the cold winter rain a one-horse load
of household goods pitifully carries an old woman on top,
exposed to the storm, and a boy leads the gaunt little
horse. What is the process of reconstruction? Freedom
from war, and the opportunity to get to work again. The
fid woman and the boy clear up a corner against a wall,
pile up the loose bricks in three walls, cover the top with
stray pieces of corrugated iron, for a stable. They find
shelter in a cellar or a dug-out, and make a fire. They
are pioneers in an old land. The next evening is seen
the age-old miracle of hope triumphant over despair when
the horse and plough rise over the hill against a crim-

150 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

son sunset, turning up the soil of the battle ground. This
I have seen. It is typical of reconstruction whether on
the farm or in the factory. There must be peace, freedom
from upheaval, and steady, persistent work. Getting on
with the barest necessaries of life, soon you begin to see
new houses, shell-torn roofs repaired, chimneys smoking.
Under such enforced saving, a few comforts and non-
essentials soon appear here and there.

The labor force is less than of old. But after Germany
was forced to disgorge its stolen machinery, the repaired
factories were ready to work. Then, who will provide
the raw cotton, the wool, the jute, the copper, the rubber,
and the coal to set the man at work and produce the goods
by which imports can be purchased ? If Europe had been
at once given a start by credits to buy materials and re-
store transportation she ought now to be humming with
industry. Food is yet needed until the land is again pro-
ducing with fertilizers as of old. This is the reason why
our bread stuffs, our materials and our coal are still pour-
ing into Europe in a large volume. But how can they
pay us ? Suppose they are granted credit. At the matur-
ity of a credit, how can they pay ? Only in goods. There-
fore, the solution is one of productive power to be built
up by labor and capital in the varied forms of material,
equipment, machinery and transportation.

How goes the struggle for this rehabilitation? Have
peace and order, after war, been given to Europe so that
she can give all her energy to developing her productive
power ? Here is the crux of the whole matter. What is
going wrong now after more than two years since the
armistice ? Let us face the actual situation, much affected
by wrong-headed blundering at the expense of suffering
to millions of innocent people. ( i ) In the first place, a
vague, new experiment in a League of Nations ought to
have been separated from the immediate establishment of
peace. The organization to enforce the terms of peace
and to establish law and order should have been sep-
arately worked out, taking the necessary deliberation with-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 151

out delaying pence. (2) That, however, is a matter of
the past. We must take the situation as its exists. In-
stead of an obvious need for order in which to restore
the ravages of war and to stimulate production, we find
the military and naval expenditure of Europe still enor-
mously and criminally high, still wasting the productive
resources of an exhausted world. (3) An abnormal ex-
penditure, without regard to the actual revenues, without
balancing the budget either by increasing taxation or by
cutting down national expenses, is sadly common. It
seems like the doings of bedlam. (4) Worst of all, the
currencies and credit of Europe have been so extended
on unsound assets or on a mere fiat issue that trade in
goods between nations is inevitably crippled. The Ger-
man mark, for instance, is almost as worthless as our old
Continental currency. The Reichsbank holds only about
1,100 millions of marks in gold ($275 millions at nominal
par) for some 64,000 millions of notes ($16,000 millions
at nominal par). This is hopeless bankruptcy for a bank
of issue. (5) Finally, the actual amount of the indemnity
to be paid by Germany has long remained unsettled to the
confusion of French and other budgets. Either Germany
must be allowed to import materials and develop her pro-
duction of goods for export, or France must be content
with a bankrupt Germany unable to pay any indemnity.
In conclusion, what methods of relief can be adopted?
We may dismiss those that assume the cancellation of war
debts due the United States, as well as those proposed at
the Brussels Conference for an international bank in-
tended to raise credits on possible resources of crippled
countries, since internal conditions make these assets un-
bankable ; or, an international syndicate for the investiga-
tion, organization and control of transactions to obtain
raw materials. The only other proposal at the Brussels
Conference, and which appears in the same general form
in that of Sir Robert Home (Jan., 1921), is that the Gov-
ernment of an importing country should support a bond
to be given by the importer in payment (or as security)

152 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

for foreign goods. This is one of the various attempts
to get governmental credit when the credit of the import-
ing borrower cannot stand on its own legs. Much the
same idea appears also in the (Brussels-Geneva) scheme
of the Council of the League of Nations (Dec., 1920).
The essential idea in all of these plans is a demand for
governmental aid which also turns up in our revival of
the War Finance Corporation, at the urgency of our
farmers who wish to 'sell bread-stuffs abroad.

All of these proposals are only palliatives. They ex-
tend promises to pay. It is true, like a push behind a dam-
aged automobile, they may start the wheels going; but,
if the damage is internal, the machine will soon stop again.
The remedy must be applied to the restoration of the pro-
pelling force within. In economic terms, that means for
permanent effect the building up of productive power, the
first condition must be the establishment of order and
freedom of opportunity for labor. Not only does this
imply the cessation of war and the heavy expenditure asso-
ciated therewith, but, above all, the removal of revolu-
tionary socialism which is throttling the possibilities of
steady production. The activities of fanatical agitators
to overturn the industrial system create the very reason
why capital will be alienated from co-operating with labor
in production and why credit will not be granted to dis-
turbed industries. When Europe quiets down and turns
to normal efforts to produce, the credit system will quickly
respond to her needs. Of course, materials and coal are
now essential, and credit is needed to procure them. If
this were all of the situation, there would be little diffi-
culty in obtaining from private sources the desired credit
without an appeal to governmental aid. Au fond, the
Government can supply credit only by resort to private
sources. If the application is a doubtful case, unsatisfac-
tory to private lenders, then it is likely that we shall have
an appeal for governmental help. The true remedy for
unsettled Europe is to drop politics, international rivalries
and revolutionary plots, and go hard to work. With the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 153

i

recovery of economic normality, international difficulties
would rapidly dwindle; such things as matters of ex-
change would soon take care of themselves, especially if
measures are undertaken to reduce and redeem the note
issues.

Men appointed for political reasons should have no
place in our diplomatic service in these days when eco-
nomic questions have such paramount importance. Not
only should long training and the chance of a permanent
career be the well-known conditions to entrance into this
service, but everyone who represents our country as a con-
sul or a minister or an ambassador should be trained how
to think on economic questions. Economic conditions in
all classes of people, everywhere, in all countries, directly
affect their state of mind and color all our international
relations.

J. LAWRENCE LAUGHLIN.

Specific Agencies for the Proper Con-
duct of International Relations

SPECIFIC AGENCIES FOR THE PROPER CON-
DUCT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I.

AMICABLE METHODS

The subject which I have undertaken to treat in the
present course on the history and nature of international
relations I interpret as embracing all the various agencies
or methods of international intercourse. Thus inter-
preted, it embraces both amicable methods, including
negotiation, good offices, meditation, and arbitration; and
non-amicable methods, including the withdrawal of diplo-
matic relations, retorsion and retaliation, the display or
use of force, pacific blockade, reprisals, and war.

Practitioners of private law, who are accustomed to
think of law only as it is administered by municipal or
domestic courts, are often inclined to deny legal classifi-
cation to the rules and methods by which international
relations are conducted. Perhaps we may say that, in
proportion as one has occasion to deal with international
affairs, he ceases to be controlled or misled by such a con-
ception. In the sense that force cannot always be imme-
diately and effectively applied in the international sphere
to the accomplishment of a particular object, and that
definite and common agencies are not provided in advance
for its application, the administration of international law
differs from the administration of municipal law. But it
by no means follows that law and agencies for the ad-
ministration of law do not exist in the international
sphere. In reality, organization exists in the domain of
international relations and is made effective through its
own appropriate agencies and methods.

157

158 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

(a)

NEGOTIATION

The ordinary method of conducting international rela-
tions is that of negotiation, which we may call the normal
legal mode of international intercourse. This process is
carried on by the duly appointed official representatives of
governments. In ordinary circumstances these represen-
tatives are the regular, permanent diplomatic represen-
tatives, but when the exigencies of the case seem to require
it, special or additional representatives, official or unoffi-
cial, are employed.

By the rules of the Congress of Vienna, as amended by
the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, diplomatic agents are
divided into four classes :

1 i ) Ambassadors, legates and nuncios ;

(2) Envoys, and ministers plenipotentiary ;

(3) Ministers resident;

(4) Charges d'affaires.

Legates and nuncios are the representatives of His
Holiness, the Pope, while ambassadors constitute the high-
est rank among the representatives of civil and political
powers. The most highly esteemed privilege of the am-
bassador is that, as the peculiarly personal representative
of the head of his own State, he is supposed on all occa-
sions to have a right of access to the head of the State to
whom he is accredited, together with the happy and com-
fortable privilege, so conducive to tranquil slumber in
the later morning hours, of compelling his diplomatic col-
leagues of inferior rank to wait for access to the secre-
tary of state or minister of foreign affairs so long as there
is an ambassador within sight or sound.

In one respect the ambassador shares titular but illu-
sive honors with the envoy or minister plenipotentiary.
The ambassador's proper full title is "Ambassador Ex-
traordinary and Plenipotentiary," while the envoy's
proper full title is "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 159

Plenipotentiary" In reality, neither the one nor the other
is either extraordinary or plenipotentiary. These titles
have come down from the days when special rather than
permanent missions were the rule, and when ambassadors
and envoys were actually invested with full powers, in
order to meet the extraordinary occasions which called
for their appointment. Today the usual powers and cre-
dentials of ambassadors and envoys suffice only for ordi-
nary occasions. No government would dream of
concluding a treaty with an ambassador or envoy unless
he had a special full-power. The minister resident, like
the ambassador and the envoy, is entitled to an audience
of the head of the State on the presentation of his cre-
dentials; but the envoy and the minister resident can
claim no such right in the subsequent conduct of their
business.

Charges d'affaires are divided into two classes : ( i )
Heads of missions, and (2) persons temporarily in charge
in the absence of the head of the mission. The first class
merely represents the lowest rank of permanent diplo-
matic representation. Neither class is entitled to access
to the head of the State, but is accredited or presented to
the secretary of state or minister of foreign affairs.

Immunity from ordinary legal process belongs alike to
all persons possessing a diplomatic character. This immu-
nity is sometimes called extraterritoriality and, when, in-
terpreted in the sense of this highly metaphorical word, is
often greatly exaggerated. It is sometimes said that dip-
lomatic representatives are wholly exempt from legal obli-
gation, and that their residences are foreign ground. Such
conceptions are creatures of the imagination. They have
no foundation in international law or practice. No man is
above the law, in the sense of being exempt from the duty
to obey it. The fact that a diplomatic officer is exempt
from the service of ordinary legal process, rather than
from the duty of obedience to the law, is readily dem-
onstrated by the fact that if, after his commission of an
act which the law criminally forbids, his government with-

160 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

draws his immunity, he can be prosecuted for his offense
subject to the exercise of what may be called preventive
power, employed for the purpose of forestalling or stay-
ing the violation of laws and policing regulations made
for the purpose of protecting life and property from de-
struction or injury. On the other hand, it is proper to
repeat that persons having a diplomatic character are not
subject to ordinary legal process for the enforcement of
legal liabilities, either' civil or criminal. This is a rule of
international law, and the statutes of the United States
provide for its enforcement by the courts, with appro-
priate penalties for its violation.

Diplomatic officers are not the only agents of the State
of whom international law takes cognizance. Such agents
comprise consuls, officers in command of the armed forces
of the State, military or naval, and commissioners or
other persons employed for special objects. But these
non-diplomatic agents do not by virtue of their official
character enjoy immunity from legal process unless it is
specially provided for.

Before passing to other topics, it is proper to mention,
in connection with the appointment, recall or dismissal of
diplomatic agents the question of personal acceptability.
In this relation we use the technical terms persona grata
and persona non grata. Objections may be made to re-
ceiving a diplomatic officer, or to his remaining at his post,
on the ground that he either is or has become personally
unacceptable. The reason of this rule is that the chief
object of diplomatic intercourse is the cultivation of good
relations, and that the attainment of this object is of more
importance than the personal fortunes of an individual.
Except in extraordinary emergencies, which seemed to
compel immediate action, it has been the rule, where a
minister has become unacceptable, to seek for his recall.
But, if his recall should be refused, his dismissal would
not then furnish a legal ground of complaint. Some-
times controversies on the subject have arisen from the
fact that it was alleged or believed that personal unac-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 161

reliability was assigned as a cover for a different and
unavowed reason.

GOOD OFFICES

The term good offices is used in the double sense ( i )
of the unofficial representation or advocacy of interests of
a particular government, and (2) the exercise of the func-
tion of an impartial adviser of the parties to a dispute.

The first sense is illustrated by the extension by a diplo-
matic officer with the consent of his own government and
the assent of the government to which he is accredited, of
unofficial protection to the citizens of a third country,
as has for many years been done by diplomatic and con-
sular representatives of the United States, by instruction
of their government, in behalf of citizens of Switzerland.
Yet another illustration is the unofficial representation,
by a neutral diplomatist, of the interests of one belligerent
at the capital of the other belligerent in time of war.

An illustration of the second sense is where a diplo-
matic officer acts as a friendly intermediary and counsellor
of two or more governments with a view to compose a
difference between them. Such action necessarily presup-
poses the assent of the parties to the dispute, and is indeed
usually preceded by an invitation from them, collectively
or individually . The employment of good offices, in this
sense, is naturally a matter of much delicacy, and a diplo-
matic officer who is either called upon, or seems likely to
be called upon, to act in such a capacity should be careful
to avoid anything that might tend to affect his impar-
tiality or to expose it to suspicion.

Good offices have been employed for many purposes
and on many important occasions. Not only have they
been used to adjust ordinary differences, but they have
been employed to end war as well as to avert hostilities.

There is yet another sense, not falling within either
of the two preceding categories, in which the term good
offices is used, and that is in indicating the special char-

162 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

acter of a government's interposition in behalf of one of
its citizens in presenting his claim against a foreign gov-
ernment. It is common to speak of intervention in behalf
of private claimants. This is in fact one of the recognized
forms of intervention, and it implies that the government
presents the claim as a matter of legal right, and its re-
quest for redress is considered as a "demand", although
in ordinary circumstances the word is not used. Some-
times, however, governments are asked by their citizens
to present claims which may not have a strictly legal
foundation, or which may have arisen out of an alleged
breach of contract. The government of the United States
has constantly taken the position that persons who con-
tract with foreign governments should take into account
and assume the risk of such governments' disposition or
ability to perform what they may promise to do. In such
cases, where the claimant's request for aid has seemed to
be specially meritorious, the United States has presented
his claim to the foreign government by way of "good of-
fices", thus indicating that the claim is presented in a
friendly sense and in the hope that it may be properly
considered and adjusted, but without a direct and spe-
cific request for its admission and settlement. Action in
this sense has sometimes been described as "unofficial good
offices", but the word "unofficial" has been used only ac-
cidentally, or perhaps for the purpose of emphasizing
the unofficial character of the proceeding. The word un-
official is in such a relation superfluous, since the employ-
ment of good offices is essentially an unofficial act. There
is no such thing as "official" good offices, and the term
is never applied to the process.

(c)

MEDIATION

Sir James Mackintosh once defined a mediator as "a
common friend, who counsels "both parties with a weight
proportioned to their belief in his integrity and their re-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 163

spcct for his power. "But," said Sir James, "he is not an
arbitrator, to whose decision they submit their differences,
and whose award is binding- on them." In substance
mediation is an exercise of good offices. The distinctive
meaning which the term conveys is that the proceeding
is attended with a certain formality, with special em-
phasis on the advisory or recommendatory phase. Not
infrequently a mediation resembles an arbitration, except
in the vital point that it does not result in a decision.

One of the most remarkable mediations of the United
States is that which was begun in 1866 and concluded
in 1872 for the purpose of bringing to a close the war
between Spain on the one hand, and the allied republics
of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador on the other. As
early as December 20, 1866, Mr. Seward instructed the
diplomatic representatives of the United States near the
belligerent governments to propose that a conference
should be held at Washington. Spain was willing to ac-
cept the proposal on certain conditions. Bolivia and
Ecuador were disposed to do whatever Chile and Peru
might agree upon. Chile and Peru were willing to ac-
cept only on certain conditions, one of which was that
Spain should acknowledge that the bombardment of Val-
paraiso was a violation of international law. This Spain
refused to do, and Mr. Seward's first effort was thus
unsuccessful; but, as the war itself eventually fell into
a state of "technical continuance," he renewed his propos-
als on March 27, 1868. Spain substantially accepted.
Chile thought that the conclusion of a definitive peace
would be impossible, but intimated a readiness to enter
into a truce, which would offer to neutrals all the guar-
antees and securities which they could properly claim.
Bolivia concurred in Chile's views; Peru and Ecuador
were disposed to accept unreservedly. On October 22,
1869, Mr. Fish, as Secretary of State, renewed the invi-
tation for a conference. Such a conference was opened at
the Department of State October 29, 1870, under the
presidency of Mr. Fish. Owing to the question as to the

164 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

bombardment of Valparaiso, it was found to be impossi-
ble to conclude a formal peace; but on April n, 1871,
the delegates in the conference agreed upon and signed an
armistice by which the de facto suspension of hostilities
between the belligerents was "converted into a general
armistice or truce," which was to "continue indefinitely"
and could not be broken by any of the belligerents "save in
three years after having expressly and explicitly notified
the other," through the Government of the United States,
"of its intention to renew hostilities" ; and it was provided
that, during the continuance of the armistice, all restric-
tions on neutral commerce which were incident to a state
of war should cease.

This was a very remarkable document, especially in the
fact that, as a pledge to refrain from hostilities, it was
more effective than a treaty of peace. Treaties of peace,
although they often contain pledges of perpetual amity,
are usually interpreted in this regard as declarations of
a present intention rather than of a continuing obliga-
tion, the parties preserving the "sovereign" right there-
after freely to choose between peace and war. The armis-
tice of 1871 precisely limited their freedom of action in
that particular.

In recent days there has been an anxious agitation con-
cerning the Island of Yap, which seems to have been
destined to play the part of a storm center. Thirty-five
years ago a dispute concerning it gave rise to one of the
most interesting mediations of modern times. This dis-
pute grew out of the action of a German Admiral who in
1884 raised the Imperial flag over the Island as a sign of
occupation. In order that our thoughts may be clarified
perhaps I should state that Yap is one of the Caroline
Islands and that the Caroline Islands are in the Pacific
Ocean. The act of the German Admiral provoked in
Spain an outbreak of popular violence which was marked
by attacks on the German Embassy and the German Con-
sulate at Madrid. In order to avert hostilities, Prince
Bismarck proposed the submission of the matter to the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 165

mediation of His Holiness the Pope. This proposal
the Spanish Government accepted and on October 22,
1885, His Holiness as mediator presented to the two gov-
ernments certain propositions by which the sovereignty of
Spain over the Caroline and Pelew Islands was con-
firmed, but by which Germany acquired special commer-
cial rights, together with the right to establish a naval
station and a coal depot in the islands. In conformity
with the recommendation of His Holiness, his proposi-
tions were embodied by Germany and Spain in a protocol
which was signed by their Ambassadors at Rome on
December 17, 1885.

In the discussion of good offices we have seen that con-
siderations of propriety and of delicacy have tended to
embarrass and prevent the employment of the process.
The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes concluded at The Hague on July 29, 1899, un-
dertook to remove this difficulty by stipulating that in case
of serious disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to
arms, the signatory powers should as far as possible have
recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more
friendly powers; that an offier of mediation might be
made by powers, strangers to the dispute, on their own
initiative, even during the course of hostilities, and that
the exercise of this right should never be regarded by any
of the parties to the conflict as an unfriendly act. These
stipulations denoted on the part of their authors the pos-
session of an intelligent and practical understanding of
the nature of international relations and tended to enlarge
the opportunity for the exercise of the mediatorial func-
tion.

(d)

ARBITRATION

The term arbitration, in private law, is often used to
denote an extra-judicial, or even an extra-legal, proceed-
ing of a conciliatory nature. This is not and never has
been the meaning of the term in international law, and

166 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

international arbitration never has been understood or
practiced in this sense. The signatories of The Hague
Convention were altogether justified in including in its
stipulations the declaration that "international arbitration
has for its object the settlement of differences between
states by judges of their own choice, and on the basis
of respect for law" ; and in conformity with this declara-
tion they consistently "recognized" arbitration as "the
most effective, and at the same time the most equitable,
means of settling disputes" of a "legal nature" which di-
plomacy had failed to settle.

The supposition that international arbitrators have
shown a tendency to make diplomatic compromises, that
they have failed to apply legal principles and to give
weight to legal precedents is entertained, we must assume,
by those who have not comprehensively studied the actual
record of arbitral proceedings. No doubt the utterances
and complaints of disappointed litigants have also contrib-
uted to produce misconceptions. There is a common say-
ing among members of the Bar that if an attorney loses
his case he is hardly to be censured if he gratifies his
sense of disappointment by railing at the court.

In reality there is manifest, among some of those who
discuss the subject, a tendency to misconceive and over-
rate what is called the "judicial" element in the conclu-
sions of municipal courts, as well as to misconceive and
overrate the element of "compromise" involved in the con-
clusions of international arbitrators. While the decisions
of international arbitrators, like the decisions of municipal
courts, have the character of final judgments, and are in
this sense alike "judicial," we are safe in affirming that
there is no such thing in the affairs of men as purely
"judicial" deliverances, based on "pure law," without any
element of compromise. Such things are not of this
world. Why do courts divide? Why do judges dissent?
Why does the single judge hesitate and reserve his de-
cision, and, when he eventually renders it, confess the
doubts that have troubled him and have rendered the re-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 167

suit uncertain? The answer to these inquiries is found
in the fact that such are the processes of human thought.
Our conclusions represent the anxious balancing of con-
flicting considerations and the effort, if we be honest, to
give most weight to those that may seem to us to be the
most meritorious. It is, therefore, no reproach to inter-
national arbitrators, nor does it impeach their integrity
of purpose or the judicial character of their action, to ad-
mit that, as human beings determining human disputes,
they have not been exempt from the limitations of hu-
man thought. Moreover, as one to whose lot is has fallen
actually to examine the work of international arbitra-
trs, from the earliest times to the latest, I am prepared
to pronounce unjustified the invidious imputation to them
of a disposition to substitute diplomatic compromises for
conclusions based on law and justice.

II

NON-AMICABLE METHODS

Writers have been more or less accustomed to group all
methods short of war as "pacific". Such a division, in-
volving a special and much enlarged use of the word
"pacific," necessarily produced misconceptions, and I have
therefore ventured to depart from it. I have, therefore,
divided methods of redress into the two general classes
of Amicable and Nonamicable, the nonamicable processes
including those that do not and those that do involve
the use of force.

(<*)

NON-FORCIBLE

Rupture of Diplomatic Relations

As the first example of nonamicable methods I may
mention the rupture of diplomatic relations. The with-
drawal of diplomatic representation, unless for a cause
personal to the representative, denotes dissatisfaction with

168 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the conduct of the government with which ordinary inter-
course is thus ended or restricted. It thus indicates the
existence of a state of ill-feeling which is likely to in-
crease unless the cause of it is removed. Between na-
tions, as between individuals, the results of continued ill-
feeling never can be confidently foretold. There is also
the possibility that they may lead to exasperation, and
that under the stress of nervous tension blows may be ex-
changed. While such 'results may not occur, it is not wise
wholly to exclude it from the range of possibility.

RETORSION, RETALIATION

Retorsion has been defined as "the appropriate answer
to acts which it is within the strict right of a state to do/'
but which, if not indicative of a spirit of unfriendliness,
places the citizens of foreign states under special and in-
jurious disabilities. If the foreign states whose citizens
are thus injured replies by imposing similar disabilities,
this is called "retorsion". Retorsion may, therefore, be
called retaliation in kind. It is employed largely in mat-
ters of commerce, specially where deferential or discrimi-
nating duties are imposed on the citizens, the vessels or
the produce or manufactures of the foreign state.

We distinctively use the word retaliation where the
countervailing measure exceeds the injury which it is
sought to redress or to stay. The range of retaliation is
not precisely defined. It may take the form of menace
or actual use of force, and in its latter aspect brings it
within categories hereafter to be discussed.

In the early international relations of the United States
much was heard of measures of embargo and non-inter-
course. Both these measures may be regarded as falling
under the head of retaliation.

By Joint Resolution of Congress of March 26, 1794, an
embargo was laid for thirty days on all ships and vessels
in ports of the United States bound for any foreign port
or place. The immediate cause was the British Order in
Council of November 6, 1793, restrictive of maritime

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 169

commerce. On April 18, 1794, the embargo was extended
to the 25th of the following month, and by an Act of
May 22, 1794, the exportation of munitions of war was
prohibited for a year, while their importation free of duty
was authorized for two years. This condition of things
was brought to an end by the Jay Treaty towards the
end of 1794.

The same retaliatory device was revived by Jefferson,
under whose presidency a law was passed on December
22, 1807, forbidding the departure of vessels from the
United States, foreign vessels being allowed, however, to
depart either loaded or in ballast on receiving notice of
the act. This measure was intended to redress and to
prevent the injuries inflicted on American commerce un-
der Napoleon's Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806, and
the British Blockade Decrees and Orders in Council.

The embargo was eventually repealed by the Act of
March ist, 1809, which substituted a policy of non-inter-
course. These measures of embargo and non-intercourse
may be considered as precursors of the War of 1812.

FORCIBLE

Reprisals

Reprisals, says Vattel, are used between nation and
nation in order to do themselves justice when they can-
not otherwise obtain it. Thus,

"If a nation has taken possession of what belongs to
another; if it refuses to pay a debt or repair an injury,
or to make just satisfaction, the latter may seize what
belongs to the former and apply it to its own advantage,
till it obtains full payments of what is due, together
with interest and damages, or keep it as a pledge till
the offending nation has made satisfaction. The effects
thus seized are preserved, while there is any hope of
obtaining satisfaction or justice, but when hope dis-
appears they are confiscated and then the reprisals are
accomplished."

170 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

This is a vivid picture of reprisals as they have usually
been conceived.

In former times it was not uncommon for a sovereign
to authorize his subject forcibly to seek and obtain his
own redress. For this purpose he issued to his subject
what was called a letter of reprisal. Such letters were
issued even in times of nominal peace, but the use of
them necessarily tended to obscure the distinction between
peace and war. For this reason the granting of letters
of private reprisal fell into disuse more than one hundred
years ago, and the reprisals that have been made during
the past century have been national measures carried out
by national agencies.

As reprisals involved the employment of force, they
necessarily tended to result in war, and if we examine the
history of reprisals we find that they usually resulted in
war where the nation to which they were applied was
physically able to resist.

An early example of this tendency, exhibiting a blend
of private and of public reprisals, is narrated by Ward in
his History of the Lorn of Nations (1795), I 294-296.
Although some of the details are amusing, the results
were most serious and perhaps we may say that in this
regard the affair was rather human. According to Ward,
in 1792 two sailors, the one Norman, the other English,
quarrelled in the Port of Bayonne and began to fight with
their fists, and the Englishman being the weaker is said
to have stabbed the other with his knife. The local mag-
istrates failing to intervene, the Normans applied to their
King, who authorized them to take their own revenge.
This they did by putting to sea and seizing an English
ship, some of whose crew they hung up to the masthead,
together with some dogs. The English instantly retalia-
ted; two hundred Norman vessels scoured the English
seas hanging all the seamen they could find, while the
English seized the Normans and put them to death with-
out quarter. "The affair then," says Ward, "became too
big for private hands, and the governments interposing

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 171

in form, it terminated in that unfortunate war, which by
the loss of Guienne, entailed upon the two nations an end-
less train of hostilities till it was recovered."

It would exceed the limits of my time and space to
narrate examples of reprisal during the past hundred
years, such as the famous case of Don Pacifico, the pro-
ceedings against Mexico in 1861 resulting in an attempt
by the French to set up an empire in that country, and
various other instances the history of which may readily
be found in the books. There is one case, however, to
which I desire particularly to advert because it has so
often been misconceived and mistaken. I refer to the
bombardment of Greytown by the U. S. S. Cyane in July
1854. This case has been cited as a precedent for the
occupation by the United States of Vera Cruz in 1914,
but no citation could be wider of the mark. When Grey-
town was bombarded, the community, as it was called,
was not definitely under the jurisdiction or subject to the
control of any recognized sovereignty. "It did not/' said
President Pierce in his annual message of December 4,
1854, explaining the action of the United States, "pro-
fess to belong to any regular government, and had, in
fact, no recognized dependence on or connection with any-
one to which the United States or their injured citizens
might apply for redress or which could be held respon-
sible in any way for the outrages committed." There is
more in President Pierce's message to the same effect, but
it is useless to make further quotations since the passage
cited clearly states the point that the Government of the
United States justified its action on the ground that it
was dealing with an organized political society, to which
competency to exercise the rights and to discharge the
obligations of a government is imputed.

PACIFIC BLOCKADE

To "pacific blockade" I give a separate heading with-
out intending to intimate that the subject is entitled to an
independent classification. Different opinions have been

172 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

expressed as to the nature of the measure, and indeed as
to whether it may properly be admitted to exist ; but this
difference may be due to the combination of words in
the title ; the word "blockade" having been used to desig-
nate a well-recognized belligerent operation. Nor does
the word "pacific" fortunately qualify a measure of open
force and coercion. But, if we close our eyes to the in-
appropriateness of the words and consider the nature of
the process, we may see that we have, under the title
"Pacific Blockade," merely a form of reprisal. Repris-
als, although classified as a measure short of war, in the
sense that they do not proceed upon the assumption of the
present existence of the legal condition of things called
a state of war, are not otherwise "pacific" ; and so with
pacific blockade. If the measure is not extended, as is
belligerent blockade, to the citizens, vessels and property
of third powers, it presents nothing exceptionable from
the legal point of view, so long as reprisals continue to
be acknowledged as a legal process.

Calvo cites, as the first example of pacific blockade,
the action of France, Great Britain and Russia, in 1827,
in obstructing access to the coasts of Greece, where the
Turkish armies were encamped, the representatives of the
three powers continuing to assure the Sultan of their
friendship, and to declare that peace was unbroken, al-
though the measure they adopted served to paralyze his
armies. In June, 1831, a French fleet, in order to obtain
reparation for injuries done to French subjects in Por-
tugal during the reign of Dom Miguel, "blockaded" a
number of points on the Portuguese coast and captured
a large number of Portuguese ships. A state of war did
not ensue, and on July 14, 1831, a treaty was promptly
concluded by which reparation was promised to French
subjects, while all Portuguese ships of war and of com-
merce that had been captured by the French 'fleet were
restored. In 1833 France and Great Britain, with a view
to compel the assent of the Netherlands to the recognition
of the Kingdom of Belgium under the treaty of London,

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 173

blockaded Dutch ports, and a state of war did not follow.
In 1838, however, when France instituted a pacific block-
ade of certain Mexican ports, the Mexican Government,
resenting the act, declared war, and expelled French sub-
jects from its territory. On the other hand Mexican men-
of-war as well as merchant vessels were seized by the
French, and the fortress of San Juan d'Ulloa was re-
duced. The quarrel between the two countries was ter-
minated by the treaty of March 9, 1839, by which it was
agreed to submit to a third power the decision of the
questions ( i ) whether Mexico could claim restitution of
the Mexican ships of war captured by the French after
the surrender of the fortress of Ulloa or compensation
therefor; (2) whether indemnities could be claimed for
Frenchmen who had been expelled from Mexico; and
(3) whether Mexican ships and cargoes sequestrated
during the blockade and subsequently captured by the
French in consequence of the declaration of war ought to
be considered as legally acquired to the captors. The
Queen of Great Britain, who was chosen as arbitrator,
decided on August i, 1844, that, after the departure of
the French plenipotentiary from Mexico, followed by hos-
tile operations on the part of the French against the for-
tress of Ulloa and the Mexican fleet, and the actual dec-
laration of war by the Mexican Government, and the
expulsion of French subjects from its territory, there was
a state of war between the two countries, and that neither
restitution of the vessels and cargoes mentioned nor the
payment of indemnities could be exacted.

One of the most interesting as well as most picturesque
cases of pacific blockade is that which the British Gov-
ernment conducted against Brazil, in the sixth decade of
the last century, on a demand for reparation for the
plundering of the British barque Prince of Wales on the
Brazilian coast in 1861, and a further demand for re-
dress for what was termed an outrage on three officers
of the British man-of-war Forte by the Brazilian guard
at Tijuca Hill, near Rio de Janeiro. As the British de-

174 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

mands were refused, the British admiral instituted a
pacific blockade of the port of Rio de Janeiro, and seized
and detained five Brazilian vessels as an act of reprisal.
It was subsequently arranged that the claim in the case
of the Prince of Wales should be paid under protest and
the captured vessels released, the Brazilian Government
assuming- responsibility for any losses which might have
resulted to the citizens of third countries, and that the
case of the Forte should be submitted to arbitration. As
arbitrator, the parties chose Leopold I, King of the Bel-
gians. The so-called outrage began with the arrest by
the Brazilian guard, at Tijuca Hill, of three officers of
the British admiral's flag-ship, the Forte, these officers
being a lieutenant, a mid-shipman, and the chaplain. It
appeared that these officers, at seven o'clock in the even-
ing, as they were passing the police guard-house, on their
way down the hill, were accosted by a sentinel, who ad-
vanced and inquired as to their identity. Here the ac-
counts begin to diverge. On the part of the British it
was alleged that the action of the Brazilian police was
aggressive and violent, particularly with regard to the
chaplain, and that all three officers, besides having been
treated with great brutality, were incarcerated over night
under circumstances of peculiar indignity. The Brazilian
Government, on the other hand, represented that the com-
plainants had dined at a certain hotel, where they had
"two bottles of Bordeaux and one-half bottle of cognac" ;
that, on their way down the hill, they attempted to "un-
horse an equestrian"; that, when they were accosted by
the guard, they "began to strike him with their sticks,"
and compelled him to summon aid ; that, even after they
were "deposited" in the guard-house, they showed them-
selves "haughty and scornful" ; and that, although they
"were not completely drunk," they "appeared not to be
in full possession of their mental faculties." These alle-
gations, it is only just to say, the complainants altogether
denied, although they admitted that the officer of the
guard, when they were locked up, provided them with

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 175

paper and with a pack of cards, and offered to one of
them a bed. The demands for redress made upon the
Brazilian Government were (i) that the ensign of the
guard be dismissed from the service, (2) that the sentry
who was said to have begun the attack be adequately pun-
ished, (3) that an apology be made by the Brazilian
Government, (4) that the chief of police of Rio de Janeiro
be publicly censured for certain acts prior to the com-
plainants' release. .On June 18, 1863, the arbitrator ren-
dered an award, in which, after reciting the proofs submit-
ted by the parties, held that, in the manner in which the
Brazilian laws were applied in the case, there had been
neither premeditated nor actual offense towards the Brit-
ish Navy. It should be stated that, after this decision
was rendered, the British Government sent a representa-
tive on special mission to Rio de Janeiro to express regret
for the circumstances under which the friendly intercourse
between the two countries was suspended, to disavow any
intention to offend the dignity of Brazil, and to propose
the renewal of diplomatic relations. The Emperor re-
ceived these assurances with an expression of satisfaction ;
diplomatic relations were restored, and the incident was
ended.

Further examples of pacific blockade may be found in
the books, and in this relation I would particularly com-
mend a late edition of Hall's work on International Law.
and Holland's Studies in International Laiv. Both these
eminent authorities reached the conclusion that, so long
as the measure is not extended to the prohibition of access
to the citizens, vessels and property of third countries,
no valid objection can be made to pacific blockade as a
measure of reprisal.

WAR

Much confusion may be avoided by bearing in mind the
fact that the term war is used in two senses, comprehend-
ing ( i ) acts of hostility, or war de facto, by one nation
against another without a formal declaration, and (2) the

176 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

legal condition of things called a state of war, in which
the parties prosecute their claims avowedly as belligerents.
Nothing could be more unfounded or more misleading
than the supposition that a government cannot be said to
commits acts of war, or to make war, unless war, or a state
of war, has been declared or otherwise admitted to exist.
Whether the acts of a government are to be deemed acts
of war depends on their nature and not on what it may
see fit to call them: When one government prosecutes
its claims against another government by force, it com-
mits acts of war, even though, as in the case of reprisals,
a declared or avowed state of war may not have super-
vened, and hence we find that the Constitution of the
United States, in reserving to the Congress the power
to declare war, also expressly reserved to it the power
to authorize reprisals. In 1883 the project for the build-
ing of a tunnel under the English Channel, to connect
England and France, was killed by the publication by
Lieut. Col. Maurice, then of the British War Office, of
his small volume entitled "Hostilities Without Declare
tion of War," in which he showed that in the hundred
and seventy-one years, from 1700 to 1870, inclusive, in
the almost innumerable wars that had taken place, there
were less than ten clear cases of a "declaration of war"
prior to hostilities, although, when a state of war was
eventually declared or admitted to exist, it was held to re-
late back to the commencement of hostilities. It may be
superfluous to say that, if two nations declare war against
one another, the legal condition of things called a state
of war then comes into existence, although no actual
force whatever may as yet have been employed. On
the other hand, force may be employed by one nation
against another, as in the case of reprisals, and yet no
"state of war" may arise. In such a case there may be
said to be acts of war, but no state of war. The distinc-
tion is of the first importance, since, from the moment
when a state of war supervenes, third parties become sub-
ject to the performance of the duties of neutrality as well

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 177

as to all the inconveniences that result from the exercise
of belligerent rights.

In treating of war we may at once exclude the subject
of private wars, which are no longer recognized, and may
confine our attention to public war.

LIMITED WAR

Writers have been accustomed to speak of two kinds
of war, "perfect" and "imperfect." The former described
the condition in which the whole nation is said to be at
war with another nation and all the members of each are
authorized to commit hostilities against all the members
of the other in every case permitted by the laws of war;
the latter, the condition in which hostilities are limited as
to places, persons, and things. For the terms "perfect"
and "imperfect," I have ventured to substitute the terms
general and limited. To ascribe to war perfection, unless
indeed it should result in utter annihilation of one of the
parties, seems inappropriate, while, to ascribe to it im-
perfection for falling short of that goal, might justify the
reproach of inhumanity. In reality, limited war is war,
and is as nearly perfect as any other kind, as far as it
goes.

One of the best-known examples of a limited war, which
happens to be furnished by our own history, is the con-
dition of things which existed between the United States
and France from 1798 to 1800. Engagements took place
at sea, vessels were captured, and prisoners were taken.
In the case of one of the captures (Bas v. Tingy, 4 Ball.
37), the Supreme Court of the United States held that,
as Congress had raised an army, stopped all intercourse,
dissolved all treaties, built and equipped ships of war, and
commissioned privateers the two countries were "in fact
and in law at war" ; that an American vessel fighting
with a French vessel, to subdue and make her a prize, was
"fighting with an enemy accurately and technically speak-

178 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

ing" ; and that the provisions of the law relating to prizes
made in war were applicable to the case.

GENERAL WAR

General war is not limited as to places, persons, and
things, but authorizes all acts permitted by the laws of
war against the enemy's state and its members. It may
be said that, in this sense, war is merely general re-
prisals carried on by states which have resolved to con-
duct their contention by force.

In considering the cases in which the use of violence
against persons or property may or may not be permitted
by the laws of war, we are confronted with two theories
of the nature of war. According to what we may call the
original theory, all persons belonging to the enemy, in-
cluding women and children, may lawfully be attacked and
killed and their property destroyed. This comports with
what I venture to call the annihilative or extirpatory con-
ception of the object in view. This conception is exempli-
fied in the old rule that it is permissible, if not meritori-
ous, to put all the inhabitants of a besieged city to the
sword, to say nothing of the commendations, in earlier
writers, of the use of violence against all persons and
property of the enemy.

On the other hand, towards the end of the last century
there was propounded a different theory, formulated in the
well-known sentence of Rousseau, that war is a relation,
not of individual to individual, but of state to state, and
that men are enemies, not as individuals, but only as agents
of the state. This theory has been formally accepted by
many governments and has to a certain extent been in-
corporated in their legislation. It has not been accepted
by the British Government, nor has it been accepted by
the Government of the United States. From this circum-
stance we are not by any means to infer that these two
governments have sought to give full effect to the earlier
rule in their practice. Both have accepted and advoca-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 179

ted ameliorations of the earlier rule, and have advocated
and accepted such ameliorations as a part of the modern
law of war, just as the governments which have accepted
the rule that war is a relation, not of individual to in-
dividual, but of state to state, have not consistently car-
ried out the theory in all is logical consequences. In this
way the nominal adherents of the earlier theory and the
nominal adherents of the later theory have been able to
a great extent to meet on common ground.

No doubt the subject which has chiefly served to keep
the two schools apart is that of the liability of private
property at sea to capture and confiscation. Almost two
centuries ago advanced nations discarded the capture and
confiscation of enemy private property on land. They
did this perhaps not so much on grounds of "humanity"
as on grounds of enlightened public policy, in order that
men might, after the clash of arms was over, be enabled
to resume the pursuits of civilized life, instead of perish-
ing in unproductive wastes or roaming the forests, after
the manner of wild animals, for food. But, because of
the usefulness of ships as instruments of war, and of the
relief of internal stress by foreign commerce, strong mari-
time powers manifested an unwillingness to abandon the
capture of private property at sea, and, as the logical
starting point of the proposed exemption was the aboli-
tion of the doctrine of individual enmity, they refused to
accept the new theory. The statement is constantly reit-
erated that the United States, in 1856, proposed to the
powers the abolition of the capture of private property at
sea. This statement is true only in a strictly qualified
sense. The United States did not propose to do away
either with the law of contraband or with the law of
blockade. Thus limited, the effect of the proposal, had
it been accepted, would have been much slighter than
is generally imagined. The history of wars, including
that of the last great war, demonstrates that "measures
of blockade", whatever this may mean, and contraband
lists may readily be so extended as to reduce the exemp-

180 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

tion of private property from maritime capture to negli-
gible proportions. It is therefore evident that, if the
American proposal of 1856 had been accepted, its value
would have depended on the power and the will of neu-
trals to make it practically effective.

Wars, whether limited or general, may end either de
facto or by virtue of treaties of peace. For both modes
international law provides appropriate rules. Where war
is not purely de facto, the rights of the parties are deter-
mined by the rule of uti possidetis; where the war ends
by a treaty, this rule may also be invoked, where noth-
ing is expressed to the contrary. It may be superfluous
to remark that it belongs to each independent state, in
the exercise of its sovereign rights, to decide for itself
whether it will end a war in the one or the other of these
two modes.

At the present moment a writer or speaker who ven-
tures to discuss international relations seems to lay him-
self open to the charge of incompleteness of thought if he
fails to present or to commend some proposal by which
war is to be immediately and finally abolished. Whether
this expectation proceeds from a desire to end the numer-
our armed conflicts still going on, or from a wish to pre-
serve a fancied condition of peace which does not in fact
exist, I am obliged to regard it as essentially impulsive and
superficial. At a meeting of the so-called League to En-
force Peace held at Philadelphia in June, 1915, an emi-
nent speaker expressed disappointment that certain per-
sons whom he named had not presented a plan for the
termination of the war then raging in Europe. Much
sounder was the view expressed by the late James J. Hill,
when, on the outbreak of the war early in August, 1914,
in response to the request of a reporter for an opinion
as to when the war would end, he sententiously replied :
"Young man, you can ask more fool questions in five
minutes than I can answer in a week. The war will end
when somebody gets licked." As the war progressed in
area and in intensity, orators often spoke of it as "a war

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 181

to end war." Whether those who used such phrases
have now forgotten them, it is immaterial and would be
unkind to inquire. The intoxicating effects of illusive
phrases are beyond the reach of prohibitory legislation.
No war ever has been or ever will be fought to end all
war. Wars proceed from definite, concrete causes con-
nected with conflicts of opinion or of interest by which
the passions of men are excited. The conflicts may be
far less vital or important than the parties suppose them
to be. They may indeed be altogether unimportant, ex-
cept in the particular that they produce the nervous ten-
sion which impels human beings to resort to force. On
the other hand, the differences may be of a profound and
far-reaching character, such as to produce a deep sense
of injustice and unrest. Whether in such conditions the
tendency of men in the mass to seek their ends by vio-
lence can be restrained, is always a matter of conjecture.
While threats or combinations of force conceivably may
exert a restraining influence, they may also have the oppo-
site effect, and never can be counted upon with entire
confidence. The late Count Hayashi, in his Secret Me-
moirs (pp. 226-227), is represented as having written
that the Japanese public is ordinarily rather cool, and in-
deed almost indifferent, toward foreign affairs, but that,
when something happens to force attention in that direc-
tion, "then at once the public seems to get intoxicated, as
though drunk with alcohol, and it behaves as if it were not
able to discriminate". Count Hayashi need not have im-
puted this tendency to his own people as a peculiarity.
The same tendency to get excited at the prospect of a fight,
whether between dogs, between individual men, or be-
tween nations, more or less characterizes all people. When
an acute international situation arises, the possibility of a
physical contest at once comes into view. Sudden excite-
ments thus spring up, and the capacity to think clearly
and to reason calmly, instead of being popularly com-
mended, may expose to suspicion and even to censure the
few who still retain it. In such a condition of things,

182 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the precipitation of a war is not a difficult task. Wars
will diminish in proportion as men, when confronted with
apparent conflicts of opinion or of interest, come to think
first of peaceful rather than of forcible solutions. To the
attainment of this end the systematic employment of peace-
ful and tranquillizing methods, such as good offices, me-
diation, and arbitration, is necessarily helpful.

The extent to which such agencies or methods may be
successfully employed may be said to depend rather upon
the disposition of the parties to accept them than upon the
nature of the dispute. If, for instance, arbitration has
failed to prevent a certain war, it by no means follows that
arbitration could not have settled the dispute to the sat-
isfaction of the parties, if they had been willing to try
it. Wars have often grown out of disputes far less seri-
ous and complicated than some of those which arbitra-
tion has actually settled. In the future, just as in the
past, the preservation of peace, internal as well as exter-
nal, will continue to depend on the cultivation of a spirit
of justice and of toleration, and the exemplification of that
spirit, by men and by nations, in their dealings with one
another.

JOHN BASSETT MOORE.

"The Evolution of Private
International Law "

"THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW"

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE CON-
FERRING OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF LAWS
ON ESTEBAN GIL BORGES, MINISTER
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
VENEZUELA

(In pursuance of its plan to train the students of the
School of Foreign Service not only in the theory of
Foreign Service but also in its practice, Georgetown Uni-
versity sent a group of eighteen (18) students to Vene-
zuela in the summer of 1920 to become acquainted with
the people and to study the economic conditions of the
country. This trip was a signal success, due to a large
extent to the many official courtesies extended by the
Government of Venezuela. Hence, when Dr. Esteban
Gil Borges, the Minister of Foreign Relations of Vene-
zuela, arrived in the United States at the head of a special
mission in April, 1921, Georgetown University conferred
upon the Minister the degree of Doctor of Laws. The
paper given below was read by Dr. Borges on this
occasion.)

In private international law there is evolving a national
tendency which has had a rather full theoretical develop-
ment in these recent years, particularly in Germany and
in Italy. It is, perhaps, the prevailing doctrine in the
English speaking countries.

This tendency is not an exceptional fact in private inter-
national law, but it is common in the evolution of all sys-
tems of law. Private international law tends to become
a law of the state just as in other times private law was

185

186 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the law of the race, in the case of the barbarian peoples,
and was the law of the city in the Greek and Latin forms
of society, and the law of the land in the period of feudal
social organization.

At certain moments in the course of history the ju-
ridical ideals of mankind, as it exists in one or another
group, are so energetically expressed that they take on
the form of a legal system exclusive in character. Prog-
ress has lengthened the radius of this orbit from the ethnic
unit to the city, from the city to the province, from the
province to the nation. In Rome this exclusive charac-
ter of the law dominates the Law of the Quirites. The
law of the feudal period, in its turn, was as exclusive in
nature as the Roman law of the early times. The doctrine
of territorial sovereignty, absolute in character, was ex-
clusive in a way analogous to that which had marked the
effect of the Law of the Quirites on Roman institutions.
In Rome, there was the exclusiveness of the city as against
all that lay without, while within the city there was the
exclusiveness of the patrician class as against the plebeian
class. In the middle ages, the attitude of exclusion was
that of the feudal estate on the one hand as against all that
lay outside, while within the unit of sovereignty the law
of the lord was exclusive as against that of the vassal.

Civil law was, in the cities of Greece and Rome, the
element which fused the antagonistic interests of classes
and castes into a social unit more embracing than that
of the tyrannies, despotic monarchies and military oli-
garchies of the Orient. The national law in modern times
was, in turn, the element which fused into a still more
inclusive unity, — that of the State, — the antagonistic in-
terests of the provinces as they had existed during the
feudal period.

In Rome the city limit was the frontier of law. The law
was the child of the city. The foreigner was the enemy.
The city was juridically a community isolated within its
hills.

In the society of the middle ages there was, as in Rome.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 187

a certain antagonism operating within each social group.
The feudal castle and medieval town were as hostile to
each other as had been the patrician and plebeian classes
in Rome, but over and above this hostility prevailed the
hostility against the foreigner. The doctrine of territorial
sovereignty was, as we have said, the Law of the Quirites,
translated into terms of feudal law.

Periods of time, often centuries long, were necessary
in order that progress should break down these boundaries
limiting the effect of law set up by the caste, the race, the
city, and the feudal estate, in turn. In Rome, the political
work of the Empire, the philosophical contribution of
Stoicism, the spiritual reform of Christianity, were neces-
sary to bring about the transformation of the Law of the
City into the Law of Nations. In our modern times the
political achievement of monarchy, the philosophical in-
fluence of the Natural Law School and the grinding proc-
ess of revolution were all required to change the law of
the province into the law of the nation.

The social forces which transformed the categories of
human society likewise transformed its law. Rome ex-
perienced a profound modification in its legal ideas when
those social forces made of the City of Quirites the Re-
public of the Praetors and Tribunes, and then, later, trans-
formed the Republic into a cosmopolitan empire.

Legal categories have suffered a like transformation at
the beginning of our modern period. Analogous to the
reaction against the principles of feudal society is the
reaction in law, particularly in the field of private inter-
national law. One of the manifestations of this reaction
was that of the theory of statutes. The glossators who
formulated the statutory theory were the heirs of Latin
tradition.

The legal theories of Italy were the children of Roman
cosmopolitanism.

Legal ideas and influences have roots not only in the
loose surface earth of theories, but they also have roots
deep in the historic subsoil of the Western races. These

188 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

ideas and instincts are the result of an historic evolution
which has at times lasted centuries. In the middle ages
we have seen the countries of the Roman Law develop
in the direction of the personality of law, while those
which lay outside the influence of Latin civilization de-
veloped rather towards the territorial concept of law. Lat-
er, we have seen two other elements in conflict : on the
one hand, the legal customs of feudalism, and on the
other, what was left 'of the legal system of the invaders.
The fundamental principle of the one was territorial sov-
ereignty, while the key of the other was the law of the
race. The two principles carried on a long struggle, and
historical conditions determined the victory in each in-
stance.

France and Germany were feudal countries and they
were controlled by the system of territorial sovereignty.
Italy was a country of small republics, organized munic-
ipally and saturated with Latin traditions ; and Italy was
dominated by the theory of the glossators. Roman law
and local customary law were locked in this great struggle.
The institutions of society swung now towards the im-
perial idea, that is, the idea fundamentally Roman, and
now towards the feudal idea, fundamentally the product
of the individualistic spirit of the Germanic Race. The
systems of private international law survive all the inci-
dents of this mighty struggle, from which, as a sort of
compromise formula, there emerged the statutory theory.
But this harmonizing formula had still further to ad-
just itself to the social conditions of the nations, and
from it there arose in turn systems so different in charac-
ter as that of the Italian jurists of the thirteenth century,
that of the French jurists of the sixteenth century, and
that of the Dutch jurists of the seventeenth century. The
doctrine of Bartolo is altogether different from the theory
of Dumoulin and D'Argentre, and this, in turn, differs
from those of Voet and Huber. In this connection Lau-
rent was able to say, "There is no vestige of the cosmopol-
itanism which characterized the glossators to be found

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 189

among the statutory theorists," and, again, that "The stat-
utory jurists are already French, Belgian, German."1

The reason for this difference in interpretation of the
same system of law is to be found in the controlling ideas
which characterized each of the peoples, and also in the
diversity of their social institutions. Law has been pro-
foundly affected by social conditions and mental aptitudes.
In Italy, which was a country primarily municipal in its
social structure and fundamentally Roman in its juridical
development, the dominant theory was that of the glossa-
tors. In France, on the other hand, — a feudal country,
the land of the coutumes, — the prevailing law was the law
which ran with the land, although there was discernible
an occasional tendency towards adoption of the Italian
system. Again, in the Netherlands and Belgium, which
were countries of provincial autonomy, the governing
principle in law was that of absolute territoriality.

The transformation of the doctrine of personality of
law is another example of the profound modification by
which experience shapes ideas which may have had the
same source, and, at the outset, the same nature. The
idea of the personality of law has in our modern systems
of law the same function which it had in the early cen-
turies of the middle ages among the invaders of the Ro-
man Empire. In both systems of law, the function seems
to have been identical although the ground for its opera-
tion seems to have changed.

Laine and Laurent have denied that these two systems
had an identical origin and a close relationship. "We must
not," says Laurent, "confuse the personal law of the Ger-
manic peoples with the personal law or statutory law of
French legal theory. In our system, one law governs
all those who are members of a single state. The Code
Napoleon governs all Frenchmen whatever may have
been their racial origin. Generally speaking, laws are
without authority beyond the boundaries qf the territory

'Laurent— Dr. civ. int. I— 257-258.

190 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

over which the legislator exercises jurisdiction. Some
laws, however, which deal with the status and capacity
of persons continue to govern even Frenchmen living in
foreign lands; and these laws are called personal because
they refer to the person and no Frenchmen can escape
them by departing from his native land. . . . Among the
barbarian peoples the personal law was the national law
of every man."1 "The personal laws of the French," re-
marks Laine, "are nothing else than their territorial laws
following them into foreign countries. Today all laws
which are called personal from the point of view of con-
flict of laws are really territorial laws, that is to say, they
are precisely the opposite of the personal laws of the bar-
barian peoples."

The basis of the notion of personality of law has, in
fact, been transformed. Among the barbarians the crite-
rion was the race, while in modern law it is territorial.
Its function, however, in our judgment, remains the same,
and in one and the other case to a greater or less extent
it implies the application of a national law in a foreign
country. Among the barbarians it was the law of the
tribe while among the peoples of today it is the law of
the nation. What has changed is the form of the State ;
the basis of law in the system of the invaders was the
ethnic unit, while in the modern world it is chiefly the
geographic unit.

Neither the personality of law among the barbarians
nor the territoriality of law in feudal Europe, nor the com-
promise formulas of the statutory jurists, nor again the
personality of law in our modern juridical system can
be conceived as purely theoretical notions capable of iso-
lation from historical realities. These concepts take their
origin directly in the diversity of social institutions, racial
characteristics and stages of evolution of the States. The
personality of law directly corresponds to a notion of a
state resting squarely on an ethnic unit; the "law of the

^Laurent, Dr. civ. int. I— 168.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 191

land rests, in turn, on a concept of a state founded on the
basis of a geographic unit ; while the personality of mod-
ern law finds its basis in a theory of the state resting on
the principle of nationality.

The work of centuries cannot be changed in a day.
The personality of law is destined long to remain an
element in the legal systems of those states which ac-
cepted the Roman law and the Latin theory of the State ;
the territorial character of law will likewise remain im-
bedded in the legal systems of those States which adhered
to the Germanic law and the feudal relations.

Race, historical environment, ideas, instincts, preju-
dices, political interests, national passions, — all these are
coefficients with evident influence on the formation of law
and in a less direct, but none the less certain manner on
the formation of scientific doctrines. In order to esti-
mate the possibility of a reform which would bring about
a uniformity of ideas in the teaching and principles of
positive law, we must take account of the historic factors.
Scientific thought by itself would create nothing but ab-
stract concepts. For example, if we were to try to recon-
cile the Italian theory of the personality of law and the
territorial theory which prevails in the English speaking
world, we should have to wipe out all the past of these
peoples and erase from the national life of some, centu-
ries of feudal traditions, and from that of others, centuries
of Roman traditions.

In private international law we find essential differences
between the countries of the civil law and those of the
common law, and these differences originate in large part
in the historic development of these two systems of law.
"Our English concept of the law," says Harrisson,
"preserves us from the fantastic sophism which govern
most of the law on the Continent, that is to say, the
idea that from international private law we can con-
struct a universal system based on the meditation of
juries and imposed by the force of the logical strength
on the different tribunals of Europe. For us in Eng-

192 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

land, notions of jurisprudence are derived from prac-
tical decisions and not dogmatic theories."1

"Systems of legislation," says Laine, "may be divided
into two groups; on the one hand, the system which
exist in France, Italy, and Germany, and on the other,
the systems of England and America. The first group
has as its common element the Roman law, which can-
not be found in the second; conversely, the second
group has the feudal law, which is not to be found in
the first. Consequently, between these two, systems of
legislation there is a profound difference for a double

The positive law of the United States has been com-
posed by jurisprudence and federal legislation. In mat-
ters of private international law, Anglo-American juris-
prudence still clings to the concepts of the Dutch jurists of
the eighteenth century. The doctrine of absolute terri-
torial sovereignty permeates its rigorous attitude towards
the foreigner and the foreign law.

The application of the foreign law is not admitted, but
it is tolerated on the basis of comity and as a matter of
liberalism. ' ( "Ex comitate" ; "Liberaliter" ; V. Comm. ad
Pandectas Lib. I— T. IV— "De Statutis.")

The theory of the "Lex Situs" is the basis of the private
international law of the English speaking peoples. This
theory is applied to all juridical relations, persons, status
and capacity, property and all its ramifications, contracts
and criminal law.

"It is of the highest importance," says Minor, "that
every question coming to a court for decision shall have
a 'situs' somewhere, and, generally speaking, every ques-
tion which arises will be settled by the law of the State
where this 'situs' is located. Whatever interests may be
ventilated before a tribunal, whether they have been
created by the voluntary action of an individual or have
an origin without his voluntary action but rather as a

^Harrisson, Journ. de Dr. Int. Prive, 1880, p. 548.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 193

result of the operation of law, such an interest must have
its 'situs' indicated by the individual or determined by
the law. Marriage, contract, inheritance, and crime —
each of these things has its 'situs/ and it is the law of the
'situs' which governs it. ... One of the principles of science
is that every state is sovereign within its own jurisdic-
tion. Consequently, every state may forbid the applica-
tion of foreign laws within its boundaries. It follows
that when effect is given to a foreign law it is because tem-
porarily the national law withholds its supreme authority
in favor of the foreign law, which, for the moment and
with particular reference to a specific case, is converted by
the will of the State into its national law."1

In the British Empire the difference between the jurid-
ical standards of the home country and the constituent
States of the Empire, and in the United States, the dif-
ference between the federal and state laws, has resulted
in a tendency somewhat similar to that which prevails in
private international law; and these differences have con-
ferred predominating influence on the theory of territo-
rial sovereignty.

These differences, profound in character, — which dis-
tinguish systems of private international law prevailing
on the European continent and in England, — and the dif-
ferences between the civil law of the Spanish American
countries and the common law of the United States in
America, are to be attributed less to the fondness of
thinkers for this or that theoretical construction, than to
peculiarities in the historical development of the respec-
tive juridical standards.

After the dissolution of the Roman Empire, the varie-
ty in law, based on the criterion of race, persisted. From
the eleventh through the twelfth century, the commercial
relations and the renaissance of Roman Law in the cities
of Italy modified the concept of law in the units of civil
society which there existed. As Westlake remarks, in the

'Minor, Conflict of Laws, Boston, 1901, p. 6.

194 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

application of foreign laws, principles of justice, deter-
mined by reason, were observed.1

The feudal system brought to the Western World a
new concept of private international law.2 This fact
was the starting point for two distinct systems of law on
the Continent. According to one, the law of the land was
to be applied to every controversy, while according to the
other, there could be applied to a particular case a foreign
juridical principle if the nature of the case so required.

By reason of the geographic isolation of England and
the unity of its judicial organization, that country was
somewhat remote from this conflict of legal systems. The
Norman conquest resulted in the organization of a strong
monarchy and a parliament with genuine legislative au-
thority. As Brunner declares, the Curia Regis from the
beginning displayed an unaccustomed capacity for cen-
tralizing the legal and administrative system of the coun-
try.8

These elements constituted a uniform and exclusive sys-
tem of territorial law, a closed system in which there was
no room for the variety of points of view given expression
by French, Italian, Dutch and German jurisconsults in
settling conflicts between their several customary or stat-
utory systems.

Anzilotti puts it well when he says : "In England, the
statutory theory was late in coming into use, and it was
adapted in such a way to the common law that it was
almost transformed. In all the other countries on the
Continent the principles and conclusions of this theory
were admitted. It is true that they were regarded from
different and even opposite points of view."

England remained in this geographic and legal isola-
tion down to the period of revolution. At the end of the
sixteenth century the commercial relations between Eng-

iWestlake, International Lazv, 4th Ed. p. 15.

2Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, p. 108.

'Brunner and Hastings, Sources of the Law of England.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 195

land and the Continent grew very much more close. This
was particularly the case between England and the Low
Countries. The Dutch publicists of the school of Gro-
tius, Rodemberg, of the two Voets, and of Huber, enjoyed
great prestige.

English jurisprudence found its doctrines particularly
applicable to the legal system of England, and as applica-
tion of foreign law was regarded as a limitation of ter-
ritorial sovereignty, this obstacle was overcome by the
acceptance of the principle of comity of nations.

The comitas gentium is still in England and the United
States the basis for the application of foreign law. Brit-
ish jurisprudence and that of the United States have been
in this regard altogether conservative. In 1895, a decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States declared that
the principle of reciprocity was an indispensable requisite
for the carrying out of foreign decisions for "the comitas
gentium of the United States called for nothing more."1

Recently there has developed a tendency looking to the
conciliation of the two systems of private international
law, namely, to that of Europe and to that of the English
speaking countries. The Conference of the International
Law Association, at its meeting in Heidelberg in 1911,
declared "that there ought to be established an Interna-
tional Commission with a view to recommend mutual
concessions between the systems of law of the continent
and the English speaking peoples so as to bring them
closer to uniformity.'*

The difference in the basis of international law between
the countries of Roman tradition and those of feudal
traditions are not so profound as to compel us to abandon
our hope of reaching a compromise which will eliminate
the divergencies. National peculiarities which took shape
by reason of racial differences are today of less influence
than they were in the evolutionary period of law, while

*Cf. Beale, Harvard Law Review, 23; Wharton, Conflicts of Law.
356-357; and New York Code of Civil Procedure, Par. 1756.

196 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

those peculiarities due to geographical reasons have been
modified by reason of the improvement of communications
and means of closer contact between peoples ; while, finally,
those due to differences in social institutions are being
gradually wiped out by reason of the expansion of a sin-
gle ideal of civilization which makes identical the princi-
ples of moral and juridical life.1

The action of various common cultural factors, the
comparative studies of legislation which seek amid all the
varieties those elements which are common, and which
always exist at the bottom of all systems of law, and
upon which there may be based a harmonizing structure,
research in the universal underlying stratum of ideas an&
principles governing our civil life, and, above all, the
analogy of the interests which nationalities in this hemis-
phere have in their various juridical relations and particu-
larly in commercial law; — these factors seem to justify
our hope and to stimulate our effort in the unification of
the legal standards of America.

The most imperative need of legislative uniformity,—
and the least difficult to effect, — is to be found in the field
of commercial law. The work of uniformity in this
branch meets fewer obstacles than in the other branches
of law, as the civil or public law more immediately and
fundamentally follows the influence of national individ-
ualism and historical tradition.

Commercial institutions fulfill economic requirements
of a general character; it is, therefore, in this branch of
legal activity that the task of making uniform the law
of the American Republics can most successfully be
achieved. This will be a useful accomplishment. This
work of uniformity will not only be useful now, but it
will also clear the way, in the future, for a more em-
bracing and more profound unity of the juridical life of
the nations of this hemisphere.

"Bertin-Journ de Dr. Int. Prive, 1892-225, and 1898. For the oppo-
site view, see Raoul de la Grasserie. Raymond Saleilles, Rev. trim.
de Dr. Civ.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 197

The President of the University, in introducing the
next speaker, said :

"I believe the greatest force in the country today for
the promotion of harmonious intercourse among nations
is the Pan American Union. It is always ready to furnish
accurate historical knowledge of all the countries of
America, and it is likewise always ready to correct false
history concerning those countries. It seems that a man
to be a successful Director of that Union should possess
one of the qualities of a great poet. He has to be born
to such a position and cannot be made. The Union at
present has a man at its head who certainly seems to be
born for the position. He has a wide knowledge of the
American Republics, a broad sympathy with their peo-
ples and a geniality which is irresistible. It gives me great
pleasure to present him to you this evening in the per-
son of the Honorable Leo S. Rowe, Doctor of Laws, Di-
rector of the Pan American Union."

CLOSING REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE LEO S. ROWE,

LL.D.,
Director of the Pan American Union.

Gentlemen of the Special Delegation from Venezuela,
Members of the Board of Regents and Faculties of
Georgetown University, Students of Georgetown
University, Ladies and Gentlemen:

One would be poor both in mind and spirit were he
not to be stirred by an inspiring occasion such as this. It
is on these occasions that we are able to measure the
progress that has been made for that closer relationship,
not only between the governments, but between the peo-
ples of America, which means so much to the present and
to the future of our civilization.

It is, therefore, Mr. Minister, with a deep sense of
privilege that I bring to you the warm greetings and con-
gratulations of the Pan American Union.

198 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

We realize that in honoring you Georgetown Univer-
sity has honored itself. We greet you as the representa-
tive of that spirit of continental co-operation which both
you and your country have done so much to develop.
Statesman, philosopher, educator, you have ever held be-
fore your students and before the people of your country
the highest standards of international right and justice.
Beyond the personal tribute which this occasion means to
you, Sir, we desire to. thank you and the members of the
distinguished special mission that accompanies you for
the honor you have done this country in paying us this
visit. Your presence here means much to us, as it means
much to the other republics of the American continent,
because, aside from the great outpouring of national
feeling which the occasion of the presentation of the stat-
ue of the Liberator has brought, there is a significance
to these demonstrations which I am sure you will carry
back with you to Venezuela, and which will also re-
sound to the utmost confines of this continent.

The great national hero whose memory we have hon-
ored during the ceremonies of this last week stands forth
in the history of this continent as the pioneer of interna-
tion co-operation, the first to appreciate the importance
of unity of policy and unity of effort as between the re-
publics of the American continent, the first to realize how
much such unity of effort means to the peace of America
and to the peace of the world. Bolivar's call for the as-
sembly of the First Pan American Congress, which met in
Panama in 1826, indicates his large vision, his power to
visualize the future and his keen sense of the important
part which the republics of America were called upon to
play in the history of modern civilization. The high
standards which he set during the early years of the nine-
teenth century have required a long time of painful effort
to find acceptance throughout the continent, and it is only
the present generation that is beginning to reap the fruits
of the great, statesmanlike vision of your distinguished
countryman.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 199

And we congratulate you, Sir, as well as those who are
accompanying you, that it has been vouchsafed to you to
continue, and to express in your own public policy those
high standards and ideals for which Bolivar stood, for
which he struggled and for which he made the great sac-
rifice.

The Pan American Union greets you, Sir, not only as
the worthy representative of a great country, but as a
staunch promoter of those ideals of international justice
and fair dealing which should ever characterize the rela-
tions of the republics of America with one another and
with the world at large.

Latin America as a Factor in
International Relations

LATIN AMERICA AS A FACTOR IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF AMERICAN HISTORY

The attempt to formulate the basic principles govern-
ing the unfolding of history has been the major purpose
of every system of philosophy. Historians of every epoch
have concerned themselves with the presentation of facts,
not because of their interest in the happenings of a par-
ticular period, but rather for the purpose of reaching
some conclusion with reference to the nature of the forces
that have determined economic, social and political
development.

The treatment of the history of the Latin American
countries furnishes a curious and rather significent excep-
tion to the general rule. While the salient facts of their
history have been presented, little attempt has been made
to present a philosophical interpretation and explanation
of these facts. The result is that, especially here in the
United States, the history of the Latin American peoples
is regarded as a succession of cataclysmic changes having
little relation to one another and devoid of that larger
significance which is usually given to the events of Euro-
pean history.

For the philosophy of American history, using the
term American in its broadest continental sense, we must
look to the utterances of the great leaders of thought
and action. An analysis of their writings discloses two
major tendencies representing two distinct schools of
thought, one advocating national isolation, and the other,
international co-operation, especially as between the re-
publics of the American Continent.

203

204 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

In our own history, the contrast between these two
schools of thought is most clearly set forth in the writ-
ings of Henry Clay as contrasted with those of John
Quincy Adams. During his entire career and, especially
during the period that he served as Secretary of State,
Clay advocated the closest co-operation between the re-
publics of America. In fact, there lurked in his mind a
plan which was never definitely formulated, — to bring
about some form of political affiliation, or at least unity
of policy between the republics of the American Conti-
nent. Adams, on the other hand, looked upon affiliation
or anything approaching thereto with distrust, and re-
garded any such plan as a departure from the settled
policy of avoiding entangling alliances. It is a curious
fact that in spite of this wide difference of viewpoint,
Henry Clay became Secretary of State under Adams
and that the documents attributed to these two statesmen,
expressing their views on this basic question of foreign
policy, were issued soon after the Inauguration of
Adams.1

Clay did not hesitate to go so far as to advocate an
actual confederation of all the republics of the American
Continent, and with a vision prophetic of subsequent
efforts, proposed that this union "should wield the force
of the confederated states in defense of any member
that may be attacked. . . .

"This scheme of a general confederation of the
Americas," he said, " is submitted to the public as a
means of securing peace and power abroad, peace and
happiness at home. Every argument of humanity,
policy and reason, calls upon us to rivet the bonds of
fraternal affection between the inhabitants of the same
continent, and to guard with a sacred vigilance against
the rupture of a single link.

1See article attributed to Henry Clay, appearing in the Democratic
Press of Philadelphia and reproduced in National Intelligencer, Wash-
ington, April 26, 1825 ; also see Register of Debates in Congress, Vol.
I, Part II, page 2363.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 205

"A confederation alone is competent to this duty,
and without it we must submit to the ordinary fate of
other nations — jealousy, discord and war — whenever
any nation thinks itself strong enough to wage one
with impunity."

Adams,1 on the other hand, cautious and more con-
servative than his Secretary of State, deprecated "any
departure from that cardinal principle in our foreign in-
tercourse which distrusts and rejects alliances with for-
eign nations, for any purpose."

II

LATIN AMERICAN IDEALS, BOLIVAR

Long before Clay and Adams had formulated their
views on American continental policy, Bolivar,2 languish-
ing in exile, wrote :

"Above all means I desire to see formed in America
the greatest nation on earth; greatest, not so much by
virtue of its extent and wealth, but by virtue of its
liberty and glory."

The broad statesmanlike vision, which characterized
the great South American leader, led him to face un-
flinchingly all the political and social difficulties confront-
ing the nascent republics of the American Continent. He
realized to the fullest the obstacles which would have to
be overcome before the peoples of America could develop
into a truly democratic society. He never allowed his
vision to be obscured by formulae or phrases, and he
fully appreciated the fact that democracy means far more
than a mere form of government, and that unless it has
its roots in a truly democratic form of social organization
the mere political expression becomes a hollow and empty
form.

Throughout the thought and activity of Bolivar there

'See National Intelligencer, April 26, 1825.

2Famous Kingston letter O'Leary Memorias, XXVII, 291-319.

206 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

is evident a deep and abiding faith, not only in the future
of what he designated as the American political system,
but also in the high mission which this system is called
upon to perform.

The philosophy underlying his thought represents one
of the two great currents in international policy. On the
one hand, the policy of isolation, whose silent correlative
is force, and, on the other hand, the policy of co-opera-
tion, whose purpose is "not to restrain the forces that
make for war, but also to liberate the forces that make
for peace."

It would be presumptuous to attempt a detailed formu-
lation of the part which the republics of America are
called upon to play in the economy of a civilization,
which, until very recently, promised to be progressive.
It is fitting, however, that at the close of the first century
of their independence, some attempt be made to estimate
the part that they are called upon to play and which they
will play if their people and the governments emanating
from them fully realize the magnitude of their obliga-
tions and the possibilities of their privileged position.

One of the striking characteristics of the history of the
peoples of Central and South America has been their
readiness and willingness to place themselves in the ser-
vice of standards of international right and justice consid-
erably higher in some instances than the standards actu-
ally disclosed by the policy pursued by their respective
governments. In fact this trait has been as characteristic
of the history of the United States as of the republics of
Hispano-America.

At the time of the promulgation of the Monroe Doc-
trine, for instance, the documents of the period show
that the leading statesmen of the United States regarded
the promulgation of this Doctrine as necessary to the
safety and untrammded development of the republic; a
measure calculated to prevent the repetition on the Amer-
ican Continent of the entanglements, jealousies and rival-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 207

ries which characterized the European international sit-
uation. To the people of the United States, however,
this Doctrine meant far more than a measure of national
protection. It aroused enthusiasm because of the service
which it was calculated to render to the then struggling
republics of Latin America. It was the native idealism of
the people that prompted them to give warm support to the
Doctrine, an idealism which stands in marked contrast
with the more calculating principle of national interest
which dominated the thought of the political leaders of
the period. The generous impulses that led the people of
the United States warmly to sympathize with the
struggles for independence of the nations of Central and
South America also led to the expression of sympathy
with similar struggles in other sections of the world. In
precisely the same way we find the nations of Hispano-
America, not only warmly sympathetic, but evincing real
enthusiasm for the struggles of sister nations for political
and civil liberty.

We are here face to face with one of the really great
problems confronting the republics of the American Con-
tinent. This native idealism of the people must be made
more effective in international affairs. The surest means
to bring this about is through the establishment of a
closer relationship between public opinion and govern-
mental policy ; in a word to bridge that tragic gap, which
has been the cause of such world disaster; — the abyss
between the standards of national opinion on the one
hand, and the so-called practical aims of political leaders
on the other. This is the true significance of the struggle
for the democratization of American foreign policy; —
namely, to translate into the real world of international
relations, the idealism and generous impulses of the na-
tions of the American Continent. The difficulties, while
great, are in no sense insurmountable and the first step
toward the attainment of this end is to assure the freest
possible public discussion of every question of foreign

208 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

policy. The real democratization of government depends
not on the indefinite multiplication of elections, but rather
on that constant public discussion which crystallizes pub-
lic opinion and which makes such opinion effective in its
control over every organ of government.

III.

SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFLUENCE

During the century that has elapsed since the promul-
gation of the Monroe Doctrine, the countries of Latin
America have increased in population from 25,000,000
to 85,000,000; their estimated national wealth (while
impossible to determine accurately) has, roughly speak-
ing, advanced from $3,000,000,000 to $50,000,000,000;
their position in world commerce has changed from an
estimated total of exports and imports of $250,000,000
in 1823, to a total of $5,200,000,000 in 1920.

These figures indicate nothing short of a revolution in
their position in the economy of the world's affairs. They
can no longer be regarded as the beneficiaries of the
sympathy and more or less benign condescension of other
nations, but have come to take their position amongst
the powers of the world with all the duties and obliga-
tions which that position involves.

In order to make that position as fully effective as
possible, it is important that they adopt a policy which
will bring about at least three major results. First, they
must endeavor to secure greater financial independence
through the development of native capital, and this can
only be done through the stimulation of habits of thrift
on the part of the masses of the people. It is a reflection
on their economic development that in spite of. marvelous
resources, in spite of a vigorous and alert population,
the amount of native capital that has been invested in
their enterprises is comparatively small.

As long as the republics of Latin America remain

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 209

wholly dependent on foreign capital for the development
of their resources, so long will their independence of
judgment and of action be limited and they will thereby
be prevented from playing the part in world affairs which
they are manifestly called upon to play.

This does not imply to the slightest extent any dis-
couragement to the investment of foreign capital. It
means the establishment of financial co-operation rather
than the present situation of financial dependence.

A change significant of what the future has in store
for us is now taking place in several South American
countries where, with the combination of North and
South American capital, new enterprises are being estab-
lished and a new spirit of international co-operation
developed.

A second step — and one of even greater importance —
is the elimination of the spirit of distrust and mutual
suspicion which has characterized the relations between
some of the republics of Central and South America.
No other factor has contributed so much toward prevent-
ing the development of anything approaching unity of
continental policy. If the American republics hope to
acquire a real influence in world affairs, they must elimi-
nate from their international relations every trace of
distrust by solving the international questions now pend-
ing between them. An united America is a condition
prerequisite to an influential America. When in 1902,
after definitely settling their frontier difficulties, Chile
and Argentina solemnly agreed to a limitation of arma-
ments, an agreement amounting practically to a naval
and military holiday for a period of five years, they set
an example to the entire continent, demonstrating what
can be accomplished when mutual confidence and good
faith become the guiding factors in international rela-
tions.

In the third place, the American Republics must make
service rather than revenue the guiding principle of their

210 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

national as well as their international policy. By this,
of course, I do not mean that they need sacrifice any of
their budgetary interests, or even that they are called
upon to reduce the burden of taxation. The principle
does, however, call for the imposition of taxes according
to ability to pay rather than ease of collection, and the
application of social rather than purely financial or fiscal
considerations in fixing the cost of governmental service
to the consumer.

IV.

PAN AMERICAN CO-OPERATION

The principle which I am here defending was strik-
ingly illustrated in the recent International Postal Con-
ference held at Madrid. At this world conference the
contrast between the European and the American view-
point was clearly and almost dramatically presented.
European countries, in the desperate financial condition
which they find themselves, are seeking every possible
opportunity to increase their revenues. On the other
hand, the American Republics look upon such services
as postal communication in the light of a broad social
service, designed to foster closer ties between different
sections of the country and to bring about, internation-
ally, closer bonds of friendship and commerce between
different sections of the Continent.

The difference of viewpoint was so great, in fact, so
irreconcilable, that the only satisfactory solution was the
negotiation of a separate convention between the repub-
lics of the American Continent (to which Spain and
Portugal were also admitted) under which the domestic
rate is made applicable to all classes of mail matter be-
tween the countries parties to this agreement.

Viewed in its larger aspect, the action thus taken by
the American Republics possesses a far-reaching signifi-
cance, not only from the standpoint of their domestic

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 211

policy, but also as the indication of the principle which
should guide their international relations.

With the accomplishment of these three steps in their
national and international policy, the republics of Latin
America will be prepared fully to enter upon that larger
influence which they are destined to exercise on the des-
tinies of the modern world. Today America is the only
section of the world in which the peace spirit still pre-
vails. Signor Nitti has aptly described the situation
when he said :

"What is wrong with the world is that we still keep
the war spirit ; we do not cultivate the peace spirit." A
description of the social conditions now prevailing in
Europe even more accurate is given by one of the
keenest observers of our day.1 "After as before the
peace," he says, the temper has always been the war
temper. The peace temper has never been recovered.
There may be war in the world though not a shot is
fired. War in action has at least the virtue; that the
warmakers may affront personal perils. War in its
new form is utterly despicable; the people are still
drunk with the maddening fumes of war. . . Peace
is not a mere suspension of fighting; ... it is not a
negative but a positive thing, worth attaining by the
most laborious efforts, if needs be, worth many sacri-
fices. . . The foolish, wicked diplomatic history of
two years would nevertheless not have been possible if
the soul of mankind had not been in shadow. Not
only were the cornfields and the vineyards of France
ravaged by the war, but the cornfields and the vineyards
of the spirit were trampled under foot. The iniquities
of peace are born of the war. War has destroyed
elasticity of mind, independence of judgment and
liberty of expression. We think not so much of truth
as of conforming to the tacitly accepted fiction of the
hour."

Europe stands today under the pall of a great dis-
appointment. People have lost faith in their rulers and

'Sisley Huddleston.

212 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

give evidence of a lassitude, and a reversion to the same
standards that brought on the disaster of the Great War.
As Philip Gibbs has well said :

"War to end war now mocks at us with jeering
laughter. . . Nationalism more narrow, more bitter,
more selfish than in the world of 1914, has replaced the
fleeting hope of many peoples, that there might be a
real league of nations based upon the common sense of
common folk. . • . We have fallen back on cynicism,
as nations, as classes, as individuals. There is only one
cure for the woes of Europe and our own — not easy,
but bound to come unless we are looking for downfall.
It is the reconciliation of peoples, burying of old hatch-
ets, wiping out of old villainies and co-operating in a
much closer union of mutual help. . . Before that
can happen there must come new leaders, new enthusi-
asm for the ideals of life, a new spirit of unselfishness
and service for the common weal: — and just now, we
do not see them coming."

THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAS

It is here that a great opportunity presents itself to
the republics of America. Whether in the accomplish-
ment of this great world mission they are to have the
co-operation of the United States, still hangs in the bal-
ance, but as to the ultimate decision there can be no
doubt. Even without that co-operation, they are now
called upon to give to the world a demonstration of the
efficiency of the principle of co-operation as contrasted
with the principle of force. What Europe was unable to
do, America, must now perform. She must not fail, for,
if she does, the last hope of mankind for a new order dis-
appears. One cannot help but feel a glow of enthusiasm
at the opportunity which now presents itself to the
younger generation and which must be an inspiration to
effort, combined with a high resolve that this great Con-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 213

tinent shall make a return to the world for the privileges
and blessings that have been showered upon it.

We must ever bear in mind, however, that to fulfill
this mission our domestic, as well as our international,
policy must be dominated by those ideals which we in-
herited from the great founders of the American Re-
publics. The governments of America must heed the
yearnings and fulfill the desires of the masses of the
people. They must meet the demands of millions of men
and women "for unselfish purpose and fine vision; for
evolution and riot for revolution; for peace and not for
blood."1

But, you will ask, what part is the United States to
play in this new world order, if new world order here is
to be ? It is at this point that an important, far-reaching
decision confronts the people of this country. They must
decide whether their policy shall be continental or
selfishly national. Our entry into the European war was
a clear demonstration, if any further demonstration were
necessary, that the period of America's isolation was at
an end, and yet, with the close of the war, we find large
sections of our people attempting the manifestly impos-
sible task of resuming a status of isolation which no
longer exists and which, in fact, could not exist, given
the present economic and financial influence of this coun-
try in world affairs.

It must be clear to every student of history that unless
the American people are willing to face the responsibili-
ties which the force of circumstances has placed upon
them, disaster will follow. No far-seeing vision is re-
quired to appreciate that the Americas are destined to
be the steadying influence in the maintenance and prog-
ress of civilization. Both by that direct influence and
by their example they must impress upon the world to an
increasing degree the constructive value of co-operation,

Francis Hackett in The New Republic, May 12, 1920.

214 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

as distinguished from force. To the United States, this
is a matter vital to the further development of our demo-
cratic institutions. Isolation means armament; it means
a state of defense against every conceivable combination
that may be formed, and this means a status of milita-
rism which is inherently antagonistic to the growth of
democratic institutions.

Co-operation, therefore, with the republics of Latin
America in the development of a unified Continental
policy is a matter of interest not only to the future of our
civilization, but to the very existence of our democratic
institutions. More than this — a policy of isolation means
that the United States may become a disturbing factor in
the world relations. Such a tragedy, and tragedy it
would be, would be all the greater because of the fact
that the people of this country are essentially a peace-
loving people and that their present insistence on isola-
tion is dictated in large measure by a deeply rooted
desire for peace. In other words, the standards of
national thought, developed more than a century ago,
when isolation meant peace, have been carried into a
period in which the radical change of world conditions
makes this same demand for isolation a menace to
America's peace and may develop into a menace to the
world.

I doubt whether any other nation has ever shown quite
the same capacity as the people of this country to close
their eyes to the actual conditions with which they are
surrounded. The choice which they think confronts
them today is more apparent than real. Whatever policy
they adopt will mean much to the future of the world.
It is physically, morally, socially, and politically impos-
sible for them to isolate themselves. The real question
is whether, in unison with all the other republics of
America, they will assume their full share of responsi-
bility for the maintenance of the world's peace and thus
create conditions favorable to the normal development

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 215

of their own institutions and to the fulfillment of their
high world mission. Any other course will ultimately
spell disaster to us and possibly disaster to the world.

We sometimes discuss America as if by some in-
scrutable and special ruling of Providence she is to be
exempt from those inexorable laws that have governed
the rise and the decline of other nations. It is for this
generation to divest itself of all such illusions. America
will be great to the extent to which she points the way
and gives the practical demonstration of a better life for
the masses of her people and of a better international
order as between her constituent parts. Unless she can
make that demonstration, she will be recreant to her
trust. To the extent, however, to which she meets the
manifest requirements of the situation, she will not only
be serving herself, but she will save society from the
menace which now confronts it. This is the true mean-
ing of "America first"; the true interpretation of a slogan
divested of its narrow, selfish, and sordid meaning, and
made the servitor of mankind.

LEO S. ROWE.

The Far East as a Factor in
International Developments

THE FAR EAST AS A FACTOR IN INTER-
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

CHINA BEFORE CONTACT WITH WESTERN CIVILIZATION

The great central factor in the Far Eastern situation
is China. Not only is her own established civilization in
itself of the highest importance, but the temper, aims and
policies of this vast population will deeply affect the
future development of human history.

China has but recently come into relationship with
the rest of the world, and particularly with the western
nations. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century she
was a world by herself; the extent of her territories,
the abundance of her resources and the completeness of
her economic life made her self sufficing. She had re-
tained a high pride in her civilization from the ages when
the nations of the west were still barbarian. This tra-
dition of superiority was preserved in Chinese thought
and expressed itself in action, negatively through a re-
fusal to have anything to do with outside nations. The
Chinese constituted a great autonomous society to whom
the outside world was indifferent. It was a society in
which social and economic activities were all important
and which cared and knew little about political action in
the sense in which it was developed in the Western World.

When the merchant adventurers from the West first
forced their attentions upon the Chinese they were treated
merely as a local disturbance. Their presence and their
activities did not make any impression on the Chinese
people as a whole. Even when the merchants were fol-
lowed by diplomatic agents, these too were looked upon
not as the representatives of communities equal to the
Chinese in importance, but as interlopers to be given as
little as possible scope in Chinese affairs. It was entirely

219

220 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

for the reason that a nation of political action and po-
litical organization, as it had developed in the West, was
not understood by the Chinese that they were ready to
commit themselves to so many undertakings that turned
out to be highly disadvantageous to' them. The foreign
representatives were regarded as troublesome individuals,
disregardful of the social consideration customary among
the Chinese, given to< making threats of brutal force.
The Chinese negotiators, having in the past always ar-
ranged affairs by temporary compromises, which was
not dangerous as long as the affairs were merely local,
applied the same tactics to international negotiations,
with the result that they gradually committed their gov-
ernment to very onerous obligations.

A dim but intense consciousness among the Chinese
people that their country was being manacled led to the
outbreaks of 1900. This popular movement of protest was
indeed originally directed against the Manchus as much
as against the foreigners, but it soon was gone partly
through the manipulations of the court and its anti-foreign
character. The result was the establishment of co-opera-
tion among all the foreign powers interested in China
for the defense of the rights acquired in the past decades.
This solidarity naturally tended to fix permanently upon
China all the privileges which had been gained by any one
of the foreign nations. They claimed them! all for their
own nationals. The more liberal powers were desirous
of making concessions to China and strengthening her
government and preserving her independence, but were
confronted by the refusal O'f other powers to give up
any of the rights acquired. Thus, it worked out that in
any controversy the determining influence lay with the
power determined to make no concessions.

PRESENT DAY CHINA

Not only on account of her size and continental posi-
tion, but also because of the age and quality of her

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 221

civilization and its predominating influence in the life of
the Far East, China is the essential factor in the Far
Eastern situation. Through persistent reports of revolu-
tions and other internal trouble, the outside world -is apt
to receive the impression that China approaches a state
of confusion and anarchy, such as visited Mexico in the
worst days. Yet such is not the case, and the situation
is essentially different. China is just at present subject
to the devastations of a great natural catastrophe holding
the danger of famine and death of millions; yet aside from
this natural disaster, her social and economic life is
sound. The political troubles which we hear so much
about are on the surface. They are squabbles between
politicians and military commanders which do not reach
deep into the life of the people. The normal activities
of life, in agriculture, industry and commerce, go on un-
interruptedly, and no matter how weak the government
may be at times, the social system is strong and sound.
In fact, there is today no nation in the world where
fundamental social conditions are so stable.

China has at all times been non-political. In her life
such impersonal, abstract ideas as sovereignty, legality,
corporate existence, have not played any important part.
The relationship of Chinese society have all been concrete
and personal. Men have been found with a personal tie
to their fathers and brothers, their wives and children,
their clansmen, their teachers and the officials, in an
ascending order. There was never developed a strong
central administration. The union of the country was
one of traditions and culture, particularly literary and
philosophical rather than of legal institutions. Politi-
cally considered, it was, and still is, a loose federation of
provinces, in which the localities manage their own affairs,
and in which the popular loyalties are nearly all attached
to local, personal and visible entities.

The tradition from this system of strong personal re-
lationship to the impersonal ideas which underlie the
Western system of law, representative government and

222 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

corporate action, involves very radical changes. Never in
history before has any nation been confronted with a
problem so complex. It is because the old civilization
was so permanent, so great, and so strong, that the
change to new methods is so difficult.

The youth of China is at present animated with the
desire to build up a strong national system, utilizing the
methods of the West. The national movement, which
was organized in 1919 by students and merchants, seeks
to make the ideal of national cohesion a reality. In the
past, the great strength of the Chinese people has lain
in the management by each local community of its own
affairs, and the enormous power of tacit resistance to any
unwelcome changes or demands from' above or from
without. In China it has been practically impossible to
put through a change which the people did not accept;
but the people were not organized for positive action
through public opinion or through representative insti-
tutions. For the first time in Chinese history the attempt
is now being made to organize a positive expression of
the popular will. The actual power of government in the
larger units is in the hands of the military governors of
provinces. There is a struggle between this authority,
resting on corruption and force, and the inherited and
newly-developed desires for self-government.

China has a pacific, ethical civilization; that is, a civi-
lization which rests not on an appeal to authority based
on force, but on a universal sense of equity which ex-
presses itself constantly in popular action, without re-
course to formal tribunals. The critical question of
today is, can this ethical content of Chinese civilization
be preserved while national action is strengthened
through the adoption of efficient methods developed in
the West; or will the people of China be driven into mili-
tarism by outside aggression, and through the manipula-
tions of the satellites and instruments of an outside
militarist power? To the outcome of this great crisis
America cannot be indifferent. The temper of the great

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 223

continental nation of Asia and the character of its policy,
are of the utmost moment to us. Fortunately, after a
relationship with China extending over one hundred and
forty years, America enjoys the good will and confidence
of the Chinese in the highest measure. The problem of
China is not merely one of concessions and spheres of
influence, but one of the essential interests of civilization.
If the just and peaceable traditions of Chinese civiliza-
tion can be preserved in Asia, world peace will rest on a
more secure foundation than the ingenuity of statesmen
could contrive.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN DURING AND
AFTER THE WORLD WAR

During the Great War the neighbor of China, the
Japanese Empire, utilized every opportunity to strengthen
her position and interests in China. Immediately after
the outbreak of the war the German leasehold at Tsingtau,
with a railway extending into the interior, was seized
by Japan, with the initial declaration that these con-
cessions would be eventually returned to China. In
January, 1915, the Japanese Government caused a list
of twenty-one demands to be secretly presented to the
President of China. The demands included both conces-
sions of special right in certain localities and, in the
fifth group, general rights of participation in the exercise
of sovereign powers in China. The demands were finally
enforced in May, 1917, through an ultimatum threaten-
ing the use of force, with the exception of the fifth group
which was postponed for future action.

When the United States broke off diplomatic relations
with Germany the Chinese Government, in February,
1917, decided to follow the same policy. There were no
demands, promises or urgent representations, there was
no haggling about advantages to be obtained. After a
brief but careful consideration of the proposal of the
United States, it was accepted by the free act of the

224 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Chinese Government. At the very time when the Chinese
were making this decision, the Japanese Government ap-
proached the governments of Russia, Great Britain and
France with the suggestion that it would use its in-
fluence to bring China to the side of the Allies, on con-
dition that the German rights in Shantung were assured
to Japan. China broke off relations with Germany in
February, 1917, and declared war in August, 1917. The
Chinese Government was ready to send large bodies of
troops to Europe, but the transportation difficulties at the
time prevented such movements. Had the was lasted
longer, China would undoubtedly have become an im-
portant source of men and supplies.

After the armistice the Chinese nation entertained the
confident expectation that the German rights in Shantung
would not be given to any other power, but would revert
to China in accordance with equity and the accepted princi-
ples of international law, China being ready to indemnify
Japan for all her expenses. But the peace conference
awarded the ex-German rights to- Japan. China did not
agree to this transfer and it is therefore not legally valid,
as, by the operation of international law, the Shantung
rights had reverted to China when she declared war on
Germany in August, 1917. The secret agreements made
by certain Chinese officials with Japan, to the contrary
effect, were not recognized by the Chinese nation, as hav-
ing been made without the consent of a national repre-
sentative body.

Japan being in military possession of Tsingtau and the
railway, wanted to consider the award of the Paris peace
conference as completing her title. The Japanese Gov-
ernment made a formal offer to- negotiate with China
for the return of the German leasehold. The Chinese
Government has declined to enter into such negotiations,
because to do so would be admitting the right which
Japan claims and which China denies. Moreover, it was
understood that the Japanese Government intended to
offer the return of only the German leasehold, about one

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 225

hundred square miles of unimportant land; retaining the
highly valuable port of Tsingtau, with its steamship and
railway terminals, the railway to the capital of the
province, and the mining rights taken from the Germans.
As these are the really important factors through which
the commercial and political control of the whole province
can be effected, the Chinese people are not interested in
the proposal "to return the Shantung leasehold." The
language used has given the impression to many that
Japan had seized the entire province of Shantung, and
was generously offering to return it to China. Neither
Germany nor Japan, however, at any time had any right
to the province of Shantung, outside of the leasehold
of Tsingtau and the railway, with the adjoining mines.
Should Japan retain the railway, it was apprehended that
a situation would be created similar to that which obtains
in Manchuria.

CHINA, JAPAN, AND SIBERIA

The joint intervention of the Allied Powers in Siberia
in 1918 led to the occupation of parts of Eastern Si-
beria by Japanese troops, which still remain there though
the other allies have withdrawn their contingents.
While government is not strongly organized in Siberia,
yet the authority of the government of Chita being con-
stantly extended, and it gives promise of stability. In a
measure as its power grows, it demands more insistently
the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Russian soil.
While the Chinese Government has not established diplo-
matic relations with the Siberian Government, it has
found it necessary to make certain arrangements concern-
ing commerce passing the common boundary between
these two countries. The Siberian Government has ex-
pressed itself favorable to returning to China, concessions
made to the Czarist Government of Russia; but such
treaty revisions have of course not yet been taken up in
actual negotiations. There undoubtedly exists between

226 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the Chinese and the Russian people an instinctive sym-
pathy, which would be greatly strengthened and would
become a very important factor, were the promises to
China held out by the new governments in Russia to be
embodied in actual agreements.

International joint action in China is favored by the
creation of the financial Consortium, which has com-
pleted its organization and is now beginning to negotiate
with the Chinese Government for financial support to< be
given constructive public enterprises in China, such as
the building of roads, railways, harbors and canals. It
is recognized that the prime need of China lies in the
direction o<f better means of communication. Meanwhile,
both locally and through the Central Government, the
Chinese are beginning with their own means and in co-
operation with foreign capital, to execute comprehensive
improvements of this kind.

PAUL S. REINSCH.

The United States as a Factor in the

Development of International

Relations

THE UNITED STATES AS A FACTOR IN THE

DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

I.

THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

It is probably no exaggeration to say that no single
event in modern history has exerted a greater influence
upon the development of international relations than the
advent in 1776 of the United States of America into the
family of nations. That event was epoch-making not
only because it marked the birth of a new world power,
but because the principles of thought and action upon
which our existence as an independent nation was justi-
fied created a new departure in theories of government.
History has been described as the philosophy of hind-
sight. Reviewed in the light of the facts which gave rise
to the American Revolution and which dictated the
course of our subsequent career, no people will be found
to have adhered more closely to a consistent principle of
conduct both in domestic and foreign affairs than the
people of the United States.

To evaluate the factors which fashioned the popular
mind in 1776, and led to the principles enunciated in
the Declaration of Independence and subsequent expres-
sions of national policy, it is necessary to take into
account the origin and circumstances of colonial life in
America. Groups of sturdy pioneers had hewed out of
the wilderness the materials of civilized life in the face
of dangers unknown to the inhabitants of European com-
munities. The distance from the home-land, the democ-
racy naturally created by subjection to common problems
and dangers, the self-reliance and individualism induced

229

230 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

by the very nature of their effort, aroused in the colonists
a craving for freedom and independence. There was
born in them a devotion to self-government which a
sagacious mother country, under what Burke called a
policy of "wise and salutary neglect," had not sought
unduly to hamper. But such measure of local political
freedom as the colonists enjoyed made the more intoler-
able the system of commercial colonial monopoly which
restricted their trade almost entirely to Great Britain,
in ships of that country. The feeling of dissatisfaction
aroused found nourishment and justification in the philos-
ophy of the French disciples of the doctrine of natural
rights, with its opposition to governmental and ecclesi-
astical oppression. With this philosophy of freedom
from imposed control, which permeates the Declaration
of Independence, the moral justification for political,
commercial and intellectual emancipation had been found.
Moreover, the colonists had been parties to practically
every European war of the eighteenth century, of which
they were on occasion the unwitting cause and usually
the unwilling victims.

Bearing these facts in mind, it is readily apparent
that the American Revolution was a protest in the name
of liberty against that political, commercial and intel-
lectual bondage which was then identified with the
European systems of government. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the fundamental and dominant principle
of our domestic and foreign policy has been emancipation
from European political systems.

It requires but slight acquaintance with history to
recognize that national self-interest is the primary source
of any national policy. Of its various manifestations,
the instinct of self-preservation or security is the most
insistent. The measures for safe-guarding this funda-
mental interest are likely to be dictated principally by
physical conditions, notably geographical position. For-
eign policy, controlled by such rigorous and unchanging

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 231

conditions, is often likely to become intuitive, and in
proportion to its success, more or less permanent. Noth-
ing is, therefore, more natural than that the United
States, with its distance from Europe and its deep-seated
aversion to the European political system, should have
adopted a policy of diplomatic isolation or reciprocal non-
intervention.

The very success of our consolidation as a nation on
this continent and the continuity of our growth in power
and wealth without departure from that policy is a stand-
ing challenge to those who would, on the provocation of
what seems to them a divine inspiration, and a vision of
new necessities, subvert perhaps the most fundamental
principle of our national existence.

Consistent as our foreign policy has been down to
recent years, it has not been doctrinaire. The complete
sacrifice of expediency for principle has never been a
dominant characteristic of the American mind; so that
an occasional variant from the constant should not un-
duly mislead the investigator. Bismarck once made the
observation that "International policy is a fluid element
•which under certain conditions mil solidify, but on a
change of atmosphere reverts to its original diffuse con-
dition/' Doubtless the results of our last election will
be interpreted by the historian of our foreign policy as
a return to the constant from an attempted excursion
into the variant.

Our policy of diplomatic isolation, or non-intervention
in European affairs, is sometimes believed to have first
received formal expression in Washington's Farewell
Address, a profoundly wise legacy of constitutional pro-
portions for the guidance of the American people. But
as a matter of fact, in September, 1776, soon after the
Declaration of Independence and curiously, at the very
time the proposed and greatly needed treaty of alliance
with France, a variant from the constant, was under dis-
cussion, John Adams said:

232 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

"Our negotiations with France ought to be conducted
with great caution, and with all the foresight we could
possibly obtain ; ... we ought not to enter into any
alliance with her which should entangle us in any
future wars in Europe; we ought to lay it down as a
first principle and a maxim never to be forgotten, to
maintain an entire neutrality in all future European
wars." . . .

Yet Benjamin Franklin negotiated and signed, Febru-
ary 6, 1778, a treaty of commerce and a treaty of alliance
with France. The fact that France sought therein to
avenge her defeats by Great Britain in the Seven Years'
War does not detract from the fact that the alliance paved
the way for the success of the American cause, nor from
our indebtedness to France, consequent thereon.

Yet the very obligations sought to be imposed on us
by that treaty led, in 1793, to a reiteration, in an epoch-
making proclamation of neutrality, of our principle of
aloofness from European wars, furnished the motives for
Washington's Farewell Address, and finally caused that
limited war with France from 1798 to 1800 which gave
rise to the French Spoliation Claims. A proffered treaty
of alliance with Spain, in which we undertook to attack
Portugal and offered various concessions in return for
political aid, but indicates, by countenancing so serious
a departure from principle, how great was the need of
the struggling colonists. The flexibility of the policy
was again demonstrated by the readiness with which the
United States undertook to adhere to the Armed Neu-
trality of 1780, proposed by Catherine of Russia.

These variants each had special motives; but nothing
better demonstrates the inherently fundamental nature of
our policy than the prompt return to it after momentary
occasion for departure has passed.

On June 12, 1783, Congress passed a Resolution which
reads in part:

"The true interest of the States requires that they

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 233

should 'be as little as possible entangled in the politics and
controversies of European nations."

The consistency of our foreign policy is exemplified by
our application of what is known as the principle of
''non-intervention," which has been deemed basic in our
foreign relations. John Hay once said : 'The principles
which have guided us have been of limpid simplicity."

In explaining the principle of non-intervention and its
natural corollaries I cannot do better than quote from the
masterly work of John Bassett Moore on "The Principles
of American Diplomacy."

"The principle of "non-intervention," says Mr.
Moore, "was used in a two-fold sense. It embraced,
in the first place, non-interference in the internal affairs
of other nations. In this sense, while betokening the
revolutionary origin of the government of the United
States, it was also intended reciprocally to concede to
other nations the right to determine their form of gov-
ernment and otherwise to manage their domestic con-
cerns, each for itself in its own way. In the second
place, it embraced non-participation in the political ar-
rangements between other governments, and above all
strict abstention from any part in the political arrange-
ments of Europe.

"Of the principle of non-intervention the system of
neutrality was a logical derivative, as was also the
recognition of governments as existing entities, and not
as legitimate, or as lawful or unlawful, under the local
constitution. The Monroe Doctrine itself was but the
correlative of the principle of non-participation in
European affairs. 'Our first and fundamental maxim,'
said Jefferson, 'should be never to entangle ourselves in
the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer
Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.' By
preserving these principles it was believed that the
United States would best contribute to the preservation
of peace, abroad as well as at home, and to the spread
of liberty throughout the world."

The subsidiary principles of neutrality, the recognition
of new states and the Monroe Doctrine will be discussed
hereafter.

234 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

II.

NATURE OF EARLY AMERICAN POLICY

It is probably a fact that the necessities of a united
front in foreign relations, as exemplified, for example,
in the Treaty of 1783 and the need for its enforcement,
exerted as much influence as any other single factor in
compelling that union of interests and charter of common
action among the states of the Confederation which is
now embodied in the Constitution of the United States.
Foreign relations and domestic affairs have always been
interdependent, and it is no accident that the great names
of the founders of the country are identified as much
with foreign as with domestic affairs.

The cornerstone of American foreign policy is com-
monly believed to have been laid in Washington's Fare-
well Address, although, as we have just observed, the
principles of that policy were enunciated and acted upon
years before that celebrated utterance. The salient para.-
graphs of the Address, which in the light of present
events, seem prophetic, are these :

"The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to for-
eign nations is, in extending our commercial relations,
to have with them as little political connection as pos-
sible. So far as we have already formed engagements
(he refers to the treaty with France) let them be ful-
filled in perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us
have none or a very remote relation. Hence, she must
be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of
which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves
by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her
politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of
her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant
situation invites and enables us to pursue a different
course. . . Why forego the advantages of so peculiar
a situation ? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign
ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 235

of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and pros-
perity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, in-
terest, humor, or caprice?"

While this state paper clearly indicates the American
aversion to implication in the alliances and artificial ties,
the balances of power and kindred paraphernalia of
European political systems, Washington had no illusions
that "extraordinary emergencies" might not implicate us,
and for these he thought "temporary alliances" would
suffice. It will be noted that the extension of commercial
relations was definitely encouraged. If my judgment is
correct, that the so-called "League of Nations" created
at Versailles is in essence little more than a disguised
alliance to maintain the balance or preponderance of
power, in the time-honored fashion of European politics,
then Washington's advice, the soundness of which is but
confirmed by the practice of more than a century, clearly
points the direction of the duty of the American people.

III.

MONROE DOCTRINE

Washington's pronouncement of the principle of non-
intervention in European politics, foreshadowed its cele-
brated correlative of a generation later, the Monroe Doc-
trine. Only in the light of the background portrayed
above, can the Monroe Doctrine, perhaps the most
notable enunciation of American principles of foreign
policy, be either understood or appreciated. Its impor-
tance for us in determining the influence of the United
States on international relations and the various mean-
ings ascribed to it as a justification for diplomatic positions
assumed on occasion by this country warrant a somewhat
detailed examination of its origin and present scope.

When the dissensions in Spain foreshadowed a pos-
sible dissolution of the Spanish Empire, and even prior
to the revolt of the Spanish colonies on the American

236 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

continent, a natural apprehension prevailed in the United
States that the colonies might be coveted by the rival
empires, the French or the British. Particularly was this
fear directed toward the fate of Cuba and Mexico, in
closest proximity. In 1808, Thomas Jefferson, then
President, the merits of whose practical statesmanship
and liberal philosophy the passing of time has but en-
hanced, wrote to the governor of the Territory of
Orleans :

"We shall be satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico re-
main in their present dependence; but very unwilling
to see them in that of either France or England,
politically or commercially. We consider their interests
and ours as the same, and the object of both must be to
exclude all European influence from this hemisphere."
In 1820, when the independence of the Latin American
colonies had been substantially achieved, Jefferson spoke
of "the advantages of a cordial fraternization among all
the American nations, and the importance of their co-
alescing in an American system of policy totally inde-
pendent of and unconnected with that of Europe"

The occasion of the Monroe Doctrine was the threat
of the Holy Alliance to assist Spain to recover her Amer-
ican colonies, and the effort of Russia to extend her
northwestern boundary in America. The Holy Alliance,
formed by Russia, Prussia and Austria to express in
solemn chastizement, under the name of the "League of
Peace" the horror of God and King against such blas-
phemies upon law and order as the French Revolution
and any other revolution, had commissioned France,
which had adhered to the Alliance, to restore the Spanish
crown to Ferdinand, from which the people of Spain
had but lately relieved him. Canning, the British Sec-
retary of State for Foreign Affairs, having been notified
by France that her successful mission in Spain had in-
duced her to consider obedience to the call of duty by
proceeding to restore the Spanish crown in America,
and realizing that the restoration of Spanish authority or

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 237

the substitution of France would, by renewal of the then
customary colonial trade and navigation monopoly, seri-
ously injure the growing commerce of England with
the new Spanish-American states, approached Richard
Rush, American Minister in London, as to the possibili-
ties of a joint declaration by the two nations against the
intervention of the Allies in Spanish America. Reputable
historians have stated that, aside from the fear of French
aggrandizement and the loss of British trade, another
dominant motive with Canning was the realization that
the opening of hostilities between the Allies and the South
American states would cause a declaration of commercial
non-intercourse between those states and Europe, which
would but redound to the advantage of the United States.
The British Cabinet had, in fact, already decided that
they would not permit France to engage in the heroic
yet not altogether disinterested mission she contemplated ;
but hoped that British action to that end might become
unnecessary by the United States and Great Britain as-
suming an identical position discouraging French plans.
The United States had already recognized the inde-
pendence of most of the Spanish-American states, when
Mr. Rush's correspondence with Canning and his request
for instructions reached the United States, in the fall
of 1823. A profound impression was created. Never
was a declaration of policy more deliberately formulated,
nor better counsel sought. The correspondence was sent
by President Monroe to Jefferson and Madison for an
expression of their judgment, and John Quincy Adams,
then Secretary of State, submitted it to other leading
public men of the country. It was on this occasion that
Jefferson made his famous statement that while inde-
pendence made us a nation, this proposed declaration
"sets our compass and points the course which we are to
steer through the ocean of time opening on us. Our first
fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle our-
selves in the broils of Europe; and our second, never to

238 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

suffer Europe to intermeddle in cis- Atlantic affairs/' Jef-
ferson, Madison and Monroe, feeling that the declara-
tion sought confirmed these aims, were in favor of mak-
ing the joint proclamation suggested by Canning.
Adams, however, opposed it. He entertained a suspicion
that England's request for a joint pledge that "we could
not see any portion of (the former Spanish colonies)
transferred to any -other power (than Spain) with in-
difference," was directed equally as much against the
interference of the United States as against that of the
Holy Alliance. In his Memoirs, Adams says : "By join-
ing with her, therefore, in her proposed declaration, we
give her a substantial and perhaps inconvenient pledge
against ourselves, and really obtain nothing in return."
The formal answer to Canning's suggestion and to the
plan of the Holy Alliance, which also served notice on
Russia, was contained in President Monroe's Message to
Congress of December 2, 1823. The policy then an-
nounced, which has come to be known as the Monroe
Doctrine, was substantially formulated by Adams. Its
principal sections read as follows :

"The occasion has been judged proper for asserting
as a principle in which the rights and interests of the
United States are involved, that the American conti-
nents, by the free and independent condition which they
have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be
considered as subjects for future colonization by any
European Powers. . . The citizens of the United
States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor
of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that
side of the Atlantic. In the war of the European
Powers in matters relating to themselves we have
never taken any part, nor does it comport with our
policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded
or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make
preparation for our defence. . . The political system
of the allied powers is essentially different in this re-
spect from that of America. . . And to the defence
of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 239

much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom
of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we
have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation
is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to
the amicable relations existing between the United
States and those Powers, to declare that we should con-
sider any attempt on their part to extend their system
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
peace and safety.

"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any
European power we have not interfered and shall not
interfere. But with the governments who have de-
clared their independence and maintained it, and whose
independence we have, on great consideration and just
principles, acknowledged, we could not view any inter-
position for the purpose of oppressing them, or con-
trolling in any other manner their destiny, by any
European power, in any other light than as the manifes-
tation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United
States. . .

"Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted
at an early state of the wars which have so long agitated
that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the
same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns
of any of its Powers; to consider the government de
facto as the legitimate government for us ; to cultivate
friendly relations with it, and to preserve those rela-
tions by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all
instances, the just claims of every Power, submitting
to injuries from none. But in regard to these conti-
nents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously
different. It is impossible that the allied Powers should
extend their political system to any portion of either
continent without endangering our peace and happi-
ness. . . It is equally impossible, therefore, that we
should behold such interposition, in any form, with
indifference."

The declaration made a deep impression throughout
the civilized world. In Latin-America it was hailed as a
guaranty of independence and of a republican form of
government. In Europe, it served to terminate the re-

240 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

actionary activities of the Holy Alliance and stimulated
the growing movement for political liberty and constitu-
tional government.

The doctrine was by no means an altruistic statement
of principle. Although expressing high moral tenets ol
liberal thought, it is inspired essentially by the motive of
self-preservation and rests upon self-interest. That in-
terest was deemed to be threatened by any further colo-
nization of European powers on this continent or the con-
trol or acquisition by them of any additional American
territory. Canning, although he had invited it, pro-
nounced the Doctrine "very extraordinary" and reserved
Great Britain's full privilege to colonize any unappro-
priated portions of America. Curiously, although the
Doctrine, as a unilateral declaration of policy and notice
to the world that certain acts done by foreign countries
outside the borders of the United States would be deemed
an affront by us, could probably not, until recent years,
have been maintained without the support of Great Brit-
ain, it has been most frequently challenged by that very
power.

IV.

INTERPRETATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

It will have been observed that the Monroe Doctrine
sums up and reiterates in striking language the cardinal
principles of American foreign policy — non-intervention,
neutrality, recognition. Non-intervention, based on the
separation of the two hemispheres, was to be reciprocal.
Our neutrality in European quarrels was to be preserved.
Recognition was to depend upon an objective standard,
the de facto nature of the government in power.

With existing possessions of European countries in
America the Doctrine was not designed to interfere. But
the extension of their "political system'' to America was
inhibited. It has been asserted that with the termination
of absolute monarchy in Europe, the form of government

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 241

of the members of the Holy Alliance, the raison d'etre
of the Monroe Doctrine has been lost. But this is hardly
true. It is directed not merely against particular ob-
noxious forms of government, but against the European
political system, by which was meant the groupings, asso-
ciations and collective policy of European governments.
Any effort to bring an American nation within the sphere
of those groupings and thereby exercise European politi-
cal influence in the Americas in new areas would doubt-
less be deemed an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine.
The League of Nations has not yet seriously raised that
question; but its attempted intercession between Costa
Rica and Panama in their present dispute aroused some
resentment in the United States.

Under an accepted definition of the Doctrine, first
pronounced by President Polk in 1848 in relation to
Yucatan, a Latin-American state could not even with
its own consent come under the domination of a Euro-
pean power. This went much beyond the declaration of
Monroe, who expressly asserted the privilege of American
states, whose independence had been acknowledged, to
dispose of themselves as they saw fit. In 1870, after
San Domingo had invited and then rejected control by
Spain, President Grant declared: "No European power
can acquire by any means — war, colonization, or annexa-
tion— even when the annexed people demands it, any
portion of American territory."

Even in uninhabited territories, non-American control
in effect is inhibited. Clay, Van Buren, Webster, Polk
and Grant contested the power of any European country
to transfer any of its American possessions to another
European power; the exceptional transfer of the Island
of St. Barthelemy by Sweden to France in 1877 hardly
impairs the rigorous application of this rule. President
Grant in his Annual Message of 1870 anticipated the
complete withdrawal of European countries from Amer-
ica. He said: "The time is not probably far distant

242 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

when, in the natural course of events, the European
political connection with this continent will cease," and
his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, remarked, in an
accompanying report, that the policy announced by Mon-
roe "looks hopefully to the time when, by the voluntary
departure of European governments from this continent
and the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly
American."

The exuberance' of expression which is occasionally
excited in the American by the uninterrupted and suc-
cessful exercise of power is not better illustrated than
by the bold statement of Secretary of State Olney,
usually considered a quite conservative man, at the time
of the Venezuelan boundary controversy with Great
Britain. He then said : "Today the United States is
practically sovereign on this continent and its Hat is law
on this continent upon the subjects to which it confines
its interposition." John Bassett Moore, in commenting
upon this expansive assertion, says :

"Surely it must be admitted that no declaration more
imperialistic was ever made by an American statesman ;
nor is its imperialistic lustre dimmed by the explanation,
which Mr. Olney proceeds to make, that this paramount
position of the United States on the American continent
is due not simply to its high character, or to the fact
that wisdom and justice and equity are its invariable
characteristics, but also to the circumstance that its
infinite resources combined with its isolated position
render it master of the situation and practically invul-
nerable as against any or all other powers ! Inciden-
tally, it was this Venezuelan issue which persuaded
Admiral Mahan to say that he had changed his mind
concerning the inconceivability of war with Great
Britain."

A more recent extension of the Monroe Doctrine was
undertaken by President Roosevelt in 1907 in assuming
control of Santo Domingo when foreign powers were
pressing for payment of their claims and threatening the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 243

seizure of custom houses. The United States, by treaty,
under what Roosevelt considered the responsibilities of
the Monroe Doctrine, assumed fiscal administration of
Santo Domingo and has since extended, for somewhat
the same causes, an even greater degree of control over
Haiti. Indeed, Santo Domingo itself has since come
under police and fiscal control. The United States now
exercises a quasi-protectorate over Nicargua and Pan-
ama. We own Porto Rico and some other islands. In
Cuba and several other of the above mentioned states
supervision of their debt limits and the reserved privilege
of intervention for the maintenance of civil government
serve to extend American control over a considerable
portion of the Caribbean. But it can, I think, be fairly
asserted that, aside from occasional unauthorized trans-
gressions of resident officials, who thereby do this coun-
try grave harm, we have not abused our position in the
Caribbean countries, and our imperialism, if such it be,
has not been of an unduly exploiting type. Whatever
reserved control we exercise, the largest possible measure
of self government should accompany these administra-
tions.

Our expansion southward has given rise to some fears
on the part of Latin-American countries of an all-ab-
sorbing appetite of the United States for additional ter-
ritory. It has brought forth bitter criticisms of our
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, under which,
while insisting upon European abstention from any con-
trol in the Latin-American states, we decline to consider
the Doctrine as a self-denying ordinance upon ourselves.
The only answer to this criticism is that the United
States has not exhibited in recent years any serious in-
tention permanently to acquire additional territory in
Latin America, and that, in view of our preponderance
of power, the Cuban enterprise manifests a certain na-
tional self-restraint. Intervention in Mexico would
probably be unpopular among the American people, and

244 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

if accompanied by any territorial accessions, might be
considered by most nations as a moral stultification of
our professions in the recent war. Only the moderation
and general acceptability of our conduct will obtain
acquiescence in our enterprise from foreign countries,
and "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind" will
be found ultimately as essential to nations as to in-
dividuals.

V

FOREIGN VIEWS ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE

It may be asked how such a frankly egotistical and
occasionally arrogant assertion of policy as the Monroe
Doctrine has received acceptance by the world. Bis-
marck called it an "international impertinence." Euro-
pean writers and statesmen have never tired of denying
that it is a principle of international law. I do not be-
lieve the United States has made this claim. But without
taking such a position it must not be overlooked that
the assertion of jurisdiction and long-continued acquies-
cence therein by others is known to establish a good title
both in private and public law. Contrary to President
Wilson's recent statement that the acceptance of the Mon-
roe Doctrine as a "regional understanding," whatever
that may mean, constitutes the first recognition by
Europe of the Monroe Doctrine, it may be said that in
1903 the Duke of Devonshire declared, "Great Britain
accepts the Monroe Doctrine unreservedly'' and that is
probably the official view, in deed if not in word, of all
the European countries.

Ultimately, of course, its validity rests upon our might
and power to enforce it. But that is not its only justifi-
cation; it is an expression of one of the most elemental
conditions and principles of international relations, the
balance of power. Few persons realize the pervasiveness
of this principle in human relations, for it operates with
as unerring a precision, though sometimes only vaguely

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 245

perceptible, as a law of nature. In Europe, with its com-
pact groups of enemy nations, the balance of power,
rooted in the sense of insecurity, seemed to present the
only hope of occasional periods of peace. In the division
of our free and slave states before the Civil War, we
acknowledged, unconsciously perhaps, the operation of
the principle. The Monroe Doctrine expressed an Amer-
ican balance against Europe, in the maintenance of an
international equilibrium. Should Asia become power-
ful, it may require revision. Its maintenance has doubt-
less been aided by European quarrels — it was this which
enabled Seward to spoil Maximilian's Mexican adven-
ture in 1866 — and by the fact that an American enter-
prise could hardly have been risked by a European power
in the face of the delicate position of European relations
in the nineteenth century.

Our acquisition of the Philippines has been said to
weaken the Doctrine, but, after all, that assumption rests
upon the acquiescence of the United States. However,
much that enterprise may have trangressed Washington's
precept and whatever consequences it may still have, the
Monroe Doctrine is flexible enough to accommodate
slight variants, even if we admit this to be one. The
Lodge Resolution of 1912, though not approved by
President Taft, which looked to inhibiting the acquisi-
tion by any foreign power of any harbor or place on the
American continent that might threaten the safety of the
United States — Japan was then primarily intended — is
an expression not necessarily of the Monroe Doctrine,
but as Senator Lodge said, of the fundamental principle
of self-preservation upon which that Doctrine rests. Ex-
perience has established, that the Monroe Doctrine does
not estop us from participating in the affairs of Asia,
although it seems equally clear that it is deemed by us
efficacious to keep any control by Asiatic powers out of
America.

The lesson to be drawn from this portrayal of the ex-

246 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

pansive capacity of the Monroe Doctrine is that a certain
tolerance in international relations is necessary. It is
one of the most elementary of human weaknesses to
identify your own cause and interest with the principles
of right and justice, and to believe that your own motives
are higher and purer than those of others. Probably
nothing has caused more distress and suffering than the
reciprocal action of nations upon these assumptions. For
although it seems 'axiomatic that no one can fairly be
party and judge at the same time, the international legal
system is so constituted that it authorizes each nation
to be the judge of its own cause and to act upon its own
conclusions in its own way. International law then
legalizes the physical consequences.

The same growth in power and function that we have
seen in the Monroe Doctrine is evidenced in the attitude
of the United States toward an interoceanic canal in Cen-
tral America. When Senator Clayton — upon whose
ineptitude as Secretary of State in signing the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty of 1850 Stephen Douglas partly built his
reputation as an orator — declared in the Senate that the
United States had no power to build a canal outside the
United States, he was not contradicted. Yet after the
Civil War, which galvanized the power of the central
government into an effectiveness then undreamed of, few
people questioned the propriety of an American-built
canal under exclusive American control. When finally
President Roosevelt collaborated in the establishment of
the Republic of Panama, acquiring in partial compensa-
tion a strip of territory for canal purposes, the act was
acclaimed as a providential recognition of the mission
and destiny of the American people. A treaty with Co-
lombia, now pending, is designed to assuage injured
feelings.

To those who believe that the mission of the United
States is guided by Providence the rapid expansion of our
territory would seem to lend some support. In any

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 247

event, the acquisition of new territories seemed soon to
he accepted as the natural order of things, for it catered
to and nourished that sentiment of nationality which in
each decade had been growing stronger. Mr. Moore
says that "the acquisition of new territory had become a
habit with us." Indeed, had it not been for the slavery
question, it is probable that there would have been little
opposition to the Mexican War. Moral justifications are
rarely hard to find, and the doctrine of "natural fron-
tiers," so prevalent in Europe, has been no stranger to us.
But there is hardly any doubt that we owe to good
fortune much of our present territory, notably that which
we first acquired, and therein our influence on interna-
tional relations proved exceedingly profitable. We be-
came a nation just when two large colonial empires,
France and Spain, had by continual wars so weakened
themselves that the conservation of their resources re-
quired them to draw in their lines. Our successful war
against Great Britain had given us, besides a consider-
able territory, neighbors who were troublesome and at
best uncongenial. Every war in Europe was reflected
on our borders, and affected us. In the treaty of 1778
with France, Franklin had sagaciously stipulated against
the acquisition by France of any territory in North
America, except in the West Indies. To any other
British territory, we were to be the sole heirs. The
Mississippi controversy with Spain and frequent bound-
ary disputes made it seem desirable to acquire the
Louisiana territory. Spain had transferred this to
France in 1800; but the growing commitments of Na-
poleon in Europe made him as anxious to dispose of it
as we were to acquire it. In 1802, for a comparatively
small sum, we obtained sovereignty over an area now
covered in whole or in part by fourteen states of the
United States. About fifteen years later, Spain had
reached a position where she was willing to cede us all
that part of the Floridas which did not belong to Mexico.

248 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

In 1836, Texas declared her independence and in 1845
was annexed. Then came the war with Mexico and the
acquisition of California and New Mexico, and the Gads-
den Purchase. "Fifty-four degrees forty minutes or
fight" ultimately gave us a northwestern boundary at
49 degrees without a fight. Finally, Alaska, Hawaii,
Porto Rico, and the Philippines — whose acquisition was
not premeditated — and numerous islands in the West
Indies and in other* parts of the globe, round out an em-
pire that widely exceeds anything the founders could
have dreamed of. The late Champ Clark's optimistic
prophecy that Canada would some day be a part of the
United States, although not original with him, made
Canada so shy that she disapproved the reciprocity agree-
ment of 1911.

The responsibilities of managing so vast an estate are
possibly greater than any advantages accruing there-
from. It is the outposts of empires that have often led to
collision with the conflicting interests of other nations.
One can only hope that the United States will so use its
power as to create universal confidence that it holds, not
a prize for national exploitation, but a trusted mandate
for the civilized world.

VI.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The Monroe Doctrine did not lead to close political
relations between the United States and the countries of
Latin America, for diverse reasons. Among these were
distance, insignificant trade, and difference in language,
origin and culture. They were far nearer to Europe in
all these respects than to the United States. Neverthe-
less, their independence had hardly been recognized be-
fore the effort was made to bring the states on the Amer-
ican continent into more intimate relations. In this
movement, Henry Clay was a dominant figure. The idea
of American solidarity probably originated with the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 249

great Venezuelan statesman, Bolivar, and his idea has
fructified into the vigorous movement now known as
Pan Americanism. Clay was actuated primarily by his
devotion to the cause of liberty and felt that since the
enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine the states on this
continent had a common destiny. He therefore urged
and obtained Congressional authority for the sending of
American delegates in 1826 to the Congress of Panama,
supplying them with elaborate instructions. But the
delegates arrived unhappily after the adjournment of the
Congress; a misfortune which seemed prophetic, for the
United States was unrepresented at each of the three
succeeding congresses held up to 1864. The reasons are
not hard to find. Slavery had been severely condemned
by the southern republics — though not abolished in the
then Empire of Brazil until 1888 — and the atmosphere
for a discussion of common interests seemed under such
circumstances likely to be unpropitious ; in addition, the
territorial advance of the United States into Mexico
created a growing feeling of hostility to this country,
by no means yet dissipated. But now, where it exists,
it rests rather on present apprehension. The unstable
conditions of many of these states, which under repub-
lican forms of constitution had enabled despotism to hold
occasional sway, had not tended to make the relations
more intimate.

Yet with the advent of the Civil War, and our realiza-
tion that no government is immune from revolution, had
come a more sympathetic view from both sides. The
unsuccessful termination of France's effort to control
Mexico in the sixties and of Spain to occupy the West
Coast, and the effective demonstration of the guaranty
of the Monroe Doctrine, served gradually to bring about
better relations. Secretary of State Blaine was an im-
portant factor in this effort, and while doubtless the
growth of commercial intercourse awakened a realization
of the need for more wholesome diplomatic relations, the

250 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

sentiment for solidarity did not alone depend on such
material basis. Better acquaintance made North Ameri-
cans realize the virtues of the Latin American culture, as
well as the fact that their more progressive countries
had reached a position to which an attitude of protection
was utterly inappropriate. Under Elaine's initiative the
first International American Conference convened in
Washington in 1889; it was succeeded by others at Mex-
ico in 1901, at Rio Janeiro in 1906, and at Buenos Aires
in 1910, and only the European War has prevented
others. The results achieved in the form of treaties of
arbitration, of naturalization, and on various commercial
subjects such as patents and trade-marks, have not been
negligible; but their primary result was to enable the
states on this continent to discuss matters of common in-
terest and establish the necessary contacts.

The financial difficulties occasioned by the outbreak
of the war caused the calling in 1915 of the First Pan-
American Financial Congress, and those occasioned by
its close, the calling of the second in 1920. The most
noteworthy event of the first congress was the establish-
ment of the International, now Inter-American High
Commission, which is conducting the most effective work
in the promotion of common interests. Already it has
obtained ratification for numerous treaties, providing for
the establishment of an international gold clearance fund ;
facilitation of the work of commercial travellers; the ar-
bitration of commercial disputes ; and for the mutual pro-
tection of patents and trade-marks. The movement to
strengthen the solidarity of interests, which the build-
ing of the Panama Canal has greatly enhanced, is certain
to grow ; and the dominance of the United States will be
gradually tempered, as it already is beginning to be, by
the growth in power of the major republics of the Pan-
American Union.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 251
VII.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE FAR EAST

In the Far East, the influence of the United States
promises to be portentous. Long before we had acquired
a single possession in the Pacific, American traders and
vessels had become numerous there. The fur trade with
Canton and the whaling industry proved lucrative. With
the outbreak of the Civil War, however, and with the
decline in the use of wooden ships for the fur trade and
in the supply of whales, a marked shrinkage occurred in
the Pacific enterprise of Americans. Yet the advantages
of Hawaii as a trading-post and stopping place had al-
ready brought that region within the range of American
interest, and, as early as 1842, the President of the United
States declared in a message to Congress that the United
States would oppose the seizure of the islands by any for-
eign power. The growth of American influence in the
islands, with the gradual diminution in the native popula-
tion, finally brought them under American sovereignty.
In Samoa we secured a coaling station in the seventies,
and later obtained a protectorate over parts of the islands,
shared until recently with Germany, and now with Great
Britain. By the treaty of peace with Spain we acquired
Guam in the Ladrones and the Philippines, and thereby
became an Asiatic Power. Until Dewey's victory at
Manila there was hardly an American who dreamed of
ever possessing the Philippines, but with a successful
people, so powerful are the urgings of "manifest destiny"
that the deliberation concerning their fate was not as to
whether we should "acquire" them, but as to whether we
should "give them up." That event changed our naval
policy, stimulated the desire for an American controlled
canal at Panama and accentuated our relations with
China and Japan into national problems of the first im-
portance. President Roosevelt, prophetically perhaps,

252 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

called this period of the world's history, "the Pacific Era"
(with a capital P).

In our relations with China we have followed a course
of open dealing without seeking territory or a sphere
of influence, in marked contrast to the imperialist policy
of European nations. From the time we forbade our
citizens to participate in the opium trade, we have been
looked upon with special favor in China. Although we
profited by the trading concessions wrung from the Chi-
nese rulers by the English and the French and joined
those countries diplomatically, our trade with China was
so insignificant that until the late eighties the American
consular and diplomatic officers were engaged principally
in the protection of missionaries. Until the outbreak of
the Chino- Japanese War in 1894, the American people
took very little interest in Chinese affairs, notwithstand-
ing the celebrated Burlingam Treaty. But the American
Minister in Peking was instrumental in bringing that
war to a close, and a former American Secretary of State
represented China in the peace negotiations. While we
participated in putting down the Boxer Rebellion, we had
not, in spite of our growing trade, acquired a single foot
of Chinese territory. It was the imminence of the break-
up, by partition among the European powers, of the Chi-
nese Empire, that induced the United States to take one
of its boldest steps in Asiatic diplomacy. Unable to pre-
vent and unwilling to participate in the proposed divi-
sion, Secretary of State Hay requested acceptance of the
principle of the "open door" in China. With Great Brit-
ain's support, no European nation was disposed to refuse
its assent, and the gesture has doubtless saved China
from the fate of other weak countries in sovereign con-
trol of coveted resources.

In a sense we have made ourselves the champions of
the "open door" policy, and any attack upon it seems to
be construed as an attack upon the United States. This
first became apparent when Russia and Japan, shortly

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 253

after the conclusion of their war, sought to acquire con-
trol over certain cities and railroads in Manchuria. The
protests of Secretaries Root and Knox against what they
considered an impairment of the integrity of China and
of the principle of the "open door" and equality of op-
portunity enunciated by Secretary Hay — notably Secre-
tary Knox's proposal for the neutralization of the Man-
churian railways — created some misgivings in Japan and
brought the first serious rift into what had until then
been the most friendly relations.

Subsequent large-scale enterprises in China, requiring
financial aid, were conducted on the principle of joint
participation by British, French, German, American, Jap-
anese, Russian and other bankers. A sudden aversion to
"dollar diplomacy" in 1913 induced the withdrawal of
the United States from the Six Power Loan to China,
President Wilson stating that there should be "no en-
tangling foreign alliance even in respect to arrangements
for supervising the financial compacts of weaker govern-
ments ... the responsibility of the United States
in the Six Power Group is obnoxious to the principles
upon which this government rests." But in 1918, Ameri-
can participation seems no longer to have been obnoxious
to those principles, for Mr. Wilson approved our joining
the Four-Power consortium, committing this govern-
ment to an extent unasked in 1913. The official an-
nouncement of the Department of State, published July
29, 1918, reads in part: "The American government
will be willing to aid in every way possible and to make
prompt and vigorous representations and to take every
possible step to ensure the execution of equitable con-
tracts made in good faith by its citizens in foreign lands."
It would not be easy to find a more complete reversal of
foreign policy than is embodied in the declaration just
quoted.

In contrast with the position of the United States in
China, where we followed the diplomacy of the leading

254 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

European powers, we led, through Commodore Perry's
notable enterprise in 1854, in opening Japan to the West-
ern World. The rise of Japan into a world power is
one of the romances of the drama of history. Adopting
with marvelous facility the inventions and commercial
system of the western world, engaging, like their western
instructors, in successful wars of expansion, the psychol-
ogy and resources of the island empire now strikingly
typify the "great "power." Learning much from the
United States and enjoying until recent years the friendly
interest of the American people, the growing commercial
intercourse between the two nations had served to pro-
duce, down to 1906, an almost complete identity of in-
terest. Apart from Japan's protest against the annexa-
tion of Hawaii, later withdrawn, and minor incidents of
only passing note, the relations between the two coun-
tries until the termination of the Russo-Japanese War,
in which President Roosevelt played so prominent a part,
could hardly have been improved upon. Even the ac-
quisition of the Philippines did not visibly cool these rela-
tions. But the pressure of a growing population and
the successful outcome of a war with one of the great
empires of the world brought changes. International re-
lations are dynamic, not static; one of the inherent de-
fects of the various plans for permanent peace recently
formulated is that they assume a static condition.

In 1906 the growing influx of Japanese subjects into
our western states created the first official signs of racial
hostility. The San Francisco School Board then made
a regulation which discriminated against Japanese at-
tending school. Japan felt the situation keenly and pro-
tested on the ground that the treaty was violated. Presi-
dent Roosevelt seemed inclined to agree with Japan, and
sent Secretary Metcalf to California to investigate; it
was soon established that the school discrimination was
a minor part of an organized anti-Japanese campaign.
Here again was an illustration of the awkward constitu-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255

tional position in which the federal government has fre-
quently been placed by its inability to compel unwilling
states to observe or enforce treaty obligations. Presi-
dent Roosevelt had to assume the position of a mediator
between California and Japan, and finally obtained a re-
scinding of the school ordinance in return for a federal
immigration restriction. To this the Japanese govern-
ment agreed, but the extension to Japanese of the Chi-
nese exclusion act they have sedulously opposed. A gen-
tleman's agreement by which Japan undertakes to keep
laborers from coming to the United States has worked
only moderately well. Two recent statutes of California,
in 1913 and in 1920, designed to bar Japanese from
any interest in land, have made acute a difficult racial
problem. In view of the depth of Japanese feeling
against the discrimination involved in the exclusion from
naturalization of Japanese subjects, whereas we admit to
citizenship Africans, Turks, Arabs and the members of
other nationalities considered by them inferior, and in
view of the general belief that the discriminatory legisla-
tion constitutes a violation of the treaty of 1911, the
moderation and self-restraint of the Japanese is to be
commended. They are skillful diplomatists. How the
new proposed treaty with Japan will deal with this ir-
ritating subject is, of course, still unknown.

But the real difficulty in our diplomatic relations, if
such it be, arises not in California, but in China. Japan's
growing population and the need for foreign markets
has caused her to penetrate Manchuria, and the twenty-
one demands on the Chinese government in 1915 indi-
cate a policy of establishing her hegemony in China.
This she has endeavored to insure, notwithstanding its
apparent violation of the "open door" principle, by ob-
taining agreements from the western powers in the nature
of estoppels. Why the United States ever signed such
a vague instrument as the Lansing-Ishii agreement,
which is more likely to create than to allay trouble, is not

256 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

yet known; doubtless war exigencies were responsible.
Japan, significantly said Count Motono, is in a better
geographical position to interpret the agreement than the
United States.

We have looked with more than passive anxiety on
Japan's penetration in Siberia which, though alleged to
be temporary, may not be. In view of the British-Jap-
anese alliance, and Russia's momentary collapse, we seem
to have assumed the burden of keeping Japan in what we
consider her place. The consequences cannot be fore-
seen.

More recently, Japan's efforts to assert and retain jur-
isdiction in Shantung, contrary to pledges formally
given, have created an unfavorable impression in the
United States, although, unfortunately, it is courting
error or disappointment at any time to test international
conduct, usually inspired by motives of national self-
interest, by the ordinary standards of morality. Japan's
still more recent assertion of jurisdiction, under a League
of Nations mandate, over the island of Yap, through
which passes the cable connecting the United States
with the Far East, brings to a close a long series of
contested issues whose sober consideration by both coun-
tries does credit to their mutual sense of tolerance and
forbearance. The often repeated slogan of our "mastery
of the Pacific," to which Roosevelt in an ebullient mo-
ment, once gave exultant expression, is, in theory and
ought to be in fact, a myth ; one might suppose that the
Pacific Ocean is large enough to permit both nations to
exist and maintain interests there.

It will have been observed that in the Far East the
principle of "non-intervention" is conspicuous by its ab-
sence.

Finally, it seems necessary, in discussing the United
States as a factor in international relations, to mention
the vital part played by the United States in the Euro-
pean War, a part which has materially affected the course

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 257

of history. What effect this intervention will ultimately
have on our own future and that of the rest of the world,
only time can tell. In so far as we defended our rights
as neutrals from unlawful invasion by German subma-
rines, we followed the precedent established in 1798 and
1812. This is the ground of war upon which the Reso-
lution of Congress of 1917 is based, and it is the only
ground which I believe will stand the test of historical
criticism. In so far as President Wilson went further,
seeking to dictate and participate in rearrangements of
the map of Europe and to create a phantom League of
Nations, ostensibly for the preservation of peace, but
actually serving other purposes, he departed, doubtless,
for what seemed to him good reasons, from the funda-
mental principles upon which the nation was founded and
has since developed. Fortunately, the American people
have vetoed that dangerous step, but the mere effort to
withdraw from the commitments he sought to make will
render exceedingly difficult the tasks of the present ad-
ministration. In spite of the fact that certain idealists or
moralists profess to have discovered recent changes,
Europe is still Europe, the victim of its political system,
with "a set of primary interests, which to us have none
or a very remote relation." M. d'Haussonville, a French
publicist, aptly compared the nations of Europe to a
party of gamblers seated around a green table grown
somewhat shabby with age, where each in turn takes the
bank. Viewing the distracted countries of Europe in
1921, it seems to me that no one has expressed a more
correct judgment than our own Thomas Jefferson.
"Europe's political interests," said he, "are entirely dis-
tinct from ours. Their mutual jealousies, their balance
of power, their complicated alliances, their forms and
principles of government, are all foreign to us. They
are nations of eternal war." It requires but an impartial
mind to observe that the statesmen of Europe are still
History will appraise their handiwork.

258 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

In the light of the lessons of the past two years, our
duty seems more plain than ever, namely, to keep as far
removed as possible from their political enterprises. The
warning of John Adams, as a glance at the daily news-
papers will confirm, might have been uttered yesterday:

"It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be
continually maneuvering with us to work us into their
real or imaginary balances of power . . . but I think
it ought to be bur rule not to meddle ; and that of all
the powers of Europe, not to desire us, or perhaps,
even to permit us, to interfere, if they can help it."

But Europe today is desperate. By every method of
inducement known, by appeal to our sympathy, generos-
ity, apprehension, gratitude, cupidity, she is seeking to
persuade us to liquidate the consequences of her unfortu-
nate system of conducting international relations. I can-
not blame her; it is the instinct of self-preservation that
speaks. But while we cannot, in view of our own vital
interest in the restoration of Euorpe, assume that indif-
ference which the Swedish Ambassador in London sug-
gested to John Adams in 1782: "Sir/' said he, "I take
it for granted, that you will have sense enough to see us
in Europe cut each other's throats with a philosophical
tranquillity" ; nevertheless, it would be a mark of national
immaturity to disregard Washington's injunction against
passionate attachments for some nations and inveterate
antipathies to others. Our safety and our self-respect lie
in the cultivation of the Jeffersonian precept of "honest
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with
none."

VIII

INDIRECT INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON WORLD

POLITICS

The advent of the United States into the family of
nations was not only of immediate consequence to the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 259

world, in disturbing the balance of power in Europe, but
it also exercised an indirect influence, the fruits of which
have left a permanent impress on international relations.

Mention has been made of the circumstances, physical
and ideal, which dictated the principles espoused by the
nation then in embryo — the distance from Europe, the
insistence upon freedom from the European political sys-
tem and its perpetual quarrels and upon emancipation
from Europe's monarchical and ecclesiastical theories of
government, the demand for freedom from the system of
colonial, commercial and navigation monoplies. These
facts and aspirations, together with the facts that inde-
pendence found us with a weak government, an immense
territory, a small population, a growing maritime com-
merce, hostile neighbors in Europe and on the American
continent, who were less interested in the permanence of
our existence or institutions than they were in the use
which they could make of us in their political conflicts —
presented at once problems which tested to the full the
mettle of our early statesmen. The factors and condi-
tions with which they thus had to deal gave birth not
only to the major principles of our life as a nation, which
were outlined in the previous lecture, but also served to
shape those collateral policies and politico-legal doctrines
which mark the history of our international relations.
How far these policies and doctrines have exerted uni-
versal influence may be a matter of opinion ; but it can
hardly be doubted that many of these principles, policies
and doctrines have been powerful factors in the history
of the last century and a half.

It is probably correct to say that the discovery and
occupation of the new continent of America is the most
important fact in modern history. It disturbed vitally
the conventional groupings of Europe. In the two hun-
dred years before the American Revolution, Spain, Hol-
land, France and England, — rivals for American domi-
nation,— had experienced all the vicissitudes of success

260 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

and defeat in a series of wars which from time to time
changed the boundary lines of the unexplored continent
and impressed England with the great lesson that the
possession of sea power is the primary source of interna-
tional strength and influence.

The rivalry of the European nations aided greatly in
securing admission for the United States into the family
of nations, for France, Holland and Spain found therein
an opportunity to gratify historic grudges against Eng-
land. Whether the governments that thus in varying
degree welcomed us had no occasion for regret may be
doubted; for the independence of a colony in America
could not leave Spain unaffected, and the French mon-
archy always believed, doubtless correctly, that the in-
spiration of the French revolution was found in America.
The United States, therefore, grew to nationhood, not
merely by virtue of its inherent strength, but by reason
of the mutual distrust and conflicts among the principal
powers in Europe. The statesmen of that day knew how
to seize and employ the opportunities afforded by exist-
ing conditions; and it is to their foresightedness in
evaluating and estimating these conditions that our suc-
cessful adolescence is primarily due. For the policies of
this government down to 1820 were fashioned and de-
veloped out of the political conditions prevailing among
the states of Europe.

The birth of a new nation in Europe has, as a rule,
little effect on international law or relations; the rules
of its conduct are prescribed for it either by usage or by
the particular group that sponsors its birth. In the case
of the United States it was different. The child of a new
philosophy of government, at a distance of thousands of
miles from the established countries of the world, with a
determination to remain free from that European system
which had made the colonists sometimes the cause and
always the victims of the European struggles for political
and commercial supremacy, the new nation had both

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 261

necessities and opportunities for developing new theories
and practices in international relations. It is for these
reasons, primarily, that the entrance of the United States
into the family of nations has been deemed epoch-
making.

This originality of policy is evidenced not only in the
major principle of non-intervention, which gave rise to
its corollary, the Monroe Doctrine, and to its natural
derivatives, the system of neutrality and the doctrine of
recognition of governments de facto, but it is reflected in
the provisions of our earliest treaties with foreign pow-
ers, in which we find stipulations for liberty of conscience,
the removal of important disabilities from aliens, mitiga-
tion of the rigor and evils of war, such as humane treat-
ment for prisoners of war, the privileged withdrawal
and departure of alien enemies and the immunity of their
private property from seizure, restrictions on the belliger-
ent privilege of visit and search, prohibition, under pain
of treatment as a pirate, of the acceptance of privateering
commissions by citizens of either country from an enemy
of the other, and various limitations on belligerent cap-
tures at sea, including, in the treaty with Russia the
reciprocal immunity of merchant ships in case of war
between the signatories. Practically all these innovations
were proposed by the American negotiator; they reflect
a freedom from tradition and an initiative dictated in
part by necessity, in part by opportunity; but their sub-
stantial merit, not only in promotion of our own interest
but also in that of the world at large, is indicated by the
fact that many of those provisions have long since been
accepted among the most settled of the rules of interna-
tional law.

(a)

NEUTRALITY

Not long after the Constitution of the United States
had made us a nation capable of assuming and carrying

262 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

out international obligations, the French Revolution
broke out. The reaction of the governments of the world
was much like that now entertained toward the Russian
Revolution. The event, as the Revolution grew in inten-
sity and violence, presented to the new American govern-
ment its first great problem in foreign affairs, and the
solution adopted marked the future course of national
policy.

As the Revolution could not be promptly suppressed,
some of the European governments felt it necessary to
intervene, and when England's entrance into the conflict
in 1793 made it a maritime war, the American govern-
ment had to make its great decision. The result but
reveals the high calibre of men who then governed the
country.

The French Revolution had aroused mingled feelings
in the United States. The people generally saw in it
the counterpart and response to their own recent achieve-
ment, and enthusiastically approved it. The Government
realized better the responsibilities attached to association
in the French enterprise. It required statesmanship of a
high order, in the face of the popular clamor for aid to
France, to decline to yield the ultimate good for the
immediate popular demand ; the leaders of that day were
not sounding boards who took their position on public
questions and their views of public policy from the morn-
ing newspapers. To quote John Bassett Moore :

"They understood that the peaceful demonstration
of the beneficence of their principles, in producing
order, prosperity, and contentment at home, was likely
to accomplish far more for the cause of liberty than an
armed propagandism, which perchance might ultimately
degenerate into military despotism."

The country was then still weak. Yet American ships
of trade were to be found in all the seas. A false step.
inviting another war, might have terminated the life of
the young nation. Prudence and patriotism therefore

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 263

dictated a passive attitude toward the French Revolution.
Circumstances, however, soon made more positive action
necessary. England came into the war in 1793. Citizen
Genet was sent to the United States by France and con-
ducted a triumphal tour from Charleston to Philadelphia,
enlisting popular support for his cause, and actually com-
missioning individuals and privateers for service against
England. He also adopted a measure, since often imi-
tated, of talking to a people over the heads of their gov-
ernment, with results as disastrous to his cause as the
effort was impolitic. It usually is. To prevent acts of
the people which might precipitate unhappy commit-
ments, and to put a stop to the fomentation of hostile
enterprises on American soil, which Genet, claiming au-
thority from the treaty with France and the friendly
sentiments of the people, was then sedulously engaged in
promoting, Washington and his cabinet determined to
issue a proclamation of neutrality. They hastened in this
course for fear that hesitation might result in their being
made a tool by either France or England, the principal
belligerents. Washington's personal policy became the
national policy. In March, 1793, he wrote to Jefferson,
then Secretary of State: "War having actually com-
menced between France and Great Britain, it behooves
the Government of this country to use every means in
its power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling
us with either of those powers, by endeavoring to main-
tain a strict neutrality." The remark of Oswald, British
negotiator of the Treaty of 1783, to John Adams, had
not been lost on the Cabinet : "You are afraid/' said
Mr. Oswald, "of being made the tools of the powers of
Europe" "Indeed I am," said Adams. "Wlwt powers?"
said Oswald. "All of them" answered Adams.

The proclamation of neutrality was published before
Genet reached Philadelphia. The disputes arising out of
Genet's efforts to move the Government from the course
it had adopted, and to violate the principles of neutrality

264 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

by fitting out privateers, and capturing and condemning
British vessels within American jurisdiction, merely con-
firmed the wisdom of the American policy. The claims
of Genet to employ American soil for hostile acts in
favor of France against its enemies gave shape to the
principles of neutrality enunciated by Jefferson, then
Secretary of State. Neutrality consisted of certain rights
and duties, founded primarily on the sovereignty of every
nation within its own territory and its obligation of im-
partiality between the belligerents. Mr. Moore has sum-
marized Jefferson's principles as follows:

"As it was the right of every nation to prohibit acts
of sovereignty from being exercised by any other within
its limits, so it was, he declared, the duty of a neutral
nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the
warring powers. Hence, 'no succor should be given
to either, unless stipulated by treaty, in men, arms, or
anything else, directly serving for war/ The raising
of troops and the granting of military commissions
were, besides, sovereign rights, which, as they pertained
exclusively to the nation itself, could not be exercised
within its territory by a foreign power, without its
consent ; and if the United States had 'a right to refuse
permission to arm vessels and raise men' within its
ports and territories, it was 'bound by the laws of
neutrality to exercise that right, and to prohibit such
armaments and enlistments.' "

The neutrality proclamation of April 22, 1793, was
epoch-making, for it fixed what seemed until recent times
the immutable policy of the United States toward Euro-
pean wars. It did not use the word "neutrality," for
Jefferson believed that an avowal of permanent neutrality
should not be bartered away without concessions from
the belligerents. The proclamation was actually drafted
by Randolph, Attorney General, and announced that "the
duty and interest of the United States require that they
should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a
conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent
powers." Citizens were warned against joining in the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 265

hostilities, that they carried contraband at their risk alone,
and that violations of the law of nations within American
jurisdiction would be punished.

The proclamation created a profound impression in
Europe; for it was at least novel that a people which had
theretofore been involved in practically every European
war to which England, France or Spain had been parties
should now assert their complete independence of Euro-
pean quarrels. It was a logical step in the policy of non-
intervention in European affairs, to which utterance had
already been given by some of the leaders of the govern-
ment, and foreshadowed Washington's Farewell Address,
which definitely made non-intervention a cornerstone of
American foreign policy.

The enforcement of our neutrality in the face of the
activities of Genet, much popular disapproval, and the
weakness of the federal power, was not always easy.
But a notable charge to a grand jury by John Jay, the
first Chief Justice of the United States, in May, 1793,
ranks among the highest expressions of American policy
and has been honored by its substantial incorporation in
1871 in the Treaty of Washington with Great Britain,
another notable step in the evolution of the law of neu-
trality. Jay said :

"The laws of nations make part of the laws of this
and of every other civilized nation. They consist of
those rules for regulating the conduct of nations toward
each other which, resulting from right reason, receive
their obligations from that principle and from general
assent and practice. To this head also belong those
rules or laws which, by agreement, become established
between nations. . . We are now a nation, and it
equally becomes us to perform our duties and to assert
our rights. . . The United States are in a state of
neutrality relating to all powers at war. Therefore
they who commit, aid, or abet hostilities against those
powers, or either of them, offend against the laws of
the United States, and ought to be punished,"

266 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

Between the open violation of our neutrality by Genet
and his adherents in the United States at home, and the
like disregard of our neutral rights at sea by both France
and England, the course of the government was difficult.
Nor were we fortunate in some of our diplomatic ap-
pointments to France. Gouverneur Morris, first sent by
Washington, was too cold toward the Revolution for
French taste, and his successor, James Monroe, too warm
for American neutrality.

In view of the vagueness as to what were at that time
neutral rights and privileges, it is not surprising that the
budding commerce of America paid a heavy price for the
prevailing uncertainty and the unwillingness of each of
the belligerents to permit American vessels to trade with
the other except under severe restrictions. There was
no agreement as to what constituted contraband or block-
ade. Between paper blockades and the unlimited exten-
sion of contraband lists, the fate of the neutral's trade
seemed precarious. The rule that enemy goods, not con-
traband, on a neutral ship, were exempt from seizure,
enunciated by Frederick the Great under the name "free
ships, free goods" and embodied in the Armed Neutrality
of 1780 and in the treaty concluded by Benjamin Frank-
lin with Prussia in 1785, was still far from receiving
general acceptance; its ultimate persistence and inclusion
in the rules of international law are in no small degree
due to American effort.

The insistence upon our rights furnished a critical test
for our diplomacy, and the principles adopted in the Jay
treaty of 1794 with England and the arbitrations for
which it provided constituted a marked advance in the
development of international maritime law. The conces-
sions gained therein for neutrals were much aided by the
recognition of the obligations of neutrals which had been
embodied in the proclamation of 1793 and the statute
of 1794 which carried those obligations into effect. In
substance, the Act of 1794 forbade within the United

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 267

States the acceptance of commissions, the enlistment of
men, the fitting out and arming of vessels and the setting
on foot of military expeditions in the service of any gov-
ernment or people against a government with which the
United States was at peace. Compensation was provided
for in the Jay Treaty for those British subjects who had
suffered damages from our failure to prevent French
privateers from violating our neutrality, a precedent from
which we reaped great advantage some eighty years later
in the settlement of the "Alabama" claims of American
citizens against Great Britain. Hall, the well-known
English authority on international law, says of the atti-
tude of Washington's administration :

"The policy of the United States in 1793 constitutes
an epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality.
There can be no doubt that it was intended and believed
to give effect to the obligations then incumbent upon
neutrals. But it represented by far the most advanced
existing opinions as to what those obligations were,
and in some points it even went further than authorita-
tive international custom has up to the present time
advanced. In the main, however, it is identical with
the standard of conduct which is now adopted by the
community of nations."

Not long after the proclamation of neutrality of 1793
began that reciprocal retaliatory promulgation of Orders
in Council and decrees by the English and French gov-
ernments which made neutral commerce subservient to
belligerent expediency. Only the difficulty of determin-
ing which belligerent was doing us the most injury, our
military weakness and the realization that participation
in the war would be more disastrous than helpful to our
commerce, persuaded the statesmen of that day to over-
look the many provocations to war and adopt negotiation
instead. Each belligerent acted, with little qualification,
upon the principle asserted by Great Britain during the
recent war, namely, that if one belligerent is allowed to
make an attack upon the other regardless of neutral

268 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

rights, his opponent must be allowed similar latitude in
prosecuting the struggle "and is not limited to the adop-
tion of measures precisely identical with those of his
opponent." On this point, complete harmony seems to
prevail among belligerents. Notwithstanding all their
efforts to obtain by negotiation more favorable treatment
for American commerce, the United States was, neverthe-
less, drawn in 1798 into the limited war with France
which lasted until 1800. The Peace of Amiens brought
a brief respite to American traders and to a much
harassed Department of State.

In 1803, the great struggle between France and Eng-
land was renewed. The reciprocal issuing of retaliatory
Orders in Council and Napoleonic decrees again threat-
ened the trade of neutral American merchants and tested
the diplomatic resources of our young Department of
State — this time with less success than in the preceding
decade. Neutral rights were all but blotted out by the con-
tending belligerents. Paper blockades were the order of
the day. Fortunately, we were not then drawn into the
war, and at least we were able by continued protest to
keep alive the claims of neutrals, which ultimately, long
after the war, did obtain recognition.

Embargoes and non-intercourse proving weak as the
weapons of a neutral, we were finally, through the com-
plication with the question of impressment, drawn into
the war of 1812 with Great Britain. From France we
obtained a large indemnity by treaty.

Until the time when we became involved in the recent
European War the United States had been the consistent
champion of neutrality, and had maintained its principles
through the most difficult period of its history. It had
the satisfaction of seeing its recodified Neutrality Act of
1818 adopted substantially by Great Britain in the For-
eign Enlistment Act of 1819. It saw the main conten-
tions of its early days adopted as law in the Declaration
of Paris of 1856 and later observed — namely, that the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 269

neutral flag covers enemy's goods, except contraband ; that
neutral goods, except contraband, are free from capture
on an enemy ship, and that legal blockades must be "effec-
tive". It made important contributions to the rules of
neutrality adopted by the first and second Hague Con-
ferences and the London Conference of 1908. How far
these rules have been qualified by violation during the
late war, it is perhaps too early to say. It may, however,
be observed that though the recent European War began
with a proclamation of neutrality on our part, the prac-
tice of neutrality was beset with difficulties. The condi-
tions and the motives which had prompted our declaration
of neutrality in the European conflict of a century before
were no longer present; and the diplomatic skill of a
Washington and Jefferson was conspicuously absent.
How far neutrality as a legal status, with privileges,
rights and obligations, has suffered permanent injury
only the future can tell ; the apparent effort embodied in
the Covenant of the League of Nations to make every
war hereafter a universal war would seem to indicate a
belief that the law of neutrality had exhausted its use-
fulness. I venture to differ with such an opinion. On
the contrary, I believe that the task of the immediate
future is to strengthen rigidly the law of neutrality by
doing away with much of the difference between pro-
hibited and permitted acts of individuals and restricting
those privileges of the neutral individual in the form of
loans and other aids to belligerents which ultimately
make of neutrality either a mythical status, a precarious
privilege, or an unwelcome and distrusted obligation.

RECOGNITION

Equally consistent with the doctrine of neutrality as a
derivative from the fundamental American principle of
non-intervention has been the policy governing the recog-

270 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

nition of new governments — at least down to the begin-
ning of the Wilson administration, when so many of the
traditional principles of our foreign policy were aban-
doned or modified.

Recognition is not a legal right of the new government
or state, nor is it altogether a matter of favor. It is a
question of policy, which is influenced by such factors as
historical precedent, conceptions of national tradition and
interest, the desire for harmonious international, com-
mercial and political relations, and the necessity of ac-
knowledging facts. Nothing is more neutral, therefore,
than the policy adopted by the United States in Wash-
ington's administration of recognizing new governments
created by revolution. Our own national origin, our con-
ceptions of liberty and self-government, our dissociation
from the monarchical principle of legitimacy of govern-
ments, which we had but lately proved, our determina-
tion not to intervene in the political affairs of other
nations, our desire to keep open the channels of com-
merce, our respect for practical facts rather than ancient
theories — all combined to persuade the new American
nation to recognize promptly any new government dem-
onstrating its capacity to hold for a reasonable period
the reins of government. De facto control was the test
of government, rather than the legitimacy of the means
by which it was acquired. Revolution is always uncon-
stitutional, yet most of the states of the world, includ-
ing the Great Powers, owe their existence to such un-
constitutional origin. The epigram "whoever has the
archives is the government" has a very practical conno-
tation.

The French Revolution was responsible for the estab-
lishment both of our policy of neutrality and of recogni-
tion. In an instruction of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary
of State, to Gouverneur Morris, Minister to France,
March 12, 1792, there was embodied what has since
been deemed a classic expression of our national policy.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 271

"We surely cannot deny to any nation," said Jeffer-
son, ''that right whereon our own government is
founded — that everyone may govern itself according
to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at
its own will ; and that it may transact its business with
foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks
proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee,
president, or anything else it may choose. The will of
the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded."
Jefferson prescribed no particular tests by which this
national will was to be ascertained, whether election or
acquiescence. The mere continued existence of the new
government for a reasonable length of time and its ful-
fillment of the functions of administration within a con-
siderable portion of its territorial limits was presumably a
sufficient demonstration of its ability to express a na-
tional will.

Down to the Civil War it had been a boast of our
national tradition to be the first nation to recognize a
new government that had manifested its capacity to main-
tain the spark of life. The precedent was laid with the
revolutionary governments of France, beginning in 1792,
and was acted upon in South and Central America and
in various countries of Europe, even with respect to new
monarchies. We were among the very few governments
to recognize Don Miguel as King of Portugal. Reasons
for recognition rather than excuses for not recognizing
de facto governments, were sought. A revolution arous-
ing international concern was not denominated a "domes-
tic question" of the parent state. President Pierce in
his message to Congress of May 15, 1856, in explaining
the reception of a new minister from Nicaragua, summed
up a long line of distinguished precedents when he said :

"It is the established policy of the United States to
recognize all governments without question of their
source, or organization, or of the means by which the
governing persons attain their power, provided there
be a government de facto accepted by the people of

272 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the country, and with reserve only of time as to the
recognition of revolutionary governments arising out
of the subdivision of present states with which we are
in relations of amity. We do not go behind the fact
of a foreign government's exercising actual power to
investigate questions of legitimacy; we do not inquire
into the causes which led to a change of government.
To us it is indifferent whether a successful revolution
has been aided by foreign intervention or not ; whether
insurrection has overthrown existing governments and
another has been established in its place, according to
pre-existing forms, or in a manner adopted for the
occasion by those whom we may find in the actual
possession of power. All these matters we leave to the
people and public authorities of the particular country
to determine ; and their determination, whether it be by
positive action or by ascertained acquiescence, is to us
a sufficient warranty of the legitimacy of the new
government."

The Civil War produced many changes in the spirit and
the constitutional development of the United States, the
effects of which cannot yet be fully established. Among
the earliest and most obvious effects, however, was the
change in attitude assumed toward the recognition of new
governments and states. The unprecedented effort of a
large section of the country to establish an independent
government shook to its foundations some of our most
cherished theories. Seward saw in this attempt no prin-
ciple of self-determination, but a treasonable and seditious
effort to subvert the constitution. He at once exerted
every endeavor, by contesting the legality of the Con-
federate Government, to prevent foreign governments
not only from recognizing its independence, but even its
belligerent character. We now find the curious historical
freak of Europe acting on the American theory de facto
possession of power as the criterion of recognition, and
Seward supporting the European theory of legality or
legitimacy. The diplomatic controversy resolved itself
into an issue as to the de facto existence of the Confed-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 273

erate government, and it was not without incurring seri-
ous dangers to our international relations that Seward
was finally able to avert the recognition of the indepen-
dence of the South by Great Britain and other powers.

The event was bound to exert important influence on
our recognition policy. The obvious practical test of
dc facto authority, which had so long been a part of
our tradition, could not be readopted without important
qualification. Thus, we find Seward in 1866, after our
great danger of dissolution had been successfully averted,
conditioning the recognition of new governments not
merely on their de facto character, but on the consent of
the people, evidenced either by sanction of the legislature
or by a formal election. Consistently therewith, but en-
tirely out of harmony with our national traditions,
Seward refused to receive the representatives of revo-
lutionary factions in foreign countries seeking to estab-
lish their independence.

But again conditions were found more imperious than
theories. Revolutionary governments in South America
which established de facto authority without formal con-
sent of the people had to be dealt with, and we find down
to 1890 a partial, and after 1890, a complete departure
from the conditions of legitimacy which Seward, im-
pelled by the crisis through which he had passed and
the requirements of consistency, had sought to attach to
our recognition of new governments. The precedent of
making recognition conditional had several important
effects. It served to encourage the exercise of a power,
by withholding recognition — though earned by objective
standards — to interfere in the domestic affairs of foreign
countries, contrary to the national tradition. When thus
used as a political instrument to exert our will over that
of other nations, it subverts the principle of recognition
and the theory of the independence of states.

As the element of express consent of the people receded
in importance as a condition of recognition, it was re-

274 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

placed by the more modern criterion of capacity of the
new government to perform the international obligations
of a state. Possibly this condition, applied subjectively,
still enables a recognizing state to exact terms in the
extension of recognition, contrary to our original theory.
But while the departure of Europe from the criterion
of legitimacy to that of de facto authority exerted an
influence upon us, the development of imperialism, which
seems difficult to -dissociate from growth in economic
power, militates against a disinterested attitude toward
the free political development of other states. The enter-
prise which resulted in the recognition of Panama will
illustrate my point. But this case, like that of the Wilson
policy toward the Huerta government in Mexico and the
Tinoco government in Costa Rica, ought to be regarded
not merely as involving the question of recognition, but
rather as a question of intervention, which is always a
matter of political opportunism. In like case are the
various extensions of recognition to the new states in
central and southeastern Europe during and since the
World War. They rest on expediency rather than on
principle. This also accounts for the withholding of
recognition from the de facto government of Russia.

President Wilson, on assuming office in March, 1913,
announced in a statement of policy toward Latin- America
a new doctrine of refusal of the United States to recog-
nize new governments which had established themselves
by revolution. The object of his administration, he said,
would be "to cultivate the friendship and deserve the con-
fidence of our sister republics of Central and South
America," and to promote the common interest. "Cordial
understanding and co-operation between the peoples and
leaders of America," he said, was possible "only when
supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just
government" based "not upon arbitrary or irregular
force," but upon "law," upon the "consent of the gov-
erned" and upon "the public conscience and approval."

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 275

While the President doubtless had in mind the govern-
ment of General Huerta, who had incurred Mr. Wilson's
violent dislike — although it so happens that he was actu-
ally the President of Mexico according to the Mexican
constitution — the declaration was deemed to constitute
a policy of refusal to recognize revolutionary govern-
ments. Under the guise of promoting constitutionalism,
it embodies in effect a reincarnation of the discarded
theory of legitimacy of the Holy Alliance, to which like-
wise revolution was anathema. Read in the light of the
principles upon which this nation was founded, it must
arouse a feeling of wonder. But from the fact that
President Wilson promptly recognized recent revolution-
ary changes of government in Peru, Bolivia and Guate-
mala, in apparent disregard of his announced policy, one
may conclude that the declaration has more oratorical
than political importance.

While the development of the recognition policy of the
United States has experienced notable qualifications, in-
duced by the events of history and political expediency,
the policy has nevertheless so uniformly reverted to type
after occasional variants, that it would be safe to say that
the de facto criterion of governmental authority is still
practically the basis of our recognition policy. The more
frequent, however, the departures from principle the more
likely it is that the country will drift into the paths of
opportunism, with consequent dangers ultimately to the
national welfare.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

When the United States achieved independence, the
exorbitant claims of Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and
Denmark and other similar states to sovereignty over
parts of the high seas had largely been abandoned. En-
listing early, as we have seen, in the struggle to safeguard
the rights of neutrals against impairment in time of mari-

276 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

time war, the new nation also promptly challenged some
of the most time-honored restrictions upon the freedom
of navigating the seas in time of peace. In this, they
served not only the interests of the United States, but of
the entire world.

The dependence of large sections of the population of
the new country upon maritime commerce made restric-
tions upon its free exercise at any time, and especially in
time of peace, irritating, expensive and sometimes intol-
erable. Among the earliest American efforts to secure
the freedom of navigation throughout the world was that
involved in obtaining relief from the exactions of the
Barbary States, Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli and Algeria.
The rulers of these states had obtained the sanction of a
long-continued practice to exact tribute from the vessels
trading in the Mediterranean. Before the Revolution, a
considerable American commerce had developed with
ports in the Mediterranean. As it had to be abandoned
on the outbreak of war, one of the early tasks of the
peace was to restore it. It became necessary, therefore,
to make terms with the rulers of the Barbary States, who
had grown strong and wealthy in their tolerated occupa-
tion of licensed robbery. Yet they were but modern
examples of a system which had for centuries admitted
exclusive claims to jurisdiction over waterways and wide
expanses of the sea.

Down to 1806, Great Britain had exacted from foreign
ships in the waters of the Four Seas around the British
Isles evidences of formal submission to British jurisdic-
tion; and the practice of admitting foreign ships to na-
tional ports on payment of special dues only and exclud-
ing them from colonies altogether had long been com-
mon. As products of their time, the Barbary "pirates"
are not, therefore, to be too severely condemned. They
had, however, adopted certain Oriental practices which
made the system rather unbearable, although the states
of Europe had found it cheaper to buy them off than to

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

contest their claims. The rates they charged for their
appeasement were changed without notice, and seem
sometimes to have been based on the modern principle of
what the traffic could bear; and they had the irritating
habit, in addition to capturing the vessels, of throwing
into slavery, subject to ransom, the seamen belonging to
vessels who would not pay the price of their friendship.
Their appetite grew with what it fed upon. The Dey of
Algiers and the Bashaw of Tripoli, particularly, were
afflicted with itching palms, which required much oint-
ment, in various forms, to soothe. Down to 1815, inter-
mittent war with these pirates had temporarily inter-
rupted the exaction of their blackmail, but no final end
was made of the system until in 1815, Congress, at Presi-
dent Madison's recommendation, decided to wait upon
the Dey of Algiers with sufficient force to convince that
potentate of the error of his ways. The treaty which con-
cluded that war brought to an end every exaction of
tribute in any form in the Mediterranean.

One of the claims of jurisdiction upon the high seas
which survived the abandonment of extensive assertions
of sovereignty was that of subjecting the merchant ves-
sels of foreign nations to visit and search by national
warships, in time of peace as well as in war. An incident
of this practice, in time of war, was the taking out of
neutral ships of fellow-nationals of the belligerent found
on board. Great Britain, during the wars between 1793
and 1815, had thus taken out of American vessels not
only British subjects, but also naturalized Americans of
British origin, whose American citizenship under the pre-
vailing doctrine of indelible allegiance, Great Britain re-
fused to concede. This practice, proving increasingly
obnoxious and harmful to American commerce, was re-
sisted by the war of 1812, and although not referred to
in the Treaty of Ghent which brought that war to a close,
the practice has not been renewed. Final evidence of its
illegality is found in the American admission in 1861 of

278 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

the correctness of the British position in protesting
against the forcible taking by an American warship of the
Confederate commissioners, Mason and Slidell, from the
British steamer "Trent".

Claims to examination of foreign merchant ships in
time of peace had by the nineteenth century been reduced
to the purposes of suppressing the slave trade and piracy.
While the United States sympathized with the purpose, it
resisted tenaciously 'every effort to subject American ves-
sels to search by foreign ships on the high seas. Doubt-
less the perversion of the privilege of belligerent visit and
search to include impressment had something to do with
this reluctance, yet only by international co-operation can
such an institution as the slave trade be suppressed. In
this movement Great Britain took a leading part. Al-
though nearly every other country was willing to make
treaties with England conceding a reciprocal right of
search for this philanthropic purpose, it was not until
1862, after many diplomatic efforts, that the United
States by treaty with Great Britain admitted the right of
any foreign vessel to stop an American ship at sea in
time of peace, and the admission then was confined to a
limited area around Africa and some of the islands in
the Carribbean. The principle has since been admitted
within defined zones around Africa by the Brussels Slave
Trade Convention of 1890 and by a treaty of 1911 for
the protection of fur seals in Bering Sea.

The protest of the United States in 1873 against the
stoppage by a Spanish warship of the falsely registered
American steamer "Virginius" engaged in a hostile en-
terprise against Spain in Cuba, illustrates the traditional
insistence of the United States upon the freedom of its
vessels on the high seas in time of peace from foreign
interference. Pirates, of course, are excluded from this
protection.

The consistent effort of the United States to free the
channels of maritime commerce from artificial restrictions

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 279

is exemplified in the leading part assumed by this country
in bringing about in 1857 the relinquishment by Denmark
of her claims to the exaction of tolls from vessels passing
through the waters connecting the North Sea with the
Baltic. The demand for opening the Straits of Magellan
to free transit encountered no resistance from Chile.

A similar policy marks the diplomacy involved in se-
curing the freedom of navigation in the Canals of Suez
and Panama, though it cannot be said that unrestricted
transit in the Panama Canal is assured for anything but
peaceful commerce. The "neutralization" of the Canal is
nominal only, since the fortifications enable the United
States in time of war to use the Canal as national interests
may dictate.

The policy of opening the channels of trade is similarly
exemplified in the long diplomatic effort to secure the
freedom of navigation in international rivers, such as the
Amazon, the St. Lawrence, the La Plata and the Para-
guay. This was perhaps but a reflection in America of
the universal effort to secure freedom in river navigation,
of which the notable instances in Europe involve the
Danube and the Rhine.

The demand by contiguous states, for monopolization
of fishing in the interests of their own nationals, has
induced the last surviving claim of exclusive jurisdiction
over wide bays and marginal seas, beyond the conven-
tional ten miles and three mile limit. The three mile
zone, incidentally, was for the first time officially adopted,
in 1/93, by the United States. The more extended
claims have now been gradually limited by treaty or ac-
quiescence to certain definite areas, in which the geo-
graphical configuration of the land or considerations of
expediency or history have justified their admission.
Entire consistency on the part of the United States can-
not be asserted, for while we have sedulously resisted
the claims of Great Britain, Russia and other nations
to the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in wide bays or

280 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

particular expanses of sea, we insisted, on historical
grounds, upon American jurisdiction over the Bering
Sea, a claim which was disallowed after arbitration.

The expression "freedom of the seas", which has been
deemed an essential factor of American foreign policy,
has been used in so many senses that confusion in its
meaning is natural. In time of war, the freedom of using
the sea is, of course, greatly, if not entirely, impaired by
the belligerent exercise of the rights of capture, and the
enforcement of rules as to blockade, contraband carriage,
and collateral restrictions, legal or illegal, which their
strength permits them to impose upon neutrals. The
United States came into being at a time when war had
ceased to be the normal and had become the abnormal
and exceptional relation between states. They were,
therefore, able to give vitality to the principles of neu-
trality which they had championed, some of which had
already received approval by the European alliance known
as the Armed Neutrality.

Except for a brief period, during the Civil War, the
United States has uniformly advocated limitations upon
the privilege of belligerents to interfere with maritime
commerce, and corresponding enlargement of the rights
of neutrals. This, of course, is consistent with its tradi-
tional policy of removing restrictions from commercial
intercourse in time of peace and of war. Success in such
an effort will depend, at any given time, upon the strength
of the particular belligerents, so that it is hard to say
how far American doctrines have secured universal ac-
ceptance. Thus, the United States in the recent war
tolerated, not without protest, such practices by Great
Britain as the so-called "blockade", reminiscent of the
Napoleonic decrees and Orders in Council of a century
ago, the blacklist, operating between neutral countries,
the uncontrolled extension of contraband lists, new con-
structions of the doctrine of continuous voyage, the seiz-
ure of American mails at sea, nearly all in violation of

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 281

pre-war agreements, and such practices by Germany as
the establishment of war zones for unprecedented pur-
poses and the use of submarines as commerce destroyers.
These impairments of the rights of neutrals, the last of
which finally persuaded us to enter the conflict, merely
illustrate how mythical is the freedom of the seas in time
of war.

From this recital, one may judge how great are the
chances for acceptance by the stronger naval powers of
a policy long advocated by the United States, and some-
times identified with the term "freedom of the seas".
This is the inhibition of the capture of private enemy
property at sea, ships or goods, except contraband, and
except for blockade. In 1785, Franklin incorporated this
provision in our treaty with Prussia and it is found in
the treaty with Italy of 1871. At various times, our
Secretaries of State, including John Quincy Adams, Clay,
Marcy, Fish, Hay and Root, have proposed to foreign
powers this limitation upon belligerent action — President
Roosevelt recommending it as a matter of "humanity and
morals." A Congressional Resolution in 1904 advocated
general adoption of the measure and the United States
delegates at the first and second Hague Conferences were
instructed to propose its consideration and approval. Dr.
Scott says, in his report on the second Hague Conference,
that failure to obtain approval for it "was due solely to
the fact that large maritime powers such as Great Britain,
Japan and Russia, and in a lesser degree France, were
unwilling to renounce the right of capture of private prop-
erty, either as a means of preventing a resort to arms or
of shortening the wary by bringing the enemy to terms."

The experience of the recent war would seem to indi-
cate that in a war between the great powers, not only are
the rights of neutrals negligible, but that the conduct of
warfare at sea is subject to fewer restraints than the con-
duct of war on land. It was the realization of this condi-
tion that induced the United States to enter upon its en-

282 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

larged naval program, which some of the recent belliger-
ents do not regard with equanimity. Instead of ameliorat-
ing the status of private property at sea, by assimilating it
to the immunities heretofore enjoyed by private property
on land, the Treaty of Versailles has adopted the medieval
practice of confiscating private enemy property on land.
So inconsistent is this measure with the modern require-
ments of international commercial intercourse that it
seems inconceivable1 that capitalists anywhere could have
supported it. Not only is it likely to prove universally
unprofitable to leave foreign investments in this precarious
position, but it reduces immeasurably any chance for the
early limitation of armaments and of war, for the integ-
rity not merely of public but of private property now de-
pends upon success in arms.

In view of what has been said, it is easily comprehen-
sible why Great Britain refused, after it had served its
moral purpose, to accept the second of President Wilson's
Fourteen Points, providing for "absolute freedom of navi-
gation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in
peace and war," except as international action might pre-
scribe.

The effort to establish the rights of neutrals and the
freedom of the seas generally is but part of the larger
American policy of removing so far as possible all re-
strictions upon the freedom of commercial intercourse.
When the United States became an independent nation,
the world was fettered by the most exclusive restrictions
in trade and navigation. The colonial monopoly was per-
haps the most prevalent. The disadvantage of the colo-
nists in being confined, in their European trade, to deal-
ing with Great Britain, in British vessels, had been tem-
pered by the freedom of intercolonial trade ; and that with
the British West Indies had grown to considerable pro-
portions. Having organized an independent state, Ameri-
can merchants were much disappointed to find themselves
excluded, as foreigners, from the lucrative West Indian

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 283

Trade, and the effort of American diplomacy was directed
to securing a lifting of the ban. Not until the 'twenties,
however, when the new Spanish-American republics af-
forded free opportunities for trade, and when the growth
of the United States in commercial importance gave them
a practical power of retaliation, in the establishment of
an embargo against British vessels coming from a colony
closed to American vessels, was effective relief obtained.
A country without manufactures and exporting raw mate-
rials, the United States sought freedom of trade in for-
eign markets and was willing to admit foreign ships to
American ports on equal terms with its own. To main-
tain the open door abroad, they adopted discriminating
duties against incoming goods or vessels of countries dis-
criminating against American commerce. But the basic
principle of American commercial relations was reciprocity
of treatment, embodied in the first commercial treaty with
France of 1778. A statute of 1828, still in force, makes
a standing offer for the abolition of all discriminating
duties, regardless of the origin of the cargo or the carry-
ing vessel, and its provisions have now been extended by
proclamation and treaty to many countries. Thus, the
United States may justly claim a prominent share in the
enlightened enterprise of breaking the shackles of the
system of colonial monopoly. In the development of re-
lations with the Far East, as already observed, the policy
of the "open door" in commercial relations was steadily
pursued by the United States.

Yet the United States, by considering commerce be-
tween the United States and the Philippines, Hawaii and
Porto Rico as coasting trade, from which foreign vessels
are excluded, except by license, seems to have revived one
of the more objectionable features of the old system of
colonial monopoly, though these dependencies are, of
course, open to the trade of all nations.

But while navigation is now nominally free from arti-
ficial restrictions, the opportunities for engaging in it are

284 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

by no means equal. The system by which commerce is
subject to political control operates to exclude certain
nations or people from trade, either altogether or in given
commodities, with various parts of the world. Prefer-
ential and discriminating tariffs and tonnage dues, the
effective monopolization of the resources of backward
areas, the creation of spheres of influence, the artificial
stimulation of national merchant fleets — as in Section 34
of the Jones Act giving a 5 per cent, tariff reduction to
goods imported in American vessels, as soon as conflicting
treaties are abrogated — the control of coaling and oil sta-
tions and of international cables, the power of monopoliz-
ing trade arising out of the investment of capital — these
are but a few of the instrumentalities by which the com-
peting commercial nations seek to secure advantages over
their rivals. Much of the practice lies within the field of
what would be unfair competition under any modern sys-
tem of municipal law. Foreign policy is fashioned to the
maintenance of supremacy in this continual struggle, and
necessarily employs in its execution the forces of di-
plomacy and of arms. So long as the system of unregu-
lated and ruthless commercial competition exists, inter-
national friction is hardly avoidable.

MINOR DOCTRINES, CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICIES

In any survey of the position of the United States as a
factor in the development of international relations, a
place must be found for particular contributions and cer-
tain minor doctrines and policies which mark our growth
as a nation. Among these mention should be made of
Dr. Lieber's code for the government of the armies of
the United States in the field, of the doctrine of expatria-
tion, of the promotion of international arbitration, of the
status of treaties in our constitutional system, and of note-
worthy special contributions to the development of inter-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 285

national law. Finally, some estimate of our present posi-
tion may be warranted.

Although I think it would not be quite accurate to
characterize the United States necessarily as a peaceful
nation, our wars, since independence, have usually been
short and have not fastened on the nation the customary
psychology or paraphernalia of militarism. Yet I fancy
that our diplomatic correspondence with European coun-
tries for the next few decades will be less patronizing than
that of the past few in deploring their adherence to what
we have deemed the antiquated system of military con-
scription. Notwithstanding our traditional neutrality to
the arts of war, the United States has made one of the
most notable contributions to the regulation of the prac-
tices of war. The code of law drafted by Dr. Francis
Lieber in 1862 and known as the Instructions for the Gov-
ernment of the Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Orders No. 100, has been the foundation for
much of the subsequent codification, at Brussels in 1874
and at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, with respect to the
laws of war on land. Those instructions constitute the
essential basis of the existing Rules of Land Warfare
adopted by the War Department and have exerted con-
sideYable influence on foreign war codes. Moreover, they
were observed in practice in two wars, the Civil War and
the Spanish-American War, which is more than can be
said for the Brussels Declaration and the Hague Conven-
tions, which were either unratified or qualified in practice.
Considering the absence of precedents, Dr. Lieber's code
represents a remarkable product of technical skill, excel-
lent judgment, historical perspective and sound humani-
tarian instincts.

The true relation between the individual and the po-
litical society of which he is a member has troubled phi-
losophers more than it has governments. Notwithstand-
ing the liberal pronouncement of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as to the "inalienable rights" of men to "life,

286 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

liberty and the pursuit of happiness," not only was slavery
tolerated, but the courts of the United States with prac-
tical uniformity adopted the view of the English common
law that no man could sever the bonds of allegiance to his
country nor abjure the duties arising therefrom, without
the consent of the State. But, as immigration began to
increase toward the middle of the last century, notably
from Ireland and Germany, and as naturalized citizens
in increasing numbers visited their native countries, dif-
ficulties were presented to the Department of State in de-
termining the effect of American naturalization in a for-
eign country which declined to forego the claim, military
or other, arising out of native allegiance. James
Buchanan, as Secretary of State and President, was the
first and most vigorous of the official spokesmen for the
theory that naturalization in the United States, predicated
on forswearing allegiance to the native sovereign, severed
completely the bond of original allegiance and substituted
a new one. This not only conformed with the national
ideals of liberty of the individual to choose his own way
of life and obedience, but was appropriate to a country
receiving large numbers of immigrants. The difficulty lay
in getting foreign countries to accept our view, always
a problem in international relations.

The issue came to a head shortly after the Civil War,
when the Fenian troubles in Ireland took to that unhappy
land some naturalized citizens of Irish origin. They were
dealt with as British subjects, and the resulting popular
agitation in the United States was promptly reflected in
an Act of Congress, July 27, 1868, which declared that
the right of expatriation was "a natural and inherent
right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the
rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," that
any ruling to the contrary was "inconsistent with the
fundamental principles" of the Government, and that
native and naturalized citizens should receive the same
protection abroad. But without the acquiescence of for-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 287

eign governments, it is not easy to see how we could en-
force these principles in a foreign jurisdiction. A power-
ful aid in this direction was obtained by naturalization
treaties concluded with certain powers, of which that with
Germany, negotiated in 1868 by George Bancroft, with
the co-operation of Bismarck, was the first. In these the
subscribing countries agreed practically to recognize
American naturalization, when obtained by natives of
their countries as the exclusive warrant of their citizen-
ship.

But not all countries, nor even all the principal ones,
have been willing to conclude naturalization treaties with
us. Some, like imperial Russia and Turkey, deny the
right of expatriation absolutely, others like France and
Italy and other countries adopting compulsory military
service, concede it on condition only, and require the
State's consent. Thus, much of our diplomatic corre-
spondence is concerned with conflicting claims of citizen-
ship. Moreover, not a little difficulty in obtaining ad-
herents for our professedly liberal views is encountered by
the fact that in practice we considerably qualify the "in-
herent right of expatriation" proclaimed in the Act of
1868, by denying the privilege of naturalization, the cor-
relative of expatriation, to Chinese, Japanese and others ;
by having to admit that foreign countries, exercising juris-
diction over their native citizens, returning with an Ameri-
can naturalization certificate, could not be compelled to
give to our law precedence over their own; and by our
refusal to permit an American citizen to expatriate him-
self in time of war. While these confessed limitations
upon the freedom of expatriation weaken the principle,
it does, nevertheless, represent an American aspiration
which has exerted much influence on international rela-
tions.

The public declarations of the United States, from the
beginning, and the practice of its governmental depart-
ments, have been noteworthy for their acceptance of the

288 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

law of nations, which they sought to establish on a definite
foundation, as the guiding principle of international rela-
tions. Their preference for legal methods is exemplified
in the extent to which arbitration has been employed by
them as means of settling international differences. Only
Great Britain has resorted to arbitration more frequently.'
From the Jay treaty of 1794, which provided for three
different arbitrations, down to the present time, arbitra-
tions have been held with almost every country of Europe
and with many of the States of Latin America, involving
most important questions, principally boundaries and pe-
cuniary claims of every description. The record includes
such delicate matters as the "Alabama" claims and the
century-old dispute over the North Atlantic Coast Fish-
eries, settled at the Hague in 1910.

Nearly all the Pan-American Congresses since 1889
have expressed approval of the principle of arbitration,
though its practical value depends on the disposition of
nations actually to submit disputes. The prevailing ten-
dency to except from the treaty obligations of arbitration,
questions of vital interest, honor, etc., but indicates how
cautious nations are in agreeing to the judicial method
for settling their important disputes. As it is only these
disputes which could normally lead to war, the reliance
upon arbitration as a means of averting war, notwith-
standing the notable achievements of the nineteenth cen-
tury, cannot be considered strongly justified. While the
United States made valuable contributions to the estab-
lishment, at the first Hague Conference, of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, to which they have resorted on sev-
eral occasions, the Senate has in recent years manifested
a reluctance to widen the range of questions submissible to
arbitration. By reason of the Senate's insisting upon the
privilege of passing on each specific claim to be submitted
to arbitration under a general treaty, Mr. Moore con-
cludes that arbitration is now more difficult than it was
in the beginning, when by executive agreement or under

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 289

a treaty, long lists of claims were submitted without su-
pervision by the Senate.

The so-called Bryan treaties, of which some thirty have
been concluded with different nations, may be useful in
preventing an immediate recourse to force when there
occurs a particular incident, whose facts are doubtful,
creating a dispute between the contracting nations. It
provides for an examination by a commission and sus-
pension of hostile action for a year for investigation and
report. The principle, though known, was not resorted
to at the time of the Tampico incident with Mexico, which
gave rise to the Vera Cruz expedition against Huerta.
The Bryan treaties do not seem to have great efficacy
with respect to continuing injuries or issues arising out
of questions of conflicting principle or policy, which, after
all, constitute the effective causes of hostilities.

The recent effort to establish a court in constant session
at the Hague with fixed judges was promptly weakened
by the Assembly of the League of Nations by removing
from it the requirement for compulsory jurisdiction, prac-
tically the only advantage it possessed over the existing
court established in 1899, m which the judges are selected
from an appointed panel of four in each country. The
latter method, jurisdiction being voluntary, will, I be-
lieve, be more productive of arbitration than the recent
Hague proposal.

The United States was the first modern country to
adopt the principle that treaties are not binding until
ratified by a branch of the legislature, and that they con-
stitute the supreme law of the land conferring rights on
private individuals cognizable in the courts. The latter
principle is not yet adopted in England and most other
countries. Possibly the fact that a treaty is thus re-
garded like a statute accounts for the frequency, not gen-
erally realized, with which the United States has violated
treaties by subsequent conflicting legislation, leaving to

290 HISTORY AND NATURE OF

diplomatic methods the adjustment of the resulting diffi-
culty with foreign nations.

Mention should be made, also, of the peculiar American
interpretation of the most- favored-nation clause, incorpo-
rated in many commercial treaties. Under the European
interpretation, special privileges granted to one nation are
at once and unconditionally extended to other nations
having such a treaty clause with the grantor State, whereas
the United States extends the same favors only on condi-
tion that such other nations satisfy the same conditions
under which these privileges were originally given to the
grantee State. Without such a reciprocal concession, the
American view is that the second State would receive
gratuitously what the grantee State obtained only upon
valuable consideration. Notwithstanding the criticism of
Europe, the American interpretation has been maintained
and has received the carefully considered approval of the
Supreme Court.

The fact that treaties are the supreme law of the land
and that the law of nations is recognized by our Consti-
tution as a part and source of municipal law, upon which
the courts may draw in determining controversies, have
served to give international law a legal importance in the
United States which it does not possess in many other
countries. Sir Henry Maine pays a high tribute to this
view of the United States that international law is an in-
tegral part of the law of every member of the family of
nations, without legislative adoption or formal agreement.
This undoubtedly accounts for some of the remarkable
state papers which have issued from our Department of
State, constituting universally acknowledged authorities
on the principles of international law they expound. It
has also served to endow the decisions of our courts,
notably of the Supreme Court, with an international im-
portance entirely disproportionate to the case under con-
sideration. The names of Marshall, Kent and Story will
forever be identified with these judicial contributions to

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 291

the growth of international law. It has also encouraged
American publicists to give a concrete legal setting to their
views, not usually found in the writings of continental
authorities on international law. With these contribu-
tions the names of Kent, Wheaton, Dana, Woolsey, Field,
Wharton and Moore are prominently identified. I regard
John Bassett Moore, since the death of Westlake and
Renault, as the greatest contemporary authority on inter-
national law and relations. Combining, as he does, tech-
nical knowledge of the highest order, a sound, critical,
yet tolerant judgment of men and events, genuine nobility
of character, to which sincerity is axiomatic, a profound
appreciation of the principles and philosophy of American
government, and a large practical experience in intimate
association with our foreign relations, it seems incon-
ceivable that any American administration, least of all
the last, could afford not to profit by his wise counsel and
judgment.

And now the United States is at the cross roads. While
not the greatest crisis of our history, the recent World
War has created problems and developed policies which
may have a profound and lasting effect upon the future
of the country. Fortunately, there appears now to be a
disposition to return, so far as possible, to the funda-
mental principles upon which our national greatness has
been achieved. But one cannot escape the thought that
with our change in economic and political status with re-
spect to the rest of the world, temptations to abandon
principle for opportunism and expediency will continue
to present themselves. I conceive that the maintenance
of our position as the leading exponent of political lib-
erty and democracy among a free people will depend upon
the steadfastness with which those temptations are re-
sisted.

EDWIN M, BORCITARD.

Appendix

APPENDIX
GROTIUS, SUAREZ AND DE VICTORIA

While Dr. James Brown Scott was Solicitor for the
Department of State in 1906, he took the first steps in
an admirable undertaking which has since proved to
be a great boon to teachers and students of International
Law, the publication of the "Classics of International
Law."

"Grotius," wrote Dr. Scott on November 2, 1906, "is
universally considered as the founder of International
Law. This, like many general statements, is true enough
but likely to mislead. He was not the founder nor was
he the father of the science any more than Adam Smith
was the founder or father of Political Economy as a
Science. . . . We look beyond Grotius and see that
the international law of today is rooted in a more remote
past."

From that remote past, the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace has reprinted numerous classics in
excellent and convenient form for scientific study.
Among the precursors of Grotius two have been recog-
nized by the Editor-in-Chief (Dr. Scott) as of prime im-
portance— Francis de Victoria, the Dominican, and Fran-
cis Suarez, the Jesuit.

The influence of Suarez on international law has been
well discussed by Dr. Herbert Wright in the "American
Journal of International Law," vol. xiv., No. 2, page 307
(April, 1920). In reviewing a new Spanish edition of
Suarez, Dr. Wright says: "James Lorimer, in his "In-
stitutes of the Law of Nations,"1 calls attention to 'the
extreme injustice of the manner in which, down to our
own time, it has been customary to speak of the scholastic
jurists/ and a little farther on he continues : The fact is,
that ever since the Reformation the prejudices of Pro-

295

296 APPENDIX

testants against Roman Catholics have been so vehement
as to deprive them of the power of forming a dispassion-
ate opinion of their works, even if they had been ac-
quainted with them, which they rarely were.' The same
author, in a footnote, gives expression to the belief "that
no more valuable contribution could be made to the lit-
erature of jurisprudence at the present time than a col-
lection and translation of the portions of these works
which have reference to general jurisprudence and inter-
national law." But these statements were made nearly
forty years ago*, and the injustice and prejudice, on the
one hand, have largely disappeared, while interest in
popularizing the translations of relevant portions of
the works mentioned has long since been aroused by
Prof. Ernest Nys and by the "Classics of International
Law" being published by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, under the general editorship of Dr.
James Brown Scott, and now by a new series of Clasicos
jurisdicos inaugurated by the publishing house of Reus
with the present volume.

The selection of the Spanish Jesuit, Francisco Suarez,
as the first author in the series, is a most happy one, for
the echoes of his tercentenary celebration have not yet
entirely died away. Attention which had hitherto been
confined to a few historians of international law, such as
Ward, who calls him "a writer of great perspicuity and
comprehension of mind,"2 and Hallam, who regards him
as "by far the greatest man in the department of moral
philosophy, whom the order of Loyola produced in this
age, or perhaps in any other,"3 was now more popularly
centered upon him, and especially did his native country
hasten to make tardy amends for the oblivion into which
one of the purest glories of its history had been allowed
to fall.

This newly aroused interest, however, should by no
means be permitted to be local, for Suarez should be uni-
versally recognized as one of the truly great founders of
international law, second perhaps only to the great Gn>

APPENDIX 297

tius, if indeed to him. In fact, there is little or nothing
new in Grotius' general treatment of his subject; his sys-
tem is fundamentally identical with the ideas outlined by
Suarez.* It is true that Grotius advanced far beyond all
his predecessors in the detailed elaboration of his prin-
ciples, but the fact nevertheless remains that "Suarez
has put on record with a master's hand the existence of a
necessary human society transcending the boundaries oi
states,8 the indispensableness of rules for that society, the
insufficiency of reason to provide with demonstrative
force all the rules required, and the right of human
society to supply the deficiency by custom enforced as
law, such custom being suitable to nature/'6 And there-
fore, "it is rather remarkable," as Ward notes, "that in
his survey of the writers who preceded him, he (Grotius)
makes no mention of Suarez, the clearest of all those
who had attempted to discuss the law of nature, and the
difference between it and the Law of Nations,"7 although
it is true that Grotius elsewhere8 recognizes in him one
of the greatest theologians and a profound philosopher.

Francisco Suarez was born at Granada on January 5,
1548, not quite a year and a half after the death of that
other scholastic glory of Spain, Franciscus de Victoria.
In 1564 he entered the Society of Jesus at Salamanca,
where he studied philosophy and theology from 1565 to
1570. Ordained to the priesthood in 1572, he taught
successively and most successfully at Avila, Segovia, Val-
ladolid, Rome (15801585), Alcala (1585-1592), Sala-
manca (1592-1597), and finally Coimbra (1597-1616).
He died on September 25, 1617, but in the short space
of twenty-three years (15901613), he wrote and pub-
lished twelve extensive and important works on theo-
logical and philosophical questions, as well as composed
seven other works published posthumously, the last as late
as 1859.

Although there is much of interest from the point of
view of international law in the other works of Suarez,
such as his De bcllo? which constitutes Disputation XIII

298 APPENDIX

of the posthumous treatise De charitate, his complete
legal system is to be found in the De legibus etc Deo
legislator e, published in 1612 (five years before the
author's death) at Coimbra, where he held the chair of
theology in the university. The work is divided into
ten books, of which only the first appears in this volume,
and, as the publishers say, for the first time in Spanish.
It is presumed that the other nine books are to follow.
An idea of the comprehensiveness of the entire work may
be gleaned from the following titles of the ten books :

Book I — On law in general, its nature, causes and

effects.
Book II — On eternal law and natural law and the

law of nations.
Book III — On positive human law in itself, and as

it can be considered in the pure nature

of man, Which law is also called civil

law.

Book IV — On positive canon law.
Book V — On the variety of human laws, and

especially on adverse law.
Book VI — On the interpretation, cessation and

mutation of laws.
Book VII — On unwritten law, which is called

custom.
Book VIII — On favorable human law, or that which

grants privilege.

Book IX — On the old positive divine law.
Book X — On the new divine law.

In 'his discussion of Victoria's influence, the Editor-in-
Chief of the International Law Classics writes : "The
reasons for including Victoria's tractates are sufficiently
set forth by Professor Nys in his introduction, and yet
the general editor is unwilling to allow the volume to go
to press without a tribute in passing to the broadminded
and generous-hearted Dominican, justly regarded as one
of the founders of International Law, and whose two

APPENDIX 299

tractates here reproduced are, as Thucydides would say,
a perpetual possession to the international lawyer. Vic-
toria's claim as a founder of the Law of Nations must
unfortunately be based upon these two readings taken
down by a pupil and published after his death, without
the professor's revision, and in a very summary form.
They are sufficient, however, to show that International
Law is not a thing of our day and generation, or of The
Hague Conferences, nor indeed the creation of Grotius,
but that the system is almost as old as the New World."
Both Suarez and Victoria have appeared in text and
translation in 'The Classics of International Law."

'James Lorimer, "The Institutes of the Law of Nations" (London,
1883), Vol. 1, p. 71.

2Robert Ward, "An Enquiry Into the Foundation and History of
the Law of Nations in Europe" (London, 1795), Vol. 1, p. 16.

'Henry Hallam, "Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the
15th, 16th and 17th Centuries" (London, n. d.), p. 524.

4Cf. Thomas Alfred Walker, "A History of the Law of Nations"
(Cambridge, 1899), Vol. I, p. 330.

5Cf. ibid., p. 156.

"John Westlake, ''Chapters on the Principles of International Law"
(Cambridge, 1894), pp. 27-28.

'Ward, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 614.

"Hugo Grotius, Ep. 154, /. Cordesio.

"This work and relevant portions of the De Legibus will appear
in text and English translation in the Classics ni International Law.

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